




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THE ALABAMA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY



Vol. XXXVI

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Milo B. Howard, Jr., Editor

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LACHLAN MCGILLIVRAY: A SCOT ON THE ALABAMA FRONTIER

by

Mary Ann Oglesby Neeley

Most Alabamians are familiar with Alexander McGillivray, the Creek leader who did so much to help his people maintain their lands in the decade following the American Revolution. His father, Lachlan McGillivray, is less well known except in regard to the glamorized story of his marriage to the half-Indian-half-French girl, Sehoy Marchand. Lachlan was an interesting and influential man in his own time who has been somewhat neglected by historians. Alabama's Albert Pickett discussed Lachlan to some extent, but he did not go into great detail regarding Lachlan's political and business achievements. Both Lachlan and the mother of his children, Sehoy, influenced their son, Alexander. The specifics concerning the parents help to explain the later actions of the offspring.

The traditional story of Lachlan and Sehoy was told by Pickett, and subsequent historians, including Thomas Owen, John Caughey, and Arthur P. Whittaker, have followed his example. The early Alabama historian described Lachlan as the son of wealthy parents of Dunmaglass, Scotland. When he was sixteen, the boy ran away, sailed for Charleston with a shilling in his pocket, the clothes he wore, "a red head, a stout frame, an honest heart, a fearless disposition, and cheerful spirits which seldom became depressed." This dauntless lad, once in Carolina, joined and worked with a band of traders who paid him with a jack knife. Lachlan traded the implement for deerskins which he then bartered in Charleston, and thus launched himself into a career as a trader. The immigrant soon established a trading post in the vicinity of Fort Toulouse, the French enclave at the confluence of the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers in the heart of the Creek country.¹

A few miles above Fort Toulouse, at the Hickory Ground, lived an Indian girl named Sehoy Marchand. Sehoy, according to Pickett, was the daughter of Captain Marchand, a com-

¹Albert J. Pickett, *History of Alabama and Incidentally of Georgia and Mississippi* (1851; rpt. Birmingham: Birmingham Book and Magazine Co., 1962), 342-343.

mander of Fort Toulouse who had been killed during a mutiny of his troops in 1722. The mother of this girl was also named Sehoy and was a member of the powerful, elite Wind Clan.²

Pickett related that the younger Sehoy was sixteen when Lachlan arrived in the Creek land, and was "cheerful in countenance, bewitching in looks, and graceful in form." As her father was a dark-complexioned Frenchman, she did not look light enough for a half-blood. Soon Lachlan and Sehoy "joined their destinies in marriage according to the ceremony of the country." The two lived at Little Tallassee, four miles above Wetumpka, on the east bank of the Coosa, while Lachlan's trading venture, enhanced by his marriage into the Wind Clan, continued to expand.³

So has the romantic story of the parents of Alexander McGillivray been reiterated since Pickett wrote in the early 1850's. Yet, there is some doubt to be cast on the validity of this account. Pickett placed Lachlan's arrival in America in the wrong location, and it was under somewhat different circumstances.

The McGillivray clan was of celtic origin, descended from a warrior named Gillivray whose stronghold had been Dunmaglass. There was a McGillivray at the battle of Culloden who was wounded and ordered killed by Cumberland. It was from the clan seat in Invernesshire, a region strong in Stuart sentiment, that Lachlan came.⁴ Pickett was correct in stating this, but the South Carolina colony was not the young immigrant's port of entry.

The new colony to the south of Carolina, Georgia, was having problems. Following its settlement in 1733, the Trustees discovered that some of the "useful poor" from England were inclined to be "useless" in the New World, so they determined to send over some Scottish Highlanders and persecuted Germans. To procure the necessary Highlanders, Lieutenant Hugh McKay and Captain George Dunbar were commissioned to recruit the prescribed number of one hundred and fifty men, women, and children. These people were enlisted in the vicinity

²*Ibid.*, 343.

³*Ibid.*, 343, 344.

⁴Thomas Innes, ed., *The Scottish Tartans* (London: Johnston and Bacon, 1969), 68.

of Inverness. Some who signed for the voyage paid their own passage and that of their servants; some went as indentured servants to the Trust. In all, one hundred and sixty-three persons sailed on the *Prince of Wales* from Inverness, October 20, 1735. On board were three McGillivrays: Archibald, Farquar, and Lachlan.⁵

The ship arrived in Tybee Roads off Savannah on January 10, 1736. Only one of the McGillivrays was a paying passenger: Archibald was fifteen and had a grant of fifty acres. Farquar and Lachlan were not so fortunate. Farquar, age thirty, came as a servant of J. Cuthbert, and Lachlan, sixteen, was the servant of "Jo. Machintosh, Holmes' son." Apparently, Jo. left the Georgia colony to settle in Carolina in December, 1740.⁶ It is possible that Lachlan continued into Carolina with Mackintosh and from there began his life as a trader.

Thomas Woodward in his *Reminiscences* asserted that Lachlan was given his start in the Indian trade by Malcolm McPherson, and that McGillivray came into the Creek country in the company of John Tate and Daniel McDonald. By his own account, Lachlan received an Indian trading license from South Carolina in 1744 for commerce with the Upper Creeks.⁷

Among the Creeks, Lachlan met the Indian, Sehoy, who already had a daughter by McPherson. The girl did have "powerful connections" through her clan, but there is reason to doubt that she was half-French. Woodward flatly denied her white blood, asserting that she was a full-blooded Tuskegee woman. J. D. Driesbach in his letters to Lyman Draper also said that Sehoy was a Tuskegee woman of non-mixed blood. Some credence may be given these accounts as there may never

⁵Allen D. Candler, ed., *Colonial Records of the State of Georgia* (Atlanta: Franklin-Turner Co., 1905), III, 387 (Hereafter referred to as Col. Rec. Ga.); John Patterson MacLean, *An Historical Account of the Settlement of Scotch Highlanders in America* (Cleveland: Helman-Taylor Co., 1900), 150-151; E. Merton Coulter and Albert B. Saye, eds., *A List of the Early Settlers of Georgia* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1949), 83.

⁶MacLean, *Historical Account*, 151; Coulter and Saye, eds., *A List of Early Settlers*, 83, 85.

⁷Thomas Woodward, *Reminiscences of the Creek or Muskoghe Indians* (1859; rpt. Mobile: Southern University Press, 1865), 52; William L. McDowell, Jr., ed., *Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs, May 21, 1750-August 7, 1754* (Columbia: South Carolina Archives Department, 1958). 518 (Hereafter referred to as Col. Rec. S.C.).

have been a Marchand serving as commander at Toulouse. There was a Captain Marchand de Courcelle stationed at Mobile, and it was from his detachment that troops for Toulouse were selected. This man, however, was still being mentioned in records of the Mobile colony ten years after the mutiny at the fort.⁸

Lachlan and Sehoj established a relationship from which three children survived childhood: Jeannet, Sophia, and Alexander. The trader built a home and planted an apple orchard at Little Tallassee, a few miles up the Coosa River from Otciapofa (the Hickory Ground).⁹

McGillivray's career as a trader continued, and a 1750 South Carolina list of licensed Creek traders included his name. He demonstrated his usefulness to the colonial government in various ways during the years. In 1751, he wrote to the South Carolinian, William Pinckney, that the oft-mentioned rumors of Creek-Cherokee hostilities were becoming a reality as the Creeks had killed seven or eight Cherokees and were searching for others. McGillivray labeled the Cherokees the aggressors for their killing of some Creeks the previous summer.¹⁰

The trader then reported on the re-building and strengthening of the French Fort Toulouse. Built in 1717 as a trading center and an advanced outpost in the French-English rivalry for the control of the continent, the fort was not a fortification designed for either offensive or defensive action against the Indians. The natives, in their efforts to insure their lands and well-being, shifted their favors from one European power to another. Their invitation to the French to establish the fort was an example of this strategy. In 1751, the French renovated the fort in their continuing exertions to influence the Creeks,

⁸Woodward *Reminiscences*, 53-54; J. D. Driesbach to Lyman Draper, Draper Manuscripts, Series V, Vol. I, p. 1, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. (Microfilm in possession of Dr. F. L. Owsley, Jr., Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama); John Stuart to George Germaine, Oct. 6, 1777, PRO, CO 5/79, p. 61 (Microfilm, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.); Daniel H. Thomas, "Fort Toulouse," *Alabama Historical Quarterly*, XXII (1960), 160.

⁹Pickett, *History of Alabama*, 345; John R. Swanton, *Early History of the Creek Indians and Their Neighbors* (1922; rpt. New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1970), 242.

¹⁰McDowell, ed., *Col. Rec. S.C.*, 129; Lachlan McGillivray to William Pinckney, Dec. 18, 1751, in *ibid.*, 215-216.

and as English-French antagonisms steadily increased. Lachlan wrote that

The French at the Allebawmaw have completed their fort which is a pretty strong one; they have a boat come up lately deep loaded with a Priest, Popery, and Brandy. . . . Lachlan went on to relate that the head men of the Upper and Lower Creeks had been invited to Mobile to receive presents. He also reported hearing that "a great Number of Men arrived lately at Mobile (supposed to be Soldiers) which gives the Indians a good deal of Umbrage."¹¹

It is evident that Lachlan was acting not only as a trader, but also as an observer and representative of the colonial administration. The Creek-Cherokee hostilities continued, and in 1753, Governor James Glen of South Carolina instigated moves to end the troubles. At a conference in Charleston, Lachlan acted as interpreter for the Creeks. In 1754, he reported to Glen on the success of the peace mediations.

The Peace you made between this Nation Creek and the Cherokees shews a very promising aspect for last winter they met in the hunting ground, eat, drank, and smoaked together, and a few days ago there was several Head Men and Warriors set out from this Nation for the Cherokees in order to confirm the Peace.¹²

The South Carolina governor was informed in the same letter that there was some difficulty between the Creeks and the Choctaws. McGillivray illustrated one of the aspects of European tactics in North America with his explanation that the French were "endeavoring to make up the Breach but I hope they will not succeed." The English often pursued a policy of encouraging Indian tribal hostilities as this tended to divert the natives' animosities from themselves. The French, though, frequently encouraged peace between the tribes. Too, in 1754, the French needed Creek allies other than those living in the immediate Fort Toulouse area. The Scottish trader in his

¹¹McGillivray to Pinckney, Dec. 18, 1751, in McDowell, ed., *Col. Rec. S. C.*, 216; Thomas, "Fort Toulouse," 141-152; Bienville, "Memoir on Louisiana," in Dunbar Rowland and Albert G. Sanders, eds., *Mississippi Provincial Archives, 1704-1743, French Dominion* (Jackson: Press of Mississippi Department of Archives and History, 1932), 512.

¹²McDowell, ed., *Col. Rec. S.C.*, 388; Lachlan McGillivray to Gov. James Glen, April 14, 1754, in *ibid.*, 501-502.

letter to Glen exemplified the English approach. It was expedient that there be peace between the Creeks and Cherokees, who were English allies, but it was not an urgent matter that the Creeks and Choctaws, who were strongly Francophile, be on friendly terms.¹³

In 1754, McGillivray protested the South Carolina Council's granting a trading license in some of his towns to another trader. In stating his case, the petitioner pointed out that

he gave no cause of complaint to the Indians or his fellow traders and kept the Indians of his Towns in good Order and well affected to this Government, and that he has upon all Occasions exerted himself in the Indian Nation for the publick Good even to the Neglect and Detriment of his own Business is a fact well known to all the Traders in that Nation. . . .

Lachlan reminded the officials of his work as linguist for which he received no reward and that the reason he was not in town in June to re-apply for his license was that he was on public business. One of the towns whose license he lost was his own home, "Weetomkee, Old Town, alias Little Tallassee." The council, on consideration of the petition, withdrew the other trader's permit and in doing so reinstated McGillivray's.¹⁴

During the French and Indian War, McGillivray took part in various efforts to thwart French designs. He wrote Governor William Lyttleton of South Carolina in 1758 that the Upper Creeks had proposed an expedition against a French fort on the Mississippi. The trader had forwarded powder and ball to aid the Indians in their mission.¹⁵ In 1763, the English worries concerning the French in America ended with the defeat of the latter and their withdrawal from the continent. McGillivray's affairs prospered as he rose to further prominence among the traders.

In 1775, James Adair, a trader to the Chickasaws, dedicated his *The History of the American Indian* to Lachlan

¹³McGillivray to Glen, April 14, 1754, in McDowell, ed., *Col. Rec. S.C.*, 502; John E. Alden, *John Stuart and the Southern Frontier* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1944), 30-31.

¹⁴McDowell, ed., *Col. Rec. S.C.*, 518.

¹⁵McGillivray to Sir William Henry Lyttleton, July 13, 1758, Lyttleton Papers, 1756-1760, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan (Xeroxed copies in possession of author).

McGillivray, George Croghan, and George Galphin; all three men were active on the frontier. Adair lauded them for

Your distinguished abilities — your acquaintance with the North American Indian language, rites and customs — your long application and service in the dangerous sphere of an Indian life and your successful management of the savage natives. . . .¹⁶

The author described Lachlan McGillivray as "humane and intelligent" and acclaimed both Galphin and Lachlan as "sensible, public-spirited, and judicious." He credited the traders with keeping the Creeks from joining the Cherokees in their attacks on the English in 1760-1761. In recommending either McGillivray or Galphin for the position of Indian superintendent, Adair stated that no one had as much influence with the dangerous "Muskoghe" as they.¹⁷ Although Lachlan was never appointed to the office, his influence and esteem among the traders are attested to be Adair's proposal.

McGillivray did not confine his activities to those of a trader, nor did he spend his whole time in the Indian Country. In 1749, as a resident of Augusta, he petitioned the Council of Georgia for one hundred acres of land on which he proposed to build a grist mill; the request was granted. Lachlan continued to ask for grants and usually received what he desired. In 1755, he was granted a lot in Hardwicke, and in 1756, five hundred acres on the Little Ogeechee River. From 1756 to 1762, he was the recipient of eight lots (some in Savannah and some in Augusta) and over seven thousand acres of land. In January, 1761, he stated that he owned forty-nine slaves.¹⁸

The trader-planter was recognized as a prominent citizen in the Georgia colony by various appointments to public office. In March, 1757, he became justice of the peace for the districts of Halifax and Augusta; on November 7, 1768, the Council of Georgia elected him as a member of the General Assembly for Halifax and Parish St. George. He was named commissioner

¹⁶Samuel Cole Williams, ed., *Adair's History of the American Indian* (Nashville: National Society of Colonial Dames of America in Tennessee, 1953), xxxiii.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 299, 393.

¹⁸Candler, ed., *Col. Rec. Ga.*, VI, 294; VII, 347, 344; Silas Emmett Lucas, Jr., *Index to the Headright and Bounty Grants of Georgia* (Vidalia, Ga.: Georgia Genealogical Reprints, 1970), n.p.; Candler, ed., *Col. Rec. Ga.*, VIII, 460-461.

of roads for Northwest Road "as far as Christ Church extends" on June 29, 1780.¹⁹

As the colonies moved toward a break with Great Britain and revolution, many Scots in America retained their loyalty to the Crown while others followed the course of the patriots. Lachlan took the path of the loyalists. In 1774, he signed a petition objecting to the method used for drawing up resolutions by "pretended advocates for liberties in America." In all the colonies at this time, non-mercantile elements were trying to "drive a reluctant minority of merchants into a sacrifice of trading interests for a good desired only by the former."²⁰ Lachlan McGillivray was not willing to destroy his ties with the British Empire.

Because of his pro-English sympathies, Lachlan was treated severely by the Georgians at the close of the war. The executive Council ordered his property appraised on June 19, 1783, and on June 24, 1783, the property was ordered sold. On July 15, the House of Assembly requested the governor to send to the executives and legislatures of all the states a list of persons issued with an Act of Attainder, Banishment, and Confiscation. Lachlan's name was fourth on this list which was headed by James Wright, the former royal governor. Besides banishment, Lachlan lost an estimated \$100,000 in property. At the fall of Savannah and the departure of the British, McGillivray went back to Scotland and was living in Dunmaglas as late as 1799.²¹

¹⁹Candler, ed., *Col. Rec. Ga.*, VII, 505; X, 646; Lilla M. Hawes, ed., *Collection of Georgia Historical Society* (Savannah: Georgia Historical Society, 1952), X, 112.

²⁰George Gillman Smith, *The Story of Georgia: 1732-1860* (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1968), 224; George White, *Historical Collections of Georgia* (1855; rpt. Danielsville, Ga.: Heritage Paper, 1968), 48-49; Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution: 1763-1776* (New York: Frederick Unger Publishing Co., 1957), 6.

²¹Allen D. Candler, ed., *The Revolutionary Records of Georgia* (Atlanta: Franklin-Turner Co., 1908), 506-507; Georgia Statutory Laws, Record of the States, Ga. B2, July 15, 1783, n.p. (Microfilm, Ralph B. Draughon Library, Auburn University, Auburn, Ala.); Arthur Preston Whitaker, "Alexander McGillivray, 1783-1789, 1789-1793," *North Carolina Historical Review*, V (1928), 181; Pickett, *History of Alabama*, 419; John Innerarity to William Panton, March 12, 1799, in Marie Taylor, "William Panton," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XIV (1935), 118.

Although he did not take his family to Scotland with him, Lachlan had made some provisions for his son through the years. In 1759 and 1762, he requested and received grants of land for Alexander in Georgia. Thomas Woodward did not think that Alexander was literate, but a magazine of 1790 claimed that the elder McGillivray had the younger educated in Charleston and Savannah. Pickett and Woodward differ as to the circumstances and whereabouts of his children at the time of the last battle of Savannah. Woodward stated that Lachlan left the Creek Nation with Sophia and Alexander, but he was forced to send them back in the custody of a slave because of the American strength around the beleaguered town. Pickett states that Sophia, who was married and had a son, was in the city with her father during the siege. Alexander was, by this time, a British agent among the Creeks and participating in Indian assaults on the Georgia frontier settlements. It is, therefore, unlikely that he was sent back to the Indian country in the care of his father's slaves. He was an independent young man engaged in activities of his own.²²

Lachlan McGillivray, during his years among the Indians, developed an understanding of the problems confronting the natives because of their contact with the whites. One of the most serious of these was the use of hard liquor by the tribes. A contemporary author, Alexander Hewatt, commenting on the decreasing Indian population, blamed it on reduction of hunting grounds, European encouragement of tribal animosities, smallpox, the Indian slave trade, and, most fatally, the introduction of "spiritous liquors." Lachlan, too, thought liquor very damaging to the natives. In a letter to Governor Glen in 1754, McGillivray wrote

The Indians are well affected and a general peace and Quietness resides among them, excepting what Disturbances is occasioned by immoderate Quantities of Rum brought among them. Which is a stop put to, would very

²²Candler, ed., *Col. Rec. Ga.*, VIII, 123-124, 647; *The Universal Asylum and Columbin Magazine*, Sept., 1790, William Augustus Bowles File, Albert J. Pickett MSS. Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, Ala.; Woodward, *Reminiscences*, 53; Pickett, *History of Alabama*, 418; Mary Ann Neeley, "Alexander McGillivray, Diplomatic Leader of the Creeks: 1783-1793 (unpublished Master's thesis, Auburn University, 1973), 25, 28-29, 33.

much contribute towards a good Harmony among the Indians.²³

In a letter to Governor Lyttleton in 1759, McGillivray reported on the deaths of several of the Chickasaws "of small-pox owing to an immoderate use of spiritous liquors, bathing in cold water and drinking freely thereof."²⁴

The frontier Indian traders were a hardy breed, looking for personal gain and achievement but with an interest in the Indians as a people to be both exploited and loved. Lachlan McGillivray was one of these who gained importance in the development of the Alabama-Georgia frontier. It is detracting from the real personality and character of the man to associate him only in regards to an Indian love affair and the accomplishments of his son. The older McGillivray, through his astuteness in dealing with both the natives and the whites, accrued money and status. Because of his loyalty to the English Crown, he lost not only these but his family as well. His willingness to sacrifice his life's work because of his beliefs speaks for the character of this man who arrived in America as an indentured servant.

²³Alexander Hewatt, *An Historical Account of the Rise and Progress of the Colonies of South Carolina and Georgia* (1779; facsimile rpt. Spartenburg: The Reprint Company, 1962), II, 272-279; McGillivray to Glen, April 14, 1754 in McDowell, ed., *Col. Rec. S.C.*, 501-502.

²⁴McGillivray to Lyttleton, May 15, 1759, Lyttleton Papers.

ALABAMA TOWN PRODUCTION DURING THE ERA OF GOOD FEELINGS

by

Stuart Seely Sprague

The successful conclusion of the War of 1812 triggered the first town promotion boom in America. The battles of The Thames and Horseshoe Bend made large areas of the Old West safe for settlement. Though most of this land was sold by the acre, a growing number of enterprising men, varying from individual farmers to bands of experienced speculators, saw the advantage of buying land by the square mile, platting it, and selling it in small sections as town lots and out lots. This was a national movement, yet its Alabama manifestations have been all but overlooked.

From 1815 to 1819 a bubble of economic optimism remained unbroken. The idea of a city rising out of the wilderness did not seem far fetched to a generation that has seen Pittsburgh, Lexington, Cincinnati, Louisville and St. Louis do just that. A sizeable number of the known new towns were platted in the South. The proportion would be even higher if runs of Southern newspapers of the period, the prime source of such information, were as full as that of Northern papers. Yet despite these gaps one can say confidently that of the four states and territories in which the planning of would-be cities was most noticeable, two were Southern: Kentucky¹ and Alabama.

It was the *Mobile Gazette* that carried the poem that best epitomized the spirit of the get rich quick, instant city mania:²

SOUTHERN SPECULATIONS

What own a city! you exclaim,
Yes own the spot, that's just the same,

¹For Kentucky see Stuart Seely Sprague, "Town Making in the Era of Good Feelings: Kentucky 1814-1820," *The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society* (forthcoming).

²*Mobile Gazette* quoted in the *Dayton Ohio Watchman*, June 11, 1818, verses 4-6, 8, 10, 12.

On which the place must stand;
For if on maps its once laid down,
It is a genuine a town,
As any in the land.

Town-making, now is quite a trade,
Of which the rules are ready made,
For those who stand in need;
Thus when a sport is intended,
If these ingredients be blended,
It cannot but succeed.

First choose an elevated bluff,
Just where the river's deep enough,
For ships of larger mould;
(If there should be a bar below,
O'er which the vessels cannot go,
The fact need not be told).

The most important point perhaps,
Lies in the drawing of the maps;
The painter there must try
By mingling yellow, red and green,
To make the most delightful scene,
That ever met the eye.

Of this obscure spot you may swear,
There never was a purer air,
And if your not believed,
At least your not belied,
For none can prove that men have *died*,
Where no man ever lived.

'Tis when the rage is at its height,
That knowing ones will quit the site,
Whilst those that stop behind,
Of this desertion can't complain,
For what they lose in wealth they gain
In knowledge of mankind.

That this poem originated in Alabama and was picked up by an Ohio paper indicates not only the extent of instant city

boosting in both places, but also the similarity of the system throughout the country.

Alabama's new towns, as a group, were better advertised than any other set of would-be cities.³ When the *Philadelphia Union* devoted nearly a page and a half to new towns, fully five out of the fourteen were Alabama paper towns. Four out of the dozen known Alabama towns located in the press achieved urban status (census definition 2500 inhabitants): Florence 34,031; Athens 14,360; Demopolis 7,651 and Marion 4,289.⁴ Only Kentucky can come close to comparing with the territory in the success of its would-be cities.

The Muscle Shoals became a focal point for town promotion. BAINBRIDGE lay "immediately at the foot of the Muscle Shoals, on the South side of the Tennessee River."⁵ Perhaps anticipating the competition of its neighbor, the speculators promoting FLORENCE on the other side of the river spoke of "the usual channel for large boats" being on the northern side, "that towards the southern bank being too shallow." Those backing Florence proclaimed that "Florence lies just below the last of that long series of rapids or shallows, constituting the Muscle Shoals. This, therefore, is, and must be the head of steam-boat navigation." Not content with bragging about Florence's location, the promoters spoke of the town plat — the two main streets were 115 feet wide, other streets 99 feet wide, all lots were corner lots and of almost half an acre each; land had been donated for a college, female seminary, a public walk or pleasure ground, a jail, a court house and a market. Other advantages, real or imagined, included the expectation of an extensive armory and cannon foundery nearby and the passage of the Nashville to New Orleans military road

³Some individual cities were in Indiana and Kentucky, but taken as a whole, Alabama towns were more widely advertised. This may well be because its immigrant flow came from Georgia and Tennessee.

⁴*Nashville* (Tennessee) *Clarion* January 26, 1819, trustees J. R. Bedford, James Bright, Michael Byrd, for Marion. The other towns are discussed below.

⁵*Ibid.*, January 12, 1819 and also *Knoxville* (Tennessee) *Register* January 26, 1819, Ro. Weakley, T. Saunders, Jonathan Donelson, Jr., R. P. Currin, Charles Boyles, L. J. Gist, B. Reese, proprietors.

through town.⁶ The advertising blitz paid off as 284 lots brought \$226,000.⁷

Florence's most serious rival was HAVANNAH. This paper town was advertised not only in the *Huntsville Alabama Republican* but also in the *Nashville Clarion*, *Lexington Reporter*, *Louisville Western Courier* and *Pittsburgh Gazette*. "Of all of the sites for towns," wrote the not disinterested trustees, ". . . the town of Havannah has incomparably the highest claim to precedence in a commercial point of view." The town, like Florence, was located on the north side of the Tennessee River and nine miles from its more successful rival.⁸ Not too far away was COURTLAND, a paper town that aspired no higher than to become a county seat.⁹

If one analyzes advertisements for new towns in Alabama, two things became apparent: certain individuals were involved in more than a single speculation and the press of Tennessee and Georgia was depended upon as outlets in which to advertise the would-be cities. ALABAMA, located "only ten miles by land to the junction of the Coosa and Talapoosa," had eleven proprietors. Four gave Milledgeville, Georgia as their address, four Nashville, and three Madison County, Mississippi Territory. Both the geographical spread of the proprietors and the fact that two of them, namely James Jackson and Thomas Bibb,

⁶*Nashville* (Tennessee) *Clarion* May 19, 1818, *Lexington, Kentucky Reporter* June 3, 1818; *Louisville* (Kentucky) *Public Advertiser* July 21, 1818, all contained Florence information. Trustees listed as Leroy Pope, Thomas Bibb, John Coffee, James Jackson, J. Childress, Dabney Morriss, J. McKinley.

⁷*Canton Ohio Repository* September 18, 1818, quoting the *Washington, D. C. National Intelligencer*; John Bach McMaster *A History of the People of the United States from the Revolution to the Civil War* (New York, 1883-1913) IV, 396.

⁸*Lexington, Kentucky Reporter* July 22, 1818, *Nashville* (Tennessee) *Clarion* July 28, 1818, *Pittsburgh* (Pennsylvania) *Gazette* August 7, 1818, and scheduled to be advertised in the *Huntsville Alabama Republican*, *Louisville, Kentucky Western Courier*. E. J. Bailey, George Coulter, Hugh Campbell, Samuel Ragsdale, Joseph Farmer, trustees.

⁹*Nashville* (Tennessee) *Clarion* October 6, 1818. William H. Whitaker, James W. Camp, John M. Tilford, Joseph Farmer (name also listed for Havannah), Benjamin Thomas, William F. Broadax, Bernard M. Kiernan, trustees.

were later associated with promoting Florence are instructive.¹⁰ The same strong ties to Tennessee and Georgia can be seen in the choices J. S. Walker made in selecting newspapers in which to advertise his COOSAWDA.¹¹ The promoters of both the towns of Alabama and Coosawda believed that a city would grow up not far from the junction of the Coosa and Talapoosa.

The name of James Jackson appears in association with COTTON-PORT and ATHENS as well as ALABAMA and FLORENCE. Cotton Port, not to be confused with Cotton Gin Port at the head of navigation on the Tombigbee, was located "on the west bank of Limestone river, one mile above its junction with the Tennessee." Of its four trustees, two were associated with Florence as well. James Jackson and Jonathan Coffee.¹² ATHENS, though not having a Florence man for commissioner, was indirectly associated with James Jackson. The advertisement in the *Clarion* announced that the plan "may be seen at the counting room of James Jackson & Company, Nashville."¹³ In as much as much of Alabama was settled by Georgians and Tennesseans, it should not be that surprising that individuals and newspapers from those states should play such a prominent role in advertising Alabama's paper towns. DEMOPOLIS is a case in point being advertised in the *Knoxville Register*, *Nashville Gazette*, *Murfreesborough Courier*, *Milledgeville Georgia Journal* as well as the *Tuskaloosa Republican*, *Huntsville Alabama Republican* and *Mobile Gazette*.¹⁴

The established port of Mobile was challenged by BLAKE-LY. Though the booster press was quite uncommon in this first round of town promotion, Mobile's rival published the *Blakely Sun*. Its 1818 boast that whereas "one year ago, there

¹⁰*Ibid.*, September 2, 1817. Milledgeville proprietors John Scott, Z. Lamar, Charles Williamson, William D. Stone; Nashville proprietors A. P. Hayne, Jonathan Donelson (see also Bainbridge listing), William E. Butler, James Jackson (see also Florence and Cotton Port proprietors); Madison County, Mississippi Territory proprietors James Manning, Thomas Bibb (see also Florence), Waddy Tate.

¹¹*Knoxville* (Tennessee) *Register* July 20, 1819, to be advertised in the *Nashville* (Tennessee) *Whig*, *Augusta* (Georgia) *Journal*, *Milledgeville Georgia Journal*.

¹²Philadelphia *The Union* August 8, 1818. Trustees Jonathan Coffee, James Jackson, John Bahan, James Bright.

¹³*Nashville* (Tennessee) *Clarion* April 28, 1818. Robert Beaty and John D. Carriel, Commissioners.

¹⁴*Knoxville* (Tennessee) *Register* August 24, 1818.

was but one house," now there are one hundred was reprinted as far away as Ohio.¹⁵ Another ambitious promotion was that of Cahawba or CAHABA as it was spelled in the Eastern press. According to its backers, Cahawba "will, probably be the seat of government for the state of Alabama." This dream was fulfilled until 1825 when Tuscaloosa captured the prize.¹⁶ Not all newly promoted towns aspired to grandeur. CANTON and COURTLAND were relatively unambitious. The proprietors of the latter were "convinced that the seat of justice for the county of Lawrence, will unquestionably be located at Courtland."¹⁷ The trustees were overly optimistic as another town received the honor. Courtland, despite the fact that a railroad later ran through it, never achieved urban status, clinging on for life with a population of less than a thousand.

Neither in John W. Rep's *The Making of Urban America: A History of City Planning in the United States* nor in his companion volume *Town Planning in Frontier America* is there a treatment of Alabama's new towns. Likewise though Thomas Perkins Abernethy's *The Formative Period in Alabama, 1815-1828* contains a section entitled "The Immigrants," and his *The South in the New Nations 1789-1819* also covers the 1815-1819 period, neither volume covers in any detail, Alabama's new towns. The number and relative success of new towns within the territory indicates that at least in the case of Alabama, the South had greater urban aspirations than historians have heretofore credited the section. The immigrants and the speculators envisioned a state with towns and cities as well as farms and plantations.

¹⁵Dayton *Ohio Watchman* December 10, 1818. See also McMaster, *History of the People* IV, 395-396.

¹⁶Philadelphia *The Union* August 8, 1818; Thomas Perkins Abernethy, *The Formative Period in Alabama, 1815-1828* (University, Alabama, 1965), 53, 55, 137.

¹⁷For Canton, East of the Alabama River see *Knoxville (Tennessee) Register* February 9, 1819. For Courtland see *Nashville (Tennessee) Clarion* October 6, 1818. William H. Whitaker, James W. Camp, John M. Tilford, Joseph Farmer, Benjamin Thomas, William F. Broadax, Bernard M. Kiernan, trustees.

JOHN ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL AND THE HAMPTON'S ROADS CONFERENCE QUIXOTIC DIPLOMACY, 1865

by

Paul J. Zingg

By February, 1865, Confederate hopes for victory had all but vanished. Although the spring campaigns had not yet commenced, Grant's near-encirclement of Petersburg and Sherman's march into the Carolinas portended the inevitable collapse of Southern resistance. Yet for three rebels, the times warranted not the further prosecution of war but the final search for a negotiated peace. Commissioned by executive order of Jefferson Davis, Alexander H. Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and John Archibald Campbell journeyed to Hampton Roads, Virginia, to undertake an informal interview with official representatives of the United States government upon "the issues involved in the war existing, with a view of securing peace to the two countries."¹

On board the Union steamer *River Queen* anchored off Old Point Comfort, Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of State William H. Seward awaited the Southern commissioners. Neither party was unfamiliar with the subtleties of intersectional diplomacy. Although the conference at Hampton Roads would prove to be an important and dramatic encounter between pacific-minded representatives from the North and South, it was hardly the first such meeting. The abortive Crawford-Forsythe-Roman mission in March and April of 1861 had discouraged formal Southern contacts with the Union until the last full year of the war.² Yet, individuals on both sides

¹Instructions of Jefferson Davis to the Peace Commissioners (January, 1865), in John Archibald Campbell, *Reminiscences and Documents Relating to the Civil War During the Year 1865* (Baltimore: John Murray and Co., 1887), 4.

²The mission of Martin J. Crawford of Georgia, John Forsythe of Alabama and A. S. Roman of Louisiana represented the first official diplomatic act of the Confederacy. The Commissioners arrived in Washington on March 5, the day after the inauguration of Lincoln, and petitioned both the President and Secretary Seward for interviews. Their demands for immediate recognition of the Confederate States went unheeded. Although they exchanged notes with Seward, the Southerners were never accorded a formal interview. The ministers returned to the South soon after the outbreak of hostilities at Fort Sumter.

³Greeley to Lincoln, July 7, 1864, in Edward C. Kirkland, *The Peacemakers of 1864* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), 76.

of the Mason-Dixon line undertook numerous private peace missions, watched closely by authorities in Washington and Richmond.

Responsibility for the particular initiative which led directly to Hampton Roads lay with several sources. Horace Greely, editor of the New York *Tribune*, particularly urged Lincoln to grasp any opportunities for peace. "Our bleeding, bankrupt, almost dying country longs for peace," he wrote the President in the summer, 1864.⁴ Greely soon obtained a special presidential commission to convey a declaration of Washington's conditions for peace to a wholly unaccredited delegation of Southerners in Niagara, Canada. Although the Niagara Conference of July, 1864, dissolved almost before it began, it did serve as the vehicle by which Lincoln formally announced his requisites for peace and his personal willingness to meet and discuss the terms "with any authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States."⁵ Although private peace efforts continued, the presidential offer went virtually unheeded until January, 1865.⁵

John Archibald Campbell claimed that his correspondence with the Supreme Court Justice Samuel Nelson in December,

⁴Lincoln to "To Whom It May Concern," July 18, 1864, in Roy P. Basler, Ed., *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953), VII, 451. Lincoln's terms included "... the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery." The President's public letter is particularly noteworthy because he formally announced that Southern acceptance of the Federal emancipation program was a requisite for peace.

⁵Among the more notable of the private peace inquiries which continued during the latter days of the war were: the informal negotiations of James F. Jacquess and James R. Gilmore with Jefferson Davis, July, 1864; the Peoria and Springfield conventions, August, 1864; the unofficial discussions between United States Ambassador to Great Britain Charles Francis Adams and Tennessean Thomas Yeatman early 1864; and the Toronto meetings between Jeremiah S. Black and Jacob Thompson, August, 1864. For details, see: Harriet Chappel Owsley, "Peace and the Presidential Election of 1864," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly*, XVIII (March, 1959), 3-19; Clament A. Evans, *Confederate Military History* (Atlanta: Confederate Publishing Co., 1899), I, 477-459; Harlan H. Horner, *Lincoln and Greeley* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953); Horace Greeley, *The American Conflict* (Hartford: D. D. Cass and Co., 1886), II; and Kirkland, *The Peacemakers of 1864*. Brief sketches of these events can be found conveniently in J. G. Randall and David Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, Second Edition (Lexington: D. C. Heath and Co., 1969).

1864, led directly to the Hampton Roads conference. In mid-December Campbell inquired "whether anything could be effected for the amelioration of the conditions which it [the war] has occasioned."⁶ Campbell admitted that his inquiry was completely unofficial; his objective was "simply to promote an interchange of views and opinions which might be productive of good, and scarcely do harm." Nelson forwarded the letter to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, "who expressed satisfaction with it," but sent no reply to Campbell.⁷

The private activities of Greely, Campbell, and others certainly demonstrated a genuine, non-partisan drive for peace. The example of such efforts and the subtle pressures for peace which they brought to bear on Lincoln moved the President to express publicly his receptivity to legitimate Southern overtures.

Perhaps in the final analysis, though, the peace conference that convened at Hampton Roads was due less to individual initiative than to general public demand. The imminent collapse of the Confederacy and the overall national exhaustion relative to the war effort by December, 1864-January, 1865, doubtless placed peace negotiations in a more favorable light as a viable alternative to the war's continuation. Though conditions prevailed which by themselves were most conducive to serious peace efforts, enterprising individuals both North and South provided the final energy which placed the peace forces on the road to the Virginia conference.

In late December, 1864, Francis P. Blair, Sr., a Maryland gentleman and the father of a Brigadier General under Sherman's command, received a *carte blanche* pass from Lincoln "to . . . go South, and return."⁸ Although Lincoln denied Blair's right "to speak for the United States government," it is inconceivable that the President was wholly unaware — as he later affirmed — of the purpose and destination of Blair's

⁶Campbell to Nelson, December, 1864, in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, XVI (January, 1865), 7-8. Campbell sent a copy of this letter to George Munford, Secretary of the Society.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸Campbell to Justice Benjamin Curtis, July 20, 1865, in *Century Magazine*, XXXVIII, New Series XVI (October, 1889), 950-954.

⁹Lincoln to Blair, December 28, 1864, in Basler, *Lincoln*, VIII, 188.

trip.¹⁰ Blair traveled to Richmond where he immediately secured an interview with Jefferson Davis.

In a private conference with the Southern Chief Executive, Blair outlined a wholly incredible proposal for peace. Essentially Blair suggested that a "secret military convention" be formed between the North and the South in order to prevent the establishment of the projected French empire in Mexico and to maintain the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. The proposed alliance would temporarily suspend hostilities between the Union and the Confederacy. With attentions diverted to the elimination of the mutual French threat, statesmen might negotiate the outstanding sectional problems and extend the temporary truce into a permanent peace.¹¹

As preposterous as Blair's proposal may have seemed, it had a familiar ring. In early spring, 1861, while searching for an alternative to prevent war, Seward had proposed essentially the same plan to Lincoln.¹² The possibility of a connection between the two plans, remote though it may be, raises some intriguing questions. Did the Seward plan — a plan generally dismissed as momentary, though inexplicable, fantasy of the Secretary of State — receive serious consideration? If Blair did speak for the Administration, an impression which he certainly conveyed to Davis, did he reveal some innate expansionary tendencies of the Lincoln government? And finally, did Lincoln's attendance at Hampton Roads and Seward's evident interest in the plan during the conference indicate an endorsement of the plan?

¹⁰Lincoln to the House of Representatives, February 10, 1865, in United States War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series I, XLVI, I, 506.

¹¹The Confederate representatives at Hampton Roads have included discussions of the Blair proposal in their accounts of the conference. These include: Campbell, *Reminiscences*; Stephens, *A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States* (Philadelphia: National Publishing Co., 1870), II, 589-622; Hunter, "The Peace Commission of 1865," *SHSP*, III, (April, 1877), 168-176.

¹²Seward proposed that the United States government demand explanations from France, Great Britain, Russia, and Spain concerning their intentions in the Western Hemisphere. The memorandum, appropriately enough introduced to the Lincoln cabinet on April Fool's Day, sought a congressional declaration of war if satisfactory explanations were not forthcoming.

¹³Campbell to Curtis (July 20, 1865), in *Century Magazine*, 952.

The available evidence seems to refute any formal Federal ratification of the Mexico invasion scheme. During the conference Lincoln clearly disassociated his government from any of the Blair proposals; and Campbell noted that within five minutes after the meeting began the Confederates learned that Blair's revelations to Davis "were a delusion." The significance of the Blair plan lies in its pitiful attractiveness to the South — the same attractiveness, Fitzhugh Lee analogized, as that of "a straw that a drowning man is always authorized to seize."¹⁴

The Blair-Davis interview concluded with the Confederate President's assurances of his willingness "to enter into negotiations for the restoration of peace . . . to the two countries."¹⁵ Blair departed Richmond and met with Lincoln in Washington on January 18. The President reiterated his readiness "to receive any agent whom he [Davis], or any other influential person now resisting the national authority, may informally send to me with the view of securing peace to the people of our one common country."¹⁶ It is, of course, obvious that Davis' "two countries" and Lincoln's "one common country" are the same entity. The Confederate contention of full independence and the Union refusal to recognize that status created diplomatic problems which extended beyond mere semantics. Nevertheless, Blair felt compelled to explain to Davis the identity between his and Lincoln's terms.¹⁷

Lincoln permitted Blair to return to Richmond where he informed Davis of the President's position. Davis acted quickly. He arranged a meeting with Stephens, met his cabinet the following day, and, on January 28, dispatched Stephens, Hunter and Campbell to Hampton Roads.

¹⁴Fitzhugh Lee, "The Failure of the Hampton Conference," *Century Magazine*, LII, New Series XXX (July, 1896), 478.

¹⁵Davis to Blair, January 12, 1865, in Lincoln to the House of Representatives, February 10, 1865, *Official Records*, Series I, XLVI, I, 507.

¹⁶Lincoln to Blair, January 18, 1865, *Ibid.*, 508. The letters of Lincoln and Davis to Blair established the basis upon which the conference rested.

¹⁷Lincoln noted the results of Blair's second conversation with Davis on the back of a copy of the letter which Lincoln had given Blair on January 18. The entry, dated January 28, recorded that Davis understood Blair's explanation concerning the "two countries" and "one common country." See: Lincoln to the House of Representatives, February 10, 1865, in *Official Records*, Series I, XLVI, I, 508; Basler, *Lincoln*, VIII, 276.

The appointments of Stephens and Hunter to the commission were understandable. Vice-President Stephens, despite his well-known animosity towards Davis, held the second highest post in the Confederate government. Nominal leader of the Southern moderates, he opposed secession before the war and encouraged peace missions during it. Neither Davis nor the commissioners expected initially that Lincoln himself would represent the North at Hampton Roads. Stephens' attendance at the conference, however, helped alleviate tensions between the two delegations. He and Lincoln reminisced about associations and incidents for former days and established a tone of cordiality which would extend during the entire four-hour meeting.¹⁸ Notwithstanding the Vice-President's rapport with Lincoln, his presence on the commission demonstrated the apparently late-blooming disposition of Davis to peace efforts and considerable diplomatic sense.¹⁹

R. M. T. Hunter owed his appointment to prior experience in both the United States and Confederate governments. As a former United States Congressman, Speaker of the House, and Senator, he commanded respect from his former Union colleagues. As interim Secretary of State for the Confederacy, July, 1861-March, 1862, he acquired valuable diplomatic experience. His position in the winter of 1865 — Senator and President *pro tempore* of the Confederate upper house — required his presence in Richmond.²⁰ Yet, Davis rejected the advice of Vice-President Stephens to appoint individuals "whose absence from the city would not attract public attention," and dispatched the versatile Hunter to Hampton Roads.²¹

¹⁸See the full accounts of the meeting in: Campbell, *Reminiscences*; Stephens, *A Constitutional View*; and Hunter, "The Peace Commission of 1865," *SHSP*.

¹⁹Works on Stephens include: Rudolph von Abele, *Alexander H. Stephens: A Biography* (New York: 1946); E. Ramsey Richardson, *Little Aleck: A Life of Alexander H. Stephens, The Fighting Vice-President of the Confederacy* (New York: 1932); and two relevant articles by James Z. Rabun, "Alexander H. Stephens and Jefferson Davis," *American Historical Review*, LVIII (1953), 290-321, and "Alexander H. Stephens and the Confederacy," *Emory University Quarterly*, VI (1950), 129-146.

²⁰The only notable biography on Hunter is Henry H. Simms, *The Life of Robert M. T. Hunter: A Study in Sectionalism and Secession* (Richmond: 1935).

²¹Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 593. In all fairness, though, to the prospective Confederate peace delegates, Stephens also noted that they should be "men of ability and discretion." The Southern Vice-President's own choices were Campbell, General Henry L. Benning, ex-Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and Thomas S. Flournoy of Virginia, "a gentleman of distinguished ability and well-known personally to Mr. Lincoln."

The qualifications of the third member of the Southern peace delegation, John Archibald Campbell though more difficult to define, were hardly less impressive than those of his compatriots. Certainly they extended beyond Stephens' simple criteria that the Confederate commissioners be persons whose absence would not be missed in Richmond.

A native Georgian, Campbell had moved to Montgomery, Alabama in 1830. Admitted to the Georgia bar at age 18 by a special act of the state legislature, Campbell continued to practice law in Alabama. There he acquired considerable respect within the legal community and enjoyed a successful practice, particularly after his move to Mobile in 1837.²² Twice elected to the Alabama state legislature, Campbell represented his adopted state at the Nashville Convention of 1850.²³ In 1853 President Franklin Pierce appointed conservative Democrat Campbell to the United States Supreme Court. Though moderately opposed to secession, Campbell waived his position on the Court and resigned from the bench in April, 1861. Branded as a traitor by the North and as a Unionist by the South, he fled to New Orleans where he resumed his private law career.²⁴ Recalled to public service by the Confederacy, Campbell served as Assistant Secretary of War from October, 1862, until the end of the war.²⁵

²²Campbell was twice offered a seat on the Alabama Supreme Court. He declined both times in order to attend to his lucrative private law practice.

²³Nine slave states attended the June, 1850, convention in Nashville, Tennessee, to discuss the Compromise of 1850 and the larger issue of Southern rights. The convention adopted a resolution which called for an extension of the 1820 Missouri Compromise line westward to the Pacific. Campbell followed a pro-Southern line in contending that Congress did not have the right to define property in a state, but that Congress was bound to honor the definition as established by the individual states.

²⁴The move was more than professionally expedient as Campbell had been threatened with a lynching upon his return to Mobile.

²⁵There is no satisfactory study on any aspect of Campbell's judicial, political or diplomatic careers. A biography by Henry G. Connor, *John Archibald Campbell* (Boston: 1920), is sadly outdated, quaint in nature, and wholly inadequate. Related articles include: James P. McPherson, "The Career of John Archibald Campbell: A Study in Politics and the Law," *Alabama Review*, XIX (January, 1966), 53-63; E. I. McCormac, "Justice Campbell and the Dred Scott Decision," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XIX, 4 (March, 1933), 565-571; Thad Holt, Jr., "The Resignation of Mr. Justice Campbell," *Alabama Review*, XII (January, 1959), 105-118; Richard H. Leach, "John Archibald Campbell and the Alston Letter," *Alabama Review*, XI (January, 1958), 64-75.

It was not only Campbell's public record which brought him the Hampton Roads commission in early 1865. As Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Campbell had served as the unofficial intermediary between the Confederate commissioners Crawford, Forsythe and Roman and Secretary of State Seward during the secession and Fort Sumter crises of March-April, 1861. This mild familiarity with intersectional diplomacy, in addition to his moderate political philosophy and tacit encouragement of peace efforts during the war, made Campbell an attractive negotiator to the North and a sound representative from the South.

The wisdom of Davis, however, in selecting the three commissioners is suspect. Despite their notable political records and obligingly moderate views towards a settlement with the North the peace delegates shared a more particular chord in their relationship with the Confederate President — his enmity. Stephens and Hunter were conspicuous members of the anti-Davis group within the Confederate government. The Vice-President's criticisms were often so vocal and barbed that they partially explain the failure of the two men to meet in private conference at the Richmond capitol until January, 1865. Campbell, who claimed that the main reason he had accepted a position in the Confederate government was in anticipation of becoming "useful in the settlement of a peace,"²⁶ severely censured Davis for his recalcitrant attitude towards peace negotiations. The judge labeled the Southern President as "slow, procrastinating, obstructive, and filled with petty scruples and doubts," and he charged that the "idiosyncrasy" of Davis alone had "defeated the designs" to seek peace.²⁷ Subject to such adverse criticism, Davis conceivably could have dispatched this trio of personal political adversaries to Hampton Roads in anticipation that, with the failure of the conference, the commissioners along with illusions of rapprochement with the Union would fall into public discredit.

After the Southerners had departed Richmond for the conference, they were detained momentarily at City Point, Virginia. A discrepancy between their instructions and Lincoln's directions to his aide, who was sent to escort the com-

²⁶Campbell to Curtis, July 20, 1865, *Century Magazine*, 951.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 953.

missioners, on the issue of the meeting place caused the delay.²⁹ However, General Ulysses S. Grant hastened to assure Lincoln of his belief in the good intentions of the Confederates. Grant and the commissioners had impressed each other favorably during two interviews in the general's quarters.³⁰ Grant thus expressed concern that the Confederates' "going back without any expression from anyone in authority will have a bad influence."³⁰ The general also indicated his disappointment that Lincoln had not intended himself to meet the Southern delegation. Moved by Grant's telegram, Lincoln resolved to join Seward at Hampton Roads. "Say to the gentlemen," Lincoln wired Grant, "I will meet them personally at Fortress Monroe as soon as I can get there."³¹ The president arrived at Hampton Roads in the evening of February 2. On the morning of the 3rd, the Confederates boarded the *River Queen*.

The conference took place in the grand saloon of the Federal steamer. After the perfunctory exchange of courtesies and introductions, they mutually agreed to ground rules for the meeting. The negotiations would be entirely informal; only the five conferees would be present; and, no written records would be kept. The matter of the Mexican invasion plan, though introduced and enumerated by Stephens at the curious urging of Seward, was promptly dismissed when Lincoln firmly disavowed any knowledge or sanction of the scheme. The President dismissed the role of Francis P. Blair as an "old man"

²⁸The Confederates had been instructed "to proceed to Washington City to hold a conference with President Lincoln." Lincoln instructed Major Thomas Eckert to conduct the commissioners to Fort Monroe at Hampton Roads. He added: "If by their answer they decline to come, or propose other terms, do not have them passed through." Faced with two apparently irrevocable and contradictory directions, the Southerners hesitated. Lincoln had decided to cancel the conference when he received the Grant telegram, and, shortly after, assurances from Eckert that the Confederates had acquiesced to the President's terms. See: Stephens, Hunter, Campbell to Grant January 30, 1865; Lincoln to Eckert, January 30, 1865; Eckert to Lincoln, February 2, 1865, in Lincoln to the House of Representatives, February 10, 1865, *Official Records*, Series I, XI VI, I, 508-512; Basler, *Lincoln*, VIII, 278-282.

²⁹See: Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 597-599; Grant to Stanton, February 1 and 2, 1865, *Ibid.*; Seward to Charles Francis Adams, February 7, 1865, *Official Records*, Series I, XLVI, 2, 472.

³⁰Grant to Stanton, February 1, 1865, *Ibid.*

³¹Lincoln to Grant, February 2, 1865; Lincoln to Seward, February 2, 1865, *Ibid.*, 511; Basler, *Lincoln*, VIII, 256.

who had meant well, but who had operated without any previous commission to make such propositions. Stephens noted the short uneasy silence which followed Lincoln's words.³² Campbell later recalled that it was at this moment that he and the other commissioners finally realized that they had been "duped" by Blair.³³

Campbell then inquired as to the manner in which the restoration of the Union might be made if the Confederate States were consenting. Lincoln replied that the disbandment of forces hostile to the government of the United States and the restoration of Federal authority throughout the nation were primary requisites for reunion. The Confederates pressed for details. How would disbandment occur? How could settlements arising out of the various confiscation acts be reached? And, most pressing, what would be the status of the slave population in the Southern states? Seward dismissed most questions pertaining to the details of reunion and referred the Confederates to the President's annual message to Congress in December, 1864, in which Lincoln outlined many of the specifics for reconstruction.³⁴ The slavery question, though, received considerable attention.³⁵

"His head bent down, as if in deep reflection," Stephens recalled, the President entered into a lengthy discussion on the slavery situation.³⁶ Lincoln initially explained that the Emancipation Proclamation was a "war measure" and that its application during reconstruction was strictly for the courts to decide. Reference to the proposed constitutional amendment for the immediate abolition of slavery throughout the United States, Lincoln emphasized that, if adopted by the states, it would be his responsibility to enforce its provisions. Both parties agreed "that agitation upon the subject of the political relations between the races" would not cease with legislative emancipation. Lincoln re-emphasized, though, "that the complete restoration of the national authority everywhere was an indispensable condition" for peace.³⁷

³²Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 601.

³³Campbell to Curtis, July 20, 1865, *Century Magazine*, 953.

³⁴Annual Message to Congress, December 6, 1864, in Basler, *Lincoln*, VIII, 136-152.

³⁵Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 610-618; Campbell, "Memorandum of the Conversation at the Conference in Hampton Roads," in *Reminiscences*, 12-16.

³⁶Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 614.

³⁷Seward to Adams, February 7, 1865, *Official Records*, Series I, XLVI, 2, 471.

The accounts by Campbell and Stephens of the President's replies to their inquiries on slavery present Lincoln in a most sympathetic, almost apologetic, light. Both Southern commissioners noted Lincoln's reluctance to expound on the permanency of the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment. Constantly they stressed Lincoln's reference to both acts as purely "war measures" and that "as soon as the war ended, . . . (they) would be inoperative for the future."³⁸ Stephens, in fact, claimed that Lincoln expressed certainty that once the Southern states had been restored to their practical relations to the Union — a reference to the President's intentions for a speedy and pacific reconstruction — the ex-Confederate states themselves could easily defeat the proposed amendment by voting it down as legitimate members of the Union.³⁹

This account of Lincoln's views on slavery and emancipation must surely please those who see Lincoln as the reluctant emancipator and expedient politician *par excellence*; yet, they must also be considered with some reservation. To portray the Federal anti-slavery measures in terms of political and military necessity lessens the moral issue of slavery and partially redeems the Southern position. Although Lincoln's statements were not seriously altered by the Southern delegates in their reports, they certainly were interpreted and presented in a light most favorable to the Confederate position. Stephens, in particular, writing five years after the event, belatedly sought to moderate the differences between North and South. He described the President as a man pushed by events and bent on conciliation at any cost between the sections. Such a view obviously would lessen the improbituous stigma still assigned to the South by attuning Lincoln's position more to an even understanding of the Confederate argument than to radical condemnation of it.

The conversation at Hampton Roads then took another turn. Hunter, silent until now, asked about the status of West Virginia. Lincoln replied that the question of Virginia's boundaries would have to be settled by other departments of the

³⁸Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 611-612; Campbell, "Memorandum of the Conversation at the Conference in Hampton Roads," *Reminiscences*, 14.

³⁹Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 412.

government. However, he personally felt that West Virginia would continue to be recognized as a separate state in the Union.⁴⁰

Hunter then offered a brief summary of the conference and concluded that a final basis for peace apparently involved the "unconditional submission" of the South. Seward objected to the implied humiliation which the word "submission" carried and engaged Hunter in a mild debate, the most heated exchange during the conference. Hunter repeated his views of the conference and challenged Seward to define the North's position in terms other than that of a conqueror who refused to provide for the future security of the South. The Secretary of State again denied conqueror status for the United States and assured Hunter that all the Union sought was "required obedience to the laws." Seward contended that the guarantees and securities for the personal and political rights of the Southern people and Southern states would be adequately provided under the Constitution. The Hunter-Seward exchange relied on the rhetoric of the pre-Civil War constitutional debate. The issue, however, was pursued no further by any of the delegates; yet, the exchange revealed, if only for a moment, that after four years of fighting there was still no satisfactory solution to the Constitutional argument.

The meeting had progressed for nearly four hours when Stephens noted: ". . . there was a pause, as if all felt that the interview should close."⁴² Hunter and Stephens desperately urged the President to reconsider the subject of an armistice. He promised a reconsideration, but denied the likelihood of any change in attitude. "The two parties then took formal and friendly leave of each other."⁴³ Lincoln and Seward returned to Washington on the same day; the Confederates reached Richmond on February 5.

The conference elicited mixed responses in the North and South. Davis charged "that the enemy refused to enter into

⁴⁰Hunter, "The Peace Commission," 175-178.

⁴¹Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 616-617; Campbell, "Memorandum of the Conversation at the Conference in Hampton Roads," in *Reminiscences*, 15.

⁴²Stephens, *Constitutional View*, II, 618.

⁴³*Ibid.*

negotiations with the Confederate States."¹¹ He criticized the Federal position at Hampton Roads and declared that Lincoln's terms of "unconditional surrender" were wholly unacceptable and unreasonable. On his return to Washington, Lincoln faced a suspicious Congress, which promptly demanded a full report on the interview.¹⁵ The President's reply to the House included all of the relevant documents he possessed concerning the conference and his assurances that nothing had been said or promised at the meeting which was inconsistent with his previous statements on reunion.¹⁶

Congressional misgivings were not unwarranted. Although Lincoln's role at Hampton Roads still remains subject to uncertain speculation, some conclusions can be drawn. Just as the Niagara Conference had served as the instrument by which Lincoln formally announced the conditions for peace, Hampton Roads served as the vehicle by which he re-affirmed his terms. He assumed the initiative for reconstruction and grasped an opportunity at the conference to assert his leadership and to indicate his leniency. His disavowal of the Blair plan indicated the unalterable nature of the presidential conditions.

The Hampton Roads conference, though, proved much more than a political stage for Lincoln. Seward aptly remarked that "it is perhaps of some importance that we have been able to submit our opinions to prominent insurgents, and to have them an answer [sic] in a courteous and not unfriendly manner."¹⁷ The politics of diplomacy precluded a formal exchange of views. Moreover, despite the inevitability of the Southern frustration at Hampton Roads, the meeting clearly revealed a mutual and serious inclination to pacific negotiations. Yet, in demonstrat-

¹¹Grant filed a report with Stanton, February 7, 1864 in which he included several articles that had recently appeared in the *Richmond Dispatch*. The *Dispatch* noted in its February 7 edition that Davis had placed two documents before the Confederate Congress. The papers included the commissioners' report to Davis and his own comments on the conference. See: *Official Records*, Series I, XLVI, 2, 446.

¹⁵Thaddeus Stevens introduced a House resolution which called for full information on the Hampton Roads conference. On the same day, February 6, Charles Sumner initiated a similar resolution in the Senate. See: Basler, *Lincoln*, VIII, 286-287.

¹⁶Lincoln to the House of Representatives, February 10, 1865, *Ibid.*, 274-285; *Official Records*, Series I, XLVI, 1, 505-513.

¹⁷Seward to Adams, February 7, 1865, *Ibid.*, Series I, XLVI, 2, 473.

ing a purported basic principle in American foreign policy — the peaceful settlement of disputes — the conference revealed the inadequacy of such tenets before the forces of power politics, conflicting ideology, and aggressive militarism.

THE FOURTH ALABAMA INFANTRY: FIRST BLOOD

by

Kenneth W. Jones

Once Alabama began considering in the winter of 1860/61 an ordinance of secession, townspeople everywhere turned out to prepare for war. Local bodies of militia were organized and drilled, and the face of Alabama took on a martial aspect within a few weeks. Marion was typical of the black-belt communities in the state, and it was celebrating muster day when the act of secession was announced. Two companies of cavalry and two of infantry were drawn up in the streets, and when the news was read, "three loud and hearty cheers went up from each company on parade." A short while after, one infantry company, the Marion Rifles, was escorted to the railroad depot by very nearly the entire population of the town and surrounding county.¹ Also present were the young ladies of the town. They accompanied the Rifles, "very reluctantly bid them *adieu*, wondering in our minds whether or not would they ever return."²

The Marion Rifles proceeded to Fort Morgan, near Mobile, to join other groups from Greensboro and Tuscaloosa. The small garrison drilled and stood guard, and they built up defenses around Mobile Bay with sandbags. In the latter part of February, they returned to Marion in good spirits.³

After spending several days at home visiting friends and relatives, the Rifles were re-organized for service in Virginia where war threatened to explode. Again, the preparations for sending off the company were elaborate. A reception was arranged where the festivities were prolonged far into the night. The following day, a flag was presented to the Rifles and its Captain, Porter King. The blue silken banner had been fashioned from the wedding gown of a bride of less than three months, and it was the work of several of the area's young

¹Undated news clipping, Smith Papers, Scrapbook I, Bowling Library, Judson College, Marion, Alabama.

²Mattie M. Smith to Gussie, February 10, 1861, Smith Papers.

³"Fort Morgan Correspondence," news clipping, January 17, 1861, Smith Papers, Scrapbook I.

ladies. Captain King thanked the townsfolk using his oratorical flare, and the Rifles left town once more, travelling via steamer to Montgomery and via rail to Dalton, Georgia.⁴

The departure of the Rifles was a scene repeated all over Alabama and the South in the spring and summer of 1861. It was duplicated in Selma, Huntsville, Larkinsville, Uniontown, Evergreen, Tuskegee, and Florence, as companies from each of these places gathered at Dalton to be mustered into Confederate service. On May 2, those units were organized as the Fourth Alabama Infantry Regiment. Elections were held the following day, and a Huntsville lawyer named Egbert Jones became colonel, while Evander McIver Law and Charles L. Scott were elected lieutenant-colonel and major, respectively.⁵

The new regiment was armed with what weapons were available and on May 4 was ordered to Virginia, "buoyant with hope and eager for fame."⁶ At least one of the volunteers protested at the indignity of being moved by a train of box cars and simply refused to go. He was put on board by main force. "It was the Confederacy's first test of our mettle (and also evidence of its early necessities) and we endured it as something not relished and which we hoped would not happen again. Later in the war we were grateful for a chance to ride in anything."⁷

The Alabamians arrived in Lynchburg, Virginia where on May 7 they took the oath of allegiance to the Confederate States of America as twelve months' troops. They were issued new 69 calibre muskets which they accepted reluctantly and were ordered on to Harper's Ferry. The route was pleasant and scenic and passed through Manassas Junction to the end

"The Rifles Now Have A Flag To March Under," news clipping, July 5, 1861, Smith Papers, Scrapbook I; news clipping, Marion *Commonwealth*, April 28, 1861, Fourth Infantry Regiment file, Alabama State Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, Alabama.

⁶P. T. Vaughn [private, Company A, Selma Governor's Guards], "Memories of the Civil War," undated news clipping, Smith Papers, Scrapbook III hereafter cited as "Memories"; Mordecai M. Cooke [sergeant, Company G, Marion Rifles], "Reminiscences of the Fourth Alabama," news clipping, Marion *Commonwealth*, August 30, 1866, Fourth Infantry Regiment file.

⁷Cooke, "Reminiscences of the Fourth Alabama," news clipping, Marion *Commonwealth*, September 6, 1866, Fourth Infantry Regiment file.

⁸Vaughn, "Memories."

of track at Strassburg. The troops walked to Winchester. Most of the men had left home with trunks or valises, but these heavy, cumbersome items were quickly left behind. Changes of clothing became scarce thereafter, but the losses were eased by throngs of "rosy-cheeked girls who swarmed along the sidewalks and welcomed us as we marched up the main street" of Winchester.⁸

To Harper's Ferry from Winchester was but a short march, and the Fourth was quickly encamped on "Bolivar Heights" to begin what promised to be an intensive training period. Harper's Ferry was where "that shiftless vagabond," John Brown, had "adopted arson, robbery, and midnight assassinations as an occupation for a livelihood, and steeped his individual hands in the blood of innocent and unsuspecting people." Inciting thoughts such as these assured that the green volunteers took their training most seriously, even though they were impatient and at times bored. They were desperately anxious to fight, but they waited and practised being soldiers.⁹

Occasionally the unseasoned troops imagined injustices at the hands of their regimental commanders. Rumors blamed Colonel Jones for the monotonous inactivity, and some of the troops demanded that he resign his commission. No misconduct was charged against the colonel, but so early in the war there was no social distinction between enlisted men and their officers. Resentment at Jones' superior position must have prompted petitions to circulate through the regiment which called for his stepping down. But the colonel took the matter before his commanding officer, General Joseph E. Johnston, who advised the regiment either to draft substantive complaints or to drop the affair. None was submitted, and when the colonel promised to resign after the first engagement should his regiment desire, the men were satisfied.¹⁰

Prior to summer, 1861, Union and Confederate armies had not come to serious blows. Federal authorities were pressing for combat before their own volunteers' three-month enlistments expired. In response Brigadier General Irvin

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰*Ibid.*

McDowell prepared to advance against Brigadier General Pierre G. T. Beauregard whose Army of the Potomac was near the vital railroad center, Manassas Junction. Supporting McDowell was Major General Robert Patterson who crossed the Potomac River on July 2, 1861 to demonstrate against General Johnston and prevent the latter's Army of the Shenandoah from linking with Beauregard's at Manassas. The elderly Patterson, however, did not clearly understand his task and simply strengthened his position around Harper's Ferry. Johnston had been expecting battle and had on June 15 evacuated his army to Winchester. He left J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry behind to screen his subsequent movements.

Beauregard had positioned his army along Bull Run Creek, a front eight miles long which stretched from Union Mill's Ford to the north and west to the Stone Bridge. The creek itself was a small watercourse which ran east into the Potomac between Manassas and Centreville, falling between steep embankments bordered by thick forests and broken terrain. High ground commanded the northern side and provided a slight advantage there. Roads fanned out in several directions and there were many well-used fords.¹¹

Southerners, too, were anxious to fight a grand battle in order to end the war. Beauregard was defending Manassas but wanted to initiate an attack against Washington. His desire colored his planning, and most of his troops were stationed on the Confederate right flank. And it was General McDowell who captured the advantage by beginning the first slow moves toward Centreville and Manassas.

Union officers knew they outnumbered the Confederates and had no particular reason to believe their crossing of Bull Run Creek would be contested. Federal forces on the morning of July 18, 1861 were approaching the creek at Blackburn's and Mitchell's Fords when they stumbled into rebel defensive works. The Southerners fell back behind the creek, and the Yankees opened an artillery barrage. Since Union gunners fired from high ground, they were able to use their superior

¹¹Pierre G. T. Beauregard, "Official Report of the Battle of Bull Run, fought July 18, 1861," news clipping, Smith Papers, Scrapbook I; *Campaigns of the Civil War*, I (New York, 1963), 176.

weaponry with effect. Nonetheless, the defense held off all advances and fired at cannon flashes with such accuracy as to create a "baffled, flying foe" who fled the field amidst great confusion, littering the ground with abandoned equipment. General Beauregard had nothing but praise for his own men.


As a part of the history of this engagement, I desire to place on record that on the 18th day of July not one yard of entrenchments nor one rifle pit sheltered the men at Blackburn's ford, who, officers and men, with rare exceptions, were on that day for the first time under fire, and who, taking and maintaining every position ordered, cannot be too much commended for their soldierly behavior.¹²

Confederate casualties were light while Northern losses could only be imagined, but several corpses were found, prisoners were taken, and a variety of arms and equipment was salvaged. Beauregard was confident of further gains, and he suggested that Bull Run demonstrated that the North would not prevail against determined Southern troops.¹³ McDowell, however, decided that if a frontal assault had not worked, he would attempt to turn the Confederate left flank by marching on Beauregard from the vicinity of Sudley Springs.

General Joseph E. Johnston had been informed by wire of McDowell's attack and had ordered his army that afternoon to begin the twenty-mile march toward the railroad for Manassas. The Fourth Alabama decamped at Winchester and traveled all day and most of the night in order to cross the Shenandoah River and Blue Ridge Mountains. The Alabamians arrived in Piedmont after nightfall on July 19. Other troops, for lack of adequate rail facilities, waited there for two days without rations. But the Fourth, in company with General Johnston himself, boarded a train shortly after midnight with the Second Mississippi and two companies of the Eleventh Mississippi, all part of General Barnard E. Bee's Third Bri-

¹²Beauregard, "Official Report."

¹³*Ibid.*



gade.¹⁴ The brigade was taken to Manassas where they pulled in at noon, July 20, the last Confederate unit to reach the field before the upcoming engagement. That their passage had been rapid was indicated by the regimental tents left behind in Winchester and scanty food supplies carried along the way.¹⁵

Bee's Third Brigade along with those of Brigadier General Thomas J. Jackson and Colonel Francis Bartow were soon positioned about two miles from Manassas, along "the edge of the pine thicket, in rear of and equidistant from McLean's and Blackburn's Fords, ready to support either position."¹⁶ Here at Camp Walker the Alabama regiment spent the balance of the day and that night resting in a humid forest, eating whatever food was available. After their long journey, the regiment was fatigued and hungry, "much jaded by the exposure."¹⁷

Once at Manassas, General Johnston outranked Beauregard and assumed overall charge of the combined armies. Johnston agreed to Beauregard's planned operations, however, so that the latter remained the effective tactical commander of the Confederate army.

Sunday morning, July 21, 1861, promised to be hot. The Manassas Gap Railroad had been unable to move Johnston's

¹⁴General Johnston had organized his army into four brigades on July 30, 1861. Bee's Third Brigade was composed of the 4th Alabama, the 2nd and 11th Mississippi, the 6th North Carolina, and, temporarily, the 1st Tennessee. Also attached to the brigade was John Imboden's artillery battery (Robert T. Coles [sergeant-major, 4th Alabama], "History of Fourth Regiment, Alabama Volunteer Infantry, C. S. A., Army of Northern Virginia," [unpublished typescript, 1909], 13, Fourth Infantry Regiment files).

¹⁵W. C. Ward [private, Company G, Marion Rifles], "The Fourth Alabama at the Battle of Manassas: Part of the Regiment took action in the greatest battle ever fought in America up to that time," undated news clipping, Smith Papers, Scrapbook III.

¹⁶Pierre G. T. Beauregard, "Report of General Beauregard of the Battle of Manassas," in *Southern History of the War. Official Reports of Battles, as published by order of the Confederate Congress at Richmond* (New York, 1863), 6-7.

¹⁷Thomas J. Goldsby [captain, Company A, Selma Governor's Guards], "4th Alabama Regiment—Official Report," news clipping, [Richmond *Dispatch*], July 29, 1861, Smith Papers, Scrapbook I; and Edward P. Alexander, *Military Memoirs of a Confederate* (New York, 1907), 18-27.

entire army away from Piedmont, and the enemy was rumored to count at least 55,000 troops.¹⁸ Nevertheless, General Beauregard alerted his commanders to be prepared for an assault against the Yankees around Centreville.

Shortly after dawn, Captain Nathan G. Evans in front of the Stone Bridge on the extreme Confederate left, was confronted by Federals who advanced and opened fire with artillery. By 6 a.m., the barrage was expanded against the whole left wing. Evans was ordered to hold his place until Beauregard could launch a "rapid, determined attack, with my right wing and centre on the enemy's left flank and rear."¹⁹

Bee's brigade had breakfasted early that Sunday while speculating on the meaning of the explosions heard from the northeast. At the Stone Bridge, Evans was convinced that the demonstration against him was a feint; the Yankees were not pressing their advance. To be secure, Beauregard at 7 a.m. sent word to Bee to move as many of his and Bartlow's troops to support Evans as had been at camp, approximately 2700 men. The brigades, with the Fourth Alabama in the lead, fell in with knapsacks and arms, and Bee hurried them toward the Stone Bridge, where the enemy had first appeared. The pace was double-quick, and the day was already very hot. Little water was to be had, and the reinforcements were weary and thirsty when they moved into line on the Henry House Hill, a broad plateau south of the Warrenton Turnpike. Many of the men had suffered earlier attacks of measles and were too weak to continue the forced march.²⁰

Capt. Edward P. Alexander, from a hilltop vantage point in the Confederate rear, observed at 8:45 a.m. sunlight flashing in the distance. Peering intently, he spotted a large Federal column in the vicinity of Sudley Springs. He sent a wig-wag message to Evans, "Look out for your left; you are turned."²¹ His suspicions confirmed, Evans shifted most of

¹⁸McDowell had less than 28,000 men after he reached Centreville (*Campaigns*, I, 174). If Patterson had come from Harper's Ferry, he would have provided another 18,000 men at most (Douglas Southall Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I [New York, 1942], 43).

¹⁹Beauregard, "Battle of Manassas," 5-6.

²⁰Ward, "Fourth Alabama," Goldsby, "Official Report," Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I, 56.

²¹Alexander, *Memoirs*, 30.

his 1100 men from the bridge toward the left to defend the Manassas-Sudley Springs Road. Shortly after 9:15 a.m., leading Federal skirmishers were exchanging rifle shots with the Confederates.

Union columns on the Sudley Springs Road were poorly organized and haltingly slow. Leading elements had to wait for the rear-most companies to reach the front and complete a battle line, and it was not until 10 a.m. that the Northerners moved out of the woods onto the open fields. The inability of the Yankees to organize a unified assault allowed Evans' small force to hold them up until additional troops could strengthen the thin Confederate defense.

General Beauregard's actions during most of the early morning were pre-determined by his intention to attack with his own right flank, and he spent at least a full hour after the first shots were sounded in doing nothing. He was informed at mid-morning that his advance had miscarried and that several hours would be needed to reorganize. Under the circumstances, the general simply decided to hold his right. He dispatched orders to re-inforce Evans, who by that time was experiencing severe strain in countering the Union advance.²²

Once General Bee's Third Brigade mounted the high Henry House Hill, they found Evans confronted by growing enemy numbers. Bee responded by moving his whole force across the valley of Young's Branch somewhat before 11 a.m. Under heavy fire, Bee placed his brigade along Evans' line but a little in front and to the right. He sent Bartow's Georgia regiments to a woods of second-growth pines on the extreme right. The Fourth Alabama checked and loaded their weapons, marched through the timber up a steep hillside, and halted just behind a low fence along the timberline, about 300 yards in front of the Union positions between Bartow on the right and Evans on the left.²³

The Confederate's battle line was not in an enviable position, for it was subject to artillery fire which became increas-

²²Beauregard, "Battle of Manassas," 13.

²³Beauregard, "Battle of Manassas," 11; Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, eds., *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, I (New York, 1884-1887), 207, 247.

ingly effective, and the number of Federal infantry was constantly growing. Glancing in front of their line, the Alabamians spied "immense" numbers of Yankees. Still, the Fourth had hardly rested along the fence when General Bee rode from the left and ordered the forward movement to continue into a cornfield where only scant protection was offered by the low corn shoots, about two feet high. There the regiment lay prone, rising to fire at will.²⁴

At Confederate headquarters, when the firing swelled in volume by approximately 11 a.m., it was obvious that there was a desperate battle raging on the left flank. First Johnston and then Beauregard hurried off to see. They passed many men coming toward the rear who must have reported the precarious situation beyond Young's Branch. It took an hour and a half for the generals to reach Henry House Hill, and during that period, a veritable "bulletstorm" was directed against the Confederate line.²⁵

While the commanding officers changed their position, before 11:30 a.m., a Federal column under Colonel William T. Sherman had discovered a little-used ford across Bull Run between the Stone Bridge and Evans' new position to the northwest. Sherman crossed and was able to outflank the Confederates from the east. Just how many of the enemy the defenders were now facing from their front and right they did not know, but from the volume of fire and the growing number of casualties, they reckoned it was many.²⁶

Bee's men were in their position for about an hour before they found that "they were overlapped on each flank by the continually arriving enemy, [and] General Bee fell back to the position from which he had moved to rescue Evans — crossing the valley, closely pressed by the Federal army."²⁷ The retreat was accomplished while the Fourth Alabama regiment lay in the cornfield. It soon was clear, however, that the rest of the Third Brigade, with Bartow's and Evans' men, had melted into the woods to the south. Both flanks of the

²⁴Goldsby, "Official Report;" Coles, "History," Chapter II, 5-6.

²⁵Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I, 61-62; and Beauregard, "Battle of Manassas," 11.

²⁶Vaughn, "Memories."

²⁷Johnson, *Battles and Leaders*, I, 247. Many soldiers did not stop at the second line of defense on Henry House Hill, but they continued toward the rear, spreading tales of defeat (*Campaigns*, I, 185).

Fourth Alabama were "literally hanging in the air without a support." On three occasions, Union ranks advanced, only to be repulsed by musket fire. But the ever increasing pressure, especially from Sherman to the east, forced the Fourth to fall back after having occupied their line for what had seemed an eternity. The regiment moved rapidly, but not precipitately. The "gallant Col. Jones . . . sat conspicuously on his horse, as calm as a statue," providing strength and courage, inspiring his regiment to remain in place until the last possible moment, and preventing a rout.²⁸

The Alabamians retired in good order, recrossing the fence, passing back through the woods, and descending the hill in front of Young's Branch. After fording the small stream and reforming, they observed a large troop formation to the east, about one-quarter of a mile from the position they had just quitted, approximately in the area where reinforcements were expected. The Fourth believed these troops to be friendly at first. However, when the flag was unfurled, the strangers opened a murderous fire which killed and wounded several men, included in the latter Lieutenant Colonel Law and Major Scott. The fire was returned with interest, but the exchange had left the Fourth Alabama without field officers and still exposed.²⁹

Following the incident of Young's Branch, the Fourth moved up Henry House Hill, which they found just recently occupied by Wade Hampton's Legion, and retired through a wood toward an open field where they stood at order arms to rest and await orders. It was at this point, about 12:30 p.m., that Generals Johnston and Beauregard rode up and set about immediately to reorganize their defenses on the hill. Most of the Bee and Bartow commands had taken refuge in a thicket-shrouded ravine to the southeast of the Robinson house where they huddled in great confusion. Johnston spied a regiment in good order and asked which it was. The reply indicated that it was the remainder of the Fourth Alabama Regiment, that all its field officers were either dead or wounded, and that none of the company captains had taken command. Johnston ordered the regiment into line:

²⁸Ward, "Fourth Alabama;" Goldsby, "Official Report."

²⁹Ward, "Fourth Alabama;" and Goldsby, "Official Report."

Just at this point General [sic] Bartow, bleeding from a wound in the foot, his horse wounded and bleeding, said: "General Johnston, I am hard pressed on my right [the ravine] and I cannot hold my position without reinforcements." The general replied "You must at all hazards hold your position, and if you need reinforcements this regiment here," (pointing to the Fourth) "will support you." Bartow turned his horse and rode back to his command. General Johnson then placing himself by the colors, moved the Fourth through the scrub pine timber, placed the regiment in a washout in the rear of the Georgians and left us, shrouded by the thick pine bushes."³⁰

Having retreated from their advanced position, the Alabamians were in poor spirits, and Captain Edward D. Tracy [Company I, Huntsville North Alabamians] spoke to the regiment to offer inspiration. He knew that heavy losses had hurt morale, and he used all his eloquence to encourage. Meanwhile, General Beauregard was doing much the same; men were continuously deserting the lines, and the general rode up and down making speeches. Subsequently when all units present were properly positioned, Beauregard persuaded Johnston to retire to the Lewis House and direct reinforcements to the front.³¹

As fighting continued, the Fourth lost contact with Bartow. In order to follow the course of battle, the regiment pulled out of the thicket and moved out into the open. The men rested and sent out water details when General Bee rode up looking for any of his brigade still in formation. Captains Porter King and Richard Clarke [Company D, Uniontown Canebrake Rifle Guards] answered that he had found what remained of the Fourth Alabama. Bee said, "Come with me and go yonder

³⁰Ward, "Fourth Alabama." Johnson, *Battles and Leaders*, I, 248, relates that when General Johnston came "near this ground where Bee was reforming and Jackson deploying his brigade, I saw a regiment in line with ordered arms and facing to the front, but 200 or 300 yards in rear of its proper place. On inquiry I learned that it had lost all its field officers; so, riding on its left flank, I easily marched it to its place."

³¹Ward, "Fourth Alabama;" Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I, 67-69; Beauregard, "Battle of Manassas," 15; Alexander, *Memoirs*, 36.

where Jackson stands like a stone wall.”³² Agreement was unanimous, although the captains asked leave to allow the water details to return. The water was distributed quickly, General Bee mounted and placed himself on the left, and moved the regiment forward toward Jackson. During the movement, however, John Pelham’s artillery train was changing position toward the rear and cut the Fourth in half. Company D and part of Company G, with General Bee, obliqued to the right for about one hundred yards where Bee was mortally wounded. The rest of the regiment simply proceeded straight ahead into the thick of the fighting, unaware of Bee’s direction.³³

The battle for Henry House Hill continued for about two hours after the “stone wall” incident and would probably have been unsuccessful had it not been for the strong resistance offered by Jackson’s First Brigade, Hampton’s Legion, and units like the Fourth Alabama. The line held however, and at 2 p.m. Beauregard ordered the right of his line to move onto the plateau while Jackson pierced the enemy center. This initial success was undone shortly after, and as the Federal front continually expanded, it seemed inevitable that the Confederates would be enveloped. The sun was scorchingly hot, the Southerners were exhausted, and it was extremely difficult to keep up a sustained exchange of fire. Beauregard ordered another advance onto the plateau which finally secured it, and it was probably at this point that Bee was lost.³⁴

The turning point of First Manassas was the arrival after 3 p.m. of Col. Arnold Elzey’s Fourth Brigade, 1700 men. Once the latter was in place, Beauregard ordered a third advance

³²There are many versions of this remark; this one is reported because a member of the regiment recorded it (Ward, “Fourth Alabama”). Jackson’s brigade had arrived on Henry House Hill after noon to form a defensive line between the Henry and Robinson Houses (*Campaigns*, I, 187). However, an entirely different version of Bee’s remark is also recorded: “Being told that ‘it was what remained of the 4th Alabama,’ [Bee] replied, with an expressive gesture, ‘this is all of my brigade that I can find—will you follow me back to where the firing is going on?’ We said, ‘to the death.’” (Goldsby, “Official Report.”)

³³The regiment did not rejoin; “notwithstanding, all the companies pitched in with other regiments and fought bravely til the enemy was repulsed and the day was won.” (Letter, Richard Clarke to Bettie Lou Clarke, 14 August 1861, news clipping, Uniontown *Herald*, Smith Papers, Scrapbook II. See also Ward, “Fourth Alabama;” Goldsby, “Official Report.”)

³⁴Beauregard, “Battle of Manassas,” 17-18.

which swept the Yankees from the hill. By 4 p.m., other reinforcements had arrived, and Beauregard ordered the whole line forward once more. With great spirit, the irregular Confederate line forced the Union soldiers to retreat in extreme haste in all available directions towards Bull Run Creek. "The rout had now become general and complete."³⁵

Following the victory, great confusion reigned among Southern commands. The Fourth Alabama had remained on the field until the close of battle in support of Jackson, although the extent of their participation is not known. Their ranks had been thinned considerably by exposure to several hours of heavy fire,³⁶ and they did not participate in the pursuit of the fleeing yankees. They waited near the Lewis House, Johnston's headquarters, where they learned of the final victory.³⁷

The Fourth marched back to Manassas that night in a bitter mood, feeling disgraced for having quit their line in front of Young's Branch that morning. However, on the following day, they heard nothing but praise for themselves. For having held their ground for an hour against the Federal advance, they had won time for reinforcements to be placed on Henry House Hill which led on to ultimate victory. Later, General Samuel Heintzelman, commanding a Union brigade, wrote that the responsibility for checking his advance was shared by Evans and "an Alabama regiment," the Fourth.³⁸ When complimented for their efforts, a young member of the regiment from Huntsville remarked "that they did not deserve so much credit after all, for they thought all the while they were fighting one regiment, which was marched up four times, instead of four several fresh regiments."³⁹

The Manassas victory was important to the Confederacy, for it demonstrated that the United States Army could not as

³⁵Beauregard, "Battle of Manassas," 18-20.

³⁶The regiment lost 38 killed and 208 wounded (Willis Brewer, *Alabama: Her History, Resources, War Record, and Public Men from 1540 to 1872* [Montgomery, 1872], 594).

³⁷Ward, "Fourth Alabama."

³⁸*War of the Rebellion. A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, II (Washington, D. C., 1880), 402-404.

³⁹"'Heroes of Manassas,'" news clipping, *New Orleans Delta*, Smith Papers, Scrapbook I.

yet encroach on Southern territory, despite their size and superior weaponry. President Jefferson Davis, who had come to Manassas on the hour of triumph, reported that "the enemy was routed and fled perceptibly," and that a large quantity of arms and equipment was taken. The Richmond Congress was elated and resolved to make "prompt and patriotic efforts . . . to make provisions for the wounded, and entitle them to our gratitude." Sympathy was extended to families of fallen soldiers, but generally the South was exuberant.⁴⁰

To praise their soldiers, Generals Johnston and Beauregard overflowed with oratory. "Soldiers! We congratulate you on an event which ensures the liberty of our country. We congratulate every man of you, whose glorious privilege it was to participate in this triumph of courage and of truth — to fight in the battle of Manassas."⁴¹

Unhappily, the Manassas event was calamitous in other ways. It produced great dissension between civilian and military leaders over the progress and conduct of the war. At issue first was the non-pursuit of the Federal army into Washington. Never resolved, the question left dissatisfaction in many minds over the quality of Southern leadership. Furthermore, large numbers of men wounded at Manassas were not receiving proper care, and men in camp were falling prey to a variety of diseases which the medical staff could not alleviate. Attacks of measles had reduced the Fourth Alabama prior to Manassas, and afterward, they suffered from yellow jaundice and every disease imaginable.⁴² Col. Egbert Jones, for example, died after a lingering illness on September 3, 1861 at Culpeper Courthouse.⁴³

Despite plagues of disease, the Fourth Alabama was excited over their part in Manassas. They had been bound together "as a perfect unit, which nothing could tear asunder."⁴⁴

⁴⁰"The Battle of Manas[s]as," news clipping, *Selma Reporter*, July 22, 1861, Smith Papers, Scrapbook I.

⁴¹"The War. Address to the Army from Generals Johnston and Beauregard. . . .," news clipping, July 25, 1861, Smith Papers, Scrapbook I.

⁴²Coles, "History," Chapter III, 10-11.

⁴³"Heroes of Manassas."

⁴⁴Coles, "History," Chapter III, 19-20.

They were being regularly supplied with clothing and food by hometown friends and relatives. Capt. Richard Clarke wrote to his daughter that "I hear good accounts of your industrious efforts in behalf of my gallant company [Company D, Canebrake Rifle Guards]. I am extremely pleased with your endeavors . . . in behalf of the gallant boys who have left the comforts of home and the endearments of family to risk life and limb in the service of their country."⁴⁵ Marius Smith [private, Company G, Marion Rifles], who joined the Fourth in late August, called his people "the best people in the world" for their part in keeping his regiment well-supplied. He added that he did not know of anyone "who would not shed his own life's blood in their defense."⁴⁶

Spirits in camp were high, and many soldiers believed the war would end before Christmas. Expectations for battle within a short time were enhanced by a standing order to keep two days' rations, cooked and on hand in haversacks, at all times. It was a very uncertain kind of life for the regiment, but there were no engagements until the affair at Ball's Bluff when Nathan Evans, promoted to colonel, defeated a Federal force as it attempted to cross the Potomac. There was little to divert General Johnston from what he believed to be his main objective, to train his army.⁴⁷

Drill never seemed to end. While Major W. H. C. Whiting had been appointed to replace General Bee, the Fourth was still without regimental grade officers. Since there was no one who could drill larger units than companies, General Johnston detached a Major Allston to duty with the Fourth. However, as the latter was a cavalry officer, he was later supplemented by Major O. K. McLemore, "a splendid drill master, in fact the best the regiment ever had, and . . . a fine disciplinarian."⁴⁸

The camp rose to reveille at 5:30 a.m. Roll call later was an amusing sight, for there were no standard uniforms available in the regiment, and all manner of costumes were displayed. Drill practice came at 9 a.m. and again at 3 p.m.

⁴⁵Letter, Richard Clarke to Bettie Lou Clarke, 14 August 1861.

⁴⁶Letter, Marius B. Johnson to sister, August 22, 1861, Smith Papers.

⁴⁷Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I, 111.

⁴⁸Coles, "History," Chapter III, 3.

Dress parade followed at 5:30 p.m., and then came the evening meal: "we then eat supper, light our pipes and smoke awhile, then comes roll call again, after which we all retired into a state of retiracy."⁴⁹

By early October, President Davis had met with Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and Gustavus W. Smith, to decide on the possibility of an advance into the north, particularly Maryland. Popular demands in the South called for an immediate offensive, but the commanders reported that reinforcing and re-equipping the army for the task was impossible until the coming of Spring.⁵⁰ When the expected maneuvers did not materialize, the Fourth prepared to go into winter quarters near Dumfries in order to support large siege guns, "cockpit batteries," designed to close off navigation along the Potomac.

Camp Law was an elevated area occupied by quarters that were more permanent than the previous tents. Colonel Goldsby, newly promoted, looked to clearing off the grounds and laying out company streets. Subsequently, the regiment had "quite a respectable little town, with rather a variegated assortment of buildings, mostly tents with chimneys[,] intermixed with cabins."⁵¹ The troops began to write home for heavy gloves and warm shirts, and other items, as pen and ink, which would provide diversion during the long, winter months.⁵²

During the forced inactivity at Dumfries, the health of the regiment improved somewhat, and the regiment was growing in numbers. Only a few soldiers remained in sick bay "down at old man Merchant's hotel," or in the general hospital at Richmond for Alabama troops. By the end of November, most of the men had what they needed for a comfortable winter, and things from home were still arriving.⁵³

By December, 1861, the Confederate government was considering ways and means to encourage enlistments in the army. A Furlough and Bounty Act, signed December 11, 1861, was meant to assure re-enlistments for those twelve month volun-

⁴⁹Letter, Marius B. Johnson to sister, October 29, 1861, Smith Papers.

⁵⁰Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I, 115-118.

⁵¹Coles, "History," Chapter III, 7.

⁵²Letter, Marius B. Johnson to sister, October 29, 1861; and letter, Richard Clarke to Bettie Lou Clarke, August 14, 1861.

⁵³Letter, Marius B. Johnson to sister, November 22, 1861, Smith Papers.

teers whose terms expired in the late winter or early spring. A cash bounty of \$50 was offered along with a sixty days' furlough to an enlisted man or non-commissioned officer who agreed to serve for the war's duration or three years. In addition, men who wished to change service organizations were allowed to do so. And finally, after re-enlistments were accomplished, regiments were promised elections for company and field officers, although all commissions thereafter would be filled by direct promotion.⁵⁴

The Fourth Alabama Regiment re-enlisted for three years in January, 1862,⁵⁵ and General Johnston began to grant leaves under the provisions of the Furlough and Bounty Act. Much of February and March were used up with the Confederate Army in depleted strength, and there was some doubt that all original regiments would re-enlist at all. General Johnston feared a general deterioration in command as popular but incompetent officers were elected by promises of relaxed discipline.⁵⁶

Some justification for fears of building the army up to strength were indicated. Soldiers on leave were expected to recruit,⁵⁷ but the difficulty was great. In Selma, Capt. R. V. Kidd [Company A, Governor's Guard] advertised in the papers, "Fourth Alabama: Recruits Wanted!"⁵⁸ And William Robbins [lieutenant, Company G, Marion Rifles] wrote that "recruiting is the hardest business I ever tried" and that "too many are compromising their patriotism. . . ."⁵⁹ However, when in March the men returned with their recruits, and when the sick and wounded had recovered, the regiment was "very much augmented."⁶⁰

From Washington, McClellan's Army of the Potomac began its long-expected movement into Virginia after the warm weather dried the roads sufficiently to allow his army to pass. Johnston knew that the enemy was larger and better equipped, and, alerted to the Federal advance, he decided to pull out

⁵⁴Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I, 130-131.

⁵⁵Brewer, *Alabama*, 594.

⁵⁶Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I, 133-134.

⁵⁷Coles, "History," Chapter III, 13.

⁵⁸*Daily Reporter* (Selma), March 11, 1862, p. 3, Alabama Archives.

⁵⁹Letter, William Robbins to Porter King, March 25, 1862, Smith Papers.

⁶⁰Coles, "History," Chapter III, 13.

from his several camps at Evansport, Dumfries, the Occoquan, and Manassas to head south. Johnston reached the Rappahannock River and Rappahannock Station by March 11, 1862, where a second line of defense was established.⁶¹ The evacuation from Confederate camps was so precipitous, however, that much equipment and personal baggage was left behind and destroyed so as not to fall into enemy hands.

Nothing immediately developed as a threat from the Union army move, and General Johnston changed his position once more better to thwart any offensive which might develop against eastern Virginia. His army was being thoroughly reorganized, and commanders were shuffled extensively. None of the brigades involved at Manassas remained entirely under the man who had led it there.⁶²

The first year of war had brought tremendous changes to the Confederate soldier, particularly in his outlook. No one appreciated the extensive hours of drill and preparation, and soldiers who had earlier romanticized the war were by the end of their first year's experience willing to "give \$17,000 and a mule to get home once more."⁶³ Certainly the war was bringing much grief to a Confederacy which had only a few months earlier chased the Yankees out of Manassas. The Federal army was advancing into northern Virginia while General Johnston was retreating; winter had visited a string of disasters on the South, such as losses at Forts Henry and Donelson. And it was obvious to all that the war was going to last much longer.

In the Fourth Alabama, these sentiments could be read in the soldiers' letters. They had enlisted for a war which they expected to consist of simply "one big battle" which would end by Christmas, 1861. Manassas had come and gone. It had offered a bitter-sweet taste of victory, but the flavor was soured by continuous inactivity, or retreat, or defeat. Still, most of the southern soldiers were in good spirits. Their cause was just, and they would continue their crusade.

⁶¹E. B. Long, *Civil War Day By Day: An Almanac, 1861-1865* (Garden City, New York, 1971), 180.

⁶²Brewer, *Alabama*, 594; and Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I, 157.

⁶³Letter, Marius B. Johnson to sister, May 7, 1862, Smith Papers; and Coles, "History," Chapter III, 4.

THE ALLIANCE IN POLITICS: THE ALABAMA GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION OF 1890

by

Karl Louis Rodabaugh

When in 1890 the Alliance entered its large, dissatisfied agrarian following in the lists of Alabama politics, the resulting division among Democrats threatened to destroy the Bourbon political system. The Alliance involvement, obviously a serious matter, reflected the stage of development of agrarian discontent. For by that time, farmers had come to recognize deep bonds of identity with their brethren; they had the same sense of disadvantage, the same feeling of oppression, and adhered to the same agrarian ideology. Farmers saw the same enemy pressing down upon their ranks, armed with sinister weapons — special corporate privileges, inequitable tax structures, control of the monetary system, bribery, corruption, and monopoly — all the advantages of political power. With collapse of the Alliance economic cooperative movement imminent by 1890, the Alliamcemen concluded that, if the condition of agriculture were to be improved, and if their views were to be implemented, the mechanisms of the political system would have to be geared in their favor. United under the secret bonds of Alliance brotherhood, they would attempt to strike down the foes of the producers of plenty, and send their brothers to the hall of government to uphold freedom, equality, and righteousness — and to preserve the rural way of life.

Prior to the entry of the alliance into Alabama politics there was a period of fermentation. Since its appearance in the state, the brotherhood, fearing dissension and the danger of the Negro vote if divisive issues were raised within the Democratic party, had followed the national organization's policy and ostensibly rejected political involvement. But as Alliamcemen became very numerous in some localities, they became aware of their significance and sought local representation of their views from the Democrats. Oligarchic control of county politics by Bourbon courthouse rings, however, convinced the agrarians that they would have to gain possession of the local party machinery in order to give their proposals a hearing. Toward that end, the Alliance, in 1888, captured

the Democracy in Bibb, Shelby, and other strong Alliance counties. Although it failed in several other counties, where successful the brotherhood began nominating its own candidates for the state legislature through the Democratic party machinery.¹

The Bourbons reacted to the ominous signs of agrarian political activity. Of course, the Democratic response was as varied as the party's patchwork composition, but important reverberations were clear. Fearing the political consequence of an open attack on the powerful Alliance, the Bourbons carefully sought the approval of the agrarians, while simultaneously criticizing the growing political mission of the Alliance.² In 1888, responding to an invitation to attend a Shelby County Alliance barbecue, Senator John T. Morgan glowingly praised the brotherhood and regretted he could not join in the festivities.³ His reaction was understandable, for the temper of Alliance political involvement, at that time, called only for activity that would secure favorable legislation from the Democrats. State Alliance president S. M. Adams, a loyal Democrat, supported his party and advised Alliamcemen to vote for honest Democrats favoring agrarian interests.⁴ So the Bourbons, plainly currying favor for themselves among the agrarians, gave "verbal assent to the program of reforms demanded by the . . . Farmer's [sic] Alliance." But their insincerity soon became apparent when "they failed to honor their pledges with action."⁵ For the Bourbons had developed another way of dealing with the threat of the Alliance.

Soon the Bourbons employed racism in their fight against the agrarians, warning that political division of the whites,

¹William Warren Rogers, *The One-Gallused Rebellion: Agrarianism in Alabama, 1865-1896* (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), 166-167; Henry Pelham Martin, "A History of Politics in Clay County during the Period of Populism from 1888-1896" (M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1936), 2-3; Thomas Kermit Hearn, "The Populist Movement in Marshall County," (M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1935), 29-30.

²C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (2nd. rev. ed., New York, 1966), 78.

³Montgomery *Advertiser*, July 15, 1888, cited in William Warren Rogers, "The Farmers' Alliance in Alabama," *Alabama Review*, XV (January, 1962), 8. The *Advertiser* was the organ of the state Democratic party and the most influential newspaper in Alabama.

⁴Centreville *Bibb Blade*, May 10, 1888, cited Rogers, *One-Gallused Rebellion*, 166.

⁵Woodward, *Strange Career of Jim Crow*, 78.

which would stem from Alliance agitation, would bring dangers to white rule.⁶ Yet the Bourbons, still fearful of arousing farmer opposition, first resorted to a flank attack on the vulnerable black Alliance. In an effort to create division in the Alliance ranks, the *Montgomery Advertiser* said, "The white alliance will have no lot or part in the colored alliances."⁷ In a clear attempt to turn Allianceman away from the brotherhood, the *Advertiser* declared, "the white people of Alabama don't want any more negro influence in their affairs than they have already had, and they won't have it."⁸ Even the *Montgomery Alliance Journal*, which realized that the Negro Alliance posed a threat to white agrarian unity, embraced the hope that "there will be no more of these organizations effected," and assured the whites that it was "no more in favor of Negro Alliances than . . . the so called Negro Masonic Lodges, and would recognize one as quick as the other."⁹

By 1889, the Alliance fully realized the nature and increasing force of Bourbon resistance to large-scale agrarian organization. Surveying the field, it would have seen that it was the dominant agricultural group in Alabama, with almost all others supporting its aggressive political activities. Also apparent was the Bourbon use of the Negro threat, which could intimidate the Alliance following. Knowing that Bourbon charges that it menaced white supremacy would be averted if it captured the Democratic Party from within, the Alliance sought more vigorously to gain control of the Democracy.¹⁰

The political plans of the Alliance became clear at its annual convention of 1889. Meeting in Auburn, August 7 - 9, the assembly of state agrarian leaders approved the constitution of the new Farmers' and Laborers' Union of America, thereby officially merging the Agricultural Wheel and the

⁶Charles Grayson Summersell, "Kolb and the Populist Revolt as Viewed by Newspapers," *Alabama Historical Quarterly*, XIX (1957), 383-384.

⁷*Montgomery Advertiser*, October 3, 1889.

⁸*Ibid.*, December 22, 1889.

⁹*Montgomery Alliance Journal*, cited in William Warren Rogers, "The Negro Alliance in Alabama," *Journal of Negro History*, XLV (1960), 43.

¹⁰Allen J. Goings, *Bourbon Democracy in Alabama, 1874-1890* (University, Ala., 1951), 106; Robert D. Ward and William Warren Rogers, *Labor Revolt in Alabama: The Great Strike of 1894* (University, Ala., 1965), 39-40.

Farmers' Alliance in Alabama.¹¹ The convention also selected delegates to a national convention — of the Southern Alliance, the Northern Alliance, the Colored Alliance, and the Knights of Labor — to be held in St. Louis in December.¹² The assemblage was honored by the presence of Southern Alliance president Dr. C. W. Macune, who was in Alabama to give direction to the State Alliance efforts to humble the jutebagging trust.¹³ The convention adopted strong resolutions castigating the trust, and, as a result of the *Advertiser's* denunciations of the Alliance for its earlier boycott of the jutebagging trust, viciously condemned the *Advertiser* and its conservative policy. This widened the breach between the Bourbons and the Alliance and, finally, brought it into the open. Strategy was discussed for electing agrarians in the next state race and capturing control of the 1890 Democratic State Convention. When considering gubernatorial possibilities, the convention endorsed Reuben F. Kolb, Commissioner of Agriculture since 1887, as a farmer who would make a good governor.¹⁴

Kolb — a prominent Democrat — had experienced the difficulties of post-war agriculture so common to Alabama farmers. Upon return from the Civil War he undertook the management of the family cotton plantation, but the 1873 panic and low prices soon forced him to give up planting. Briefly he became a cotton factor, then a merchant. Convinced, fin-

¹¹John Bunyan Clark, *Populism in Alabama* (Auburn, Ala., 1927), 81. The National Wheel and the Southern Alliance officially merged in December, 1888. The new organization adopted the name of Farmers' and Laborers' Union of America. See: W. Scott Morgan, *History of the Wheel and Alliance, and the Impending Revolution* (Ft. Scott, Kans., 1889), 125-127.

¹²Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 87-88n. Delegates were: Reuben F. Kolb, Commissioner of Agriculture; Samuel M. Adams, Alabama State Alliance president; Major J. H. Harris; Hector D. Lane, editor of the Huntsville *Mercury*; T. J. Carlisle; and J. H. Higgins, representing the Wheel.

¹³Morgan, *Wheel and Alliance*, 343. Jute manufacturers raised the price of their bagging in 1888, whereupon the Alabama State Alliance initiated a boycott of jute-bagging that forced the price of jute from 13¢ down to 5¢. At first, Alliancemen were very enthusiastic about the campaign against jute manufacturers. But as the price of jute fell, they lost some of their former spirit and discontinued buying cotton-bagging that the State Alliance was handling. See: Rogers, "Farmers' Alliance in Alabama," 17, and Houston Cole, "A History of Populism in Tuscaloosa County" (M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1927), 45.

¹⁴Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 81, 83-84, 63.

ally, of the hopelessness of the entire cotton business, Kolb planted chiefly watermelons, and prospered.¹⁵

By the time he became Commissioner of Agriculture, Kolb had been active for years in the agricultural affairs of Alabama. He supported the Agricultural Society and the Alliance, participating in the Alliance's battle against the jute-bagging trust, and served as president of the Farmers' National Congress. He also joined in the movement to make the Alliance a strong, central voice for the farmers. As commissioner, Kolb called for cooperation between Midwestern capital and Alabama farmers to bring prosperity to the state. An avid proponent of scientific agriculture and agricultural education, he sought to publicize these things, as well as the activities of his department, in numerous pamphlets and bulletins. Through the medium of his publications, Kolb came into contact with the farmers, who depended upon the reports on agricultural and economic conditions in his bulletins, and who seem to have accepted him as their leader.¹⁶

As his following swelled and the agrarian movement became increasingly involved in politics, Kolb began looking ahead to the 1890 gubernatorial race. He took every opportunity, therefore, to meet farm groups and speak on agricultural and political topics. Agrarian agitation had influenced passage of an act in 1889 that provided for local institutes to raise the educational level of Alabama's farmers. As Commissioner of Agriculture, Kolb held legal responsibility for organizing and directing the institutes, so with state funds allocated for the purpose, he hired able and popular men to lecture on agricultural topics. An excellent orator himself, Kolb spoke frequently at the institutes, where he called for the farmers to become involved in politics, criticized Bourbon control of state government, and advocated the election of a farmer to the governor's office. In addition, Kolb, making use of his position as president of the Farmers' National Congress, convinced

¹⁵See: Ruth S. Cammack, "Reuben Francis Kolb: His Influence on Agriculture in Alabama" (M.S. thesis, Auburn University, 1941); Charles Grayson Summersell, "A Life of Reuben F. Kolb" (M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1930); and William Warren Rogers, "Reuben F. Kolb: Agricultural Leader of the New South," *Agricultural History*, XXII (April, 1958), 109-119.

¹⁶Cammack, "Kolb," 36-37, 4-5; Morgan, *Wheel and Alliance*, 349-351; John Sparkman, "The Kolb-Oates Campaign of 1894" (M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1924), 18.

the group's 1889 convention to adopt resolutions listing the farmers' grievances against banks, railroads, and trusts. Also due to his influence, the Farmers' Congress advised farmers to resort to the ballot and vote for men that supported the battle against the trust and promised legislation for farmers.¹⁷

While Kolb was striving to bring more farmers into Alabama politics, the Southern Alliance (following its merger with the Wheel) had moved toward greater involvement in national politics. Toward that end, a convention stemming from Southern Alliance efforts convened in St. Louis, in December 1889, to coalesce the major protest groups into one massive political movement. Kolb and S. M. Adams, President of the Alabama State Alliance, led the Alabama delegation. The Southern Alliance's purpose in calling the St. Louis Convention was to gain a broader following to use as a tool for capturing the Democratic party in the South. Indeed, the Southern Alliance, dedicated to the one-party system, feared growing talk of a third party movement, and believed that a new party would only work against its goal of controlling the Democracy.¹⁸

As the delegates at St. Louis discussed their respective views, in an attempt to arrive at a common platform, wide differences arose to block merger. The Northern Alliance objected to the exclusion of Negroes from the Southern Alliance and to its secrecy. But the Southern Alliance considered secrecy the source of its national unity and refused to drop it. It was willing to strike the word *white* from the membership clause, leaving the question of Negro eligibility to the state Alliances. The southerners, nevertheless, held out for exclusion of blacks from the Supreme Council of any new organization, and would concede this point only if it were the sole barrier to unification.¹⁹

¹⁷Summersell, "Kolb and the Newspapers," 379; Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 77-78; Frederick Emory Haynes, *Third Party Movements since the Civil War, with Special Reference to Iowa: A Study in Social Politics* (Iowa City, Ia., 1916), 226-228; Theodore Saloutos, *Farmer Movements in the South, 1865-1933* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1960), 103.

¹⁸John D. Hicks, *The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party* (Minneapolis, 1931), 113-114, 122.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 119-122; Fred A. Shannon, *The Farmers' Last Frontier: Agriculture, 1860-1897* (New York, 1945), 317.

However, other difficulties did exist. Sectional animosity was a factor, for the northerners feared absorption by the larger Southern Alliance; but economic differences were more significant. The Southern Alliance sought the subtreasury scheme²⁰ and monetary inflation as primary goals, while the more prosperous eastern farmers in the Northern Alliance saw no urgency in the money question and wanted instead new laws circumscribing the production and sale of recently developed synthetic food products. Such laws, however, promised to limit the increasing uses for southern cottonseed oil. In addition, northerners grew perishables that would not be as adjustable to storage under the subtreasury plan as tobacco and cotton. When the two alliances realized that they could not compromise their differences, they abandoned the proposed merger and retired to prepare separate, although similar, platforms.²¹

The Southern Alliance platform, called the St. Louis Demands, brought together those proposals deemed most urgent by the protest movement. And it served as the program of the new National Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union — formed by loose unification of the Knights of Labor and the Southern Alliance. Financial planks predominated: it was urged that national banks be abolished and that legal tender treasury notes be substituted for national bank notes, these

²⁰At the St. Louis Convention, Southern Alliance president Dr. C. W. Macune offered the report of the Committee on the Monetary System, which advocated implementing the subtreasury system as the first step toward gaining equal rights for agrarian interests. The subtreasury plan was designed to use the power of the federal government to correct southern credit deficiencies. Under the system, government storage facilities would be established in counties producing at least \$500,000 worth of farm products for sale; farmers could deposit non-perishable crops in the government facilities and receive certificates for 80 percent of the total local value of their goods; these certificates would enable the farmers to get loans at nominal interest rates. It was believed that, as a result of the subtreasuries, more money would come into circulation at crop-marketing times, halting the depression of farm prices. See: John D. Hicks, "The Subtreasury: A Forgotten Plan for the Relief of Agriculture," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XV (December, 1928), 256-358. For an account of the origin of the subtreasury idea, crediting it to Harry Skinner, Greenville, North Carolina populist, see: Robert Wayne Smith, "A Rhetorical Analysis of the Populist Movement in North Carolina, 1892-1896" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1957), 25-26.

²¹H. C. Nixon, "The Cleavage within the Farmer's Alliance Movement," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XV (June, 1928), 22-25.

new notes to be issued in sufficient quantity to put the nation's business on a cash basis; free coinage of silver was advocated to produce \$50 per capita circulating medium; and a key plank demanded establishment of the subtreasury system; an end was sought to speculation in agricultural futures, to alien landholdings, to excessive land ownership by railroads, and to inequitable taxes. Further appeals called for economy and honesty in government and government ownership of transportation and communication facilities. Finally, to implement their views, the newly-wed organizations proclaimed that, henceforth, farmers and laborers would cooperate to elect to office only those men pledged to support the St. Louis Demands.²²

The St. Louis Demands produced an immediate reaction in Alabama, for the decision to seek the election of only those men promising to support the Demands immediately was called a threat to Democratic unity and to white supremacy. Alliances held meetings to discuss the demands, and a few even denounced the Alabama delegates for being a party to the convention results. One local alliance went so far as to declare that a Yankee plot was underway to use the Alliance for destroying the Democratic party, while others adopted resolutions demanding that the brotherhood eschew politics and pledging allegiance to the Democracy.²³ The press especially castigated the appeal for government ownership as dangerously socialistic.²⁴ And the subtreasury proposal received elaborate criticism. The *Mobile Register*, denying that the program for crop deposits and loans would benefit the poor farmers, pictured it as a definite boom to speculators. Because they failed to comprehend fully the subtreasury plan, many Alliancemen were, undoubtedly, easy prey for the *Register's* logic.²⁵ The State Alliance, perhaps mindful of this fact and certainly aware of the controversy spawned by the Demands, decided to forgo the issue of official acceptance until after the next state elections.²⁶

²²Hicks, *Populist Revolt*, 427-430, 124-125; Shannon, *Farmers' Last Frontier*, 318.

²³Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 90-91; Summersell, "Kolb and the Newspapers," 384-385.

²⁴Montgomery *Advertiser*, August 9, 1890.

²⁵William Warren Rogers, "Agrarianism in Alabama, 1865-1896" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1959), 329.

²⁶Tuscaloosa *Times*, August 12, 1890.

Upon returning from St. Louis, the Alliance delegates met with a rising crescendo of criticism. Kolb — whose political fences had been in excellent repair before the convention — was charged with supporting treason against the Democratic party. Finding it necessary to defend himself, he affirmed his belief in white supremacy and said:

I voted against the entire series (of Demands), good and bad alike, because those to which I objected had not been eliminated . . . I yield to no man in my fealty and devotion to the Democratic Party, and I do not believe that the utmost ingenuity of my enemies can shake the faith of the people of Alabama in the soundness of my Democracy.²⁷

Kolb then announced his candidacy for the gubernatorial nomination as a Democrat.²⁸

A joint statement issued by Kolb and most of the other delegates answered other questions raised by the Demands. The men said they voted to leave the issue of Negro eligibility to the state alliances, denied that any steps had been taken at St. Louis toward the formation of a new party, and declared that any action by the Alliance leading to the establishment of a third party would violate its principles.²⁹

Kolb's candidacy, the Alliance in politics, the St. Louis Demands, and other important developments promised to make 1890 an interesting political year. In May, the Democrats would choose a successor to Governor Thomas Seay, who was completing his second term.³⁰ But conflict between the black-belt and North Alabama over legislative representation threatened to split the party into sectional camps, while declining agricultural prices and growing labor unrest added to the tension.

Labor protests appeared in the 1880s and gradually acquired a relationship to politics. As early as 1887, strikes in

²⁷Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, January 9, 1890, quoting *Montgomery Advertiser*.

²⁸Summersell, "Kolb and the Newspapers," 380.

²⁹Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, January 9, 1890, quoting *Birmingham Age-Herald*.

³⁰It was Democratic party policy to re-nominate the incumbent governor to a second two-year term, but that was traditionally the maximum term. See: Going, *Bourbon Democracy*, *passim*.

the mineral regions around Birmingham protested wage reductions by the mining industry, but a lack of organization prevented any success. The Knights of Labor had tried to organize Alabama labor in the early 1880s — even promoting separate Negro assemblies — but the organization never gained more than 400 members.³¹ The Knights, however, by appealing to increasingly resentful laborers, managed to form a Labor Party of Alabama in 1888 that called for higher wages, better working conditions, honest election laws, reforms in the convict lease system, and government ownership of the transportation and communication networks.³² Some members of the Wheel and of the Alliance joined the new party, but numerous factors prevented widespread success. First among the causes for failure was the deterioration of the Knights, for as they declined, the Knights “came to represent the employing, middle-class farmer, rather than the worker either on the farm or in the city.”³³ Moreover, no real unity among the laborers ever had been achieved. Yet the Labor party, although it lacked size and rapidly disintegrated, served as a first effort to bring Alabama’s laborers into politics.

By 1890, as prices began to drop from the comparatively higher levels of the late 1880s, Alabama began feeling the initial tremors of world-wide economic collapse. If Murray and Susan Stedman are correct in assuming that the first price declines induce large portions of the electorate to vote on the basis of economic distress, then the state was ripe for the appearance of a political force deprecating the existing system and appealing to the dissatisfied. The tone of the Alliance, indeed, pointed in that direction. State Alliance president S. M. Adams blamed low prices on a contracted currency and faulty legislation, and called for new laws to correct the ills of the financial system. Following his example, a large agrarian contingent felt that the distress they suffered could

³¹Frederick Meyers, “The Knights of Labor in the South,” *Southern Economic Journal*, VI (1939-1940), 479, 482-485; Ward and Rogers, *Labor Revolt in Alabama*, 23-28. Efforts to organize Negro labor in Alabama were met with violence. See; Sidney F. Kessler, “The Organization of Negroes in the Knights of Labor,” *Journal of Negro History* XXXVII (1952), 255, 264.

³²Ward and Rogers, *Labor Revolt in Alabama*, 37-38; Clark *Populism in Alabama*, 79.

³³Daniel M. Feins, “Labor’s Role in the Populist Movement, 1890-96” (M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1939), 29.

be traced to political origins and were ready to seek political remedies.³⁴

With unrest increasing and strong factions plotting to control the Democratic party, the structure of intra-party strength and state organization would be crucial. Because it appointed the all powerful Democratic State Executive Committee and virtually chose the officers of state government, the state convention held the key to dominance. Therefore, the selection of convention delegates was vitally important to any faction seeking to capture the party. While county conventions or primaries could be used, and conventions were the usual formula, each county executive committee had the right to determine the method for picking a county delegation to the state convention. Also, beats (precints) held either local meetings or beat primaries to select delegates to the county conventions. Once it was in the state convention, a county delegation's size determined the measure of its influence. Because there were no black delegates and the number of a county's white delegates was apportioned on the basis of the last Democratic vote for governor, black-belt counties received inordinate power in the convention. For example, Dallas County — with 9,285 whites and 45,372 Negroes — returned a Democratic gubernatorial vote of about 9,000 in 1888 and received 30 delegates, while Cherokee County — with 18,080 whites and 3,618 Negroes — had a vote of nearly 3,000 and got only 10 delegates. Twice as many whites in Cherokee possessed only one-third the delegate strength of Dallas County whites.³⁵

The resulting control of black-belt politicians over the party machinery, and their use of the Negro to preserve that power, produced the seeds of sectional splits within the Democracy. In 1889, Democratic papers, in largely white areas, demanded that representation in the 1890 convention be based solely on the white voters in a county. This seemed reasonable to those publications since only whites were allowed to vote in the primaries and to take part in the selection of convention delegates. The Bourbons, however, resisted any efforts to alter

³⁴Murray S. Stedman and Susan W. Stedman, *Discontent at The Polls: A Study of Farmer and Labor Parties, 1827-1948* (New York, 1950), 78, 80; Washington Gladden, "The Embattled Farmers," *Forum*, X (November, 1890), 315-316, 319, 321-322; *Montgomery Advertiser*, August 9, 1890.

³⁵Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 101-102, 98.

the procedure for selecting delegates. In fact, the *Advertiser* — while admitting that white counties would be under-represented in 1890 — called for settling the question by determining a county's delegation in the future on the basis of full population. Clouding the issue, the *Advertiser* said the black-belt should not be penalized because of the unfortunate presence of a large Negro population. Since Negroes would have served still as the source of black-belt dominance, the *Advertiser* was trying only to smooth over the conflict by proposing a solution that offered no real changes and by creating racial sympathy for the black-belt. To the profound dissatisfaction of the predominantly white counties, the situation remained unaltered, thereby leaving sectional animosity alive.³⁶

With tension mounting throughout the state, discussion turned to the approaching gubernatorial race. As yet, Kolb had been the only candidate to announce, but opposition to him soon became manifest. By January 1890, three of the four leading Democratic daily newspapers — the *Montgomery Advertiser*, the *Mobile Register*, and the *Birmingham News* — expressed their antipathy to Kolb. Only one of the leaders, the *Birmingham Age-Herald*, refused to declare against the commissioner. The *Age-Herald*, while criticizing the *Advertiser* for its stand against Kolb, straddled the issue of an endorsement and pushed for cooperation with the agrarians to bring political harmony. At the same time, Kolb claimed he had the backing of the state's newspapers.³⁷ Actually, most papers, as yet, had not assumed a definite position on a candidate; but they had opposed the St. Louis Demands, and conservative opinion was coalescing against Kolb and the agrarian political involvement.

As that opinion hardened, the position of Kolb and the Alliance in relation to the St. Louis Demands became a controlling factor in Bourbon arguments. Despite Kolb's statement denying that he had supported the Demands, the conservatives succeeded in linking him to them, thereby forcing him to defend them — to an extent. Bourbon opposition, however,

³⁶See: *Birmingham Age-Herald*, April 3, 1889, and *Montgomery Advertiser*, March 19, 20, 1889. Criticism had been hurled at the black-belt counties for their control of Negro votes ever since the restoration of white rule. See: Going, *Bourbon Democracy*, 33-42.

³⁷*Birmingham Age-Herald*, January 1, 29, 1890.

stemmed less from the nature of the Demands than from opposition to their source. With the Alliance threatening their dominance, the Bourbons attacked wherever they could. But fearing the political repercussions of a direct onslaught, they rushed toward the most vulnerable points. To the conservatives this meant the Alliance political activities. Kolb was attacked as the epitome of those actions. As the Bourbons carefully explained: opposition to Kolb had no implications of a stand against the brotherhood; rather, it was necessary to preserve cherished party solidarity.³⁸

Soon conservative reactions to Kolb and the Alliance became more pointed. There were reasons for this: the Bourbons, understandably, feared the basis of Kolb's strength — the distressed farmers — and realized the breadth of his appeal; moreover, his association with reform programs and pressure groups threatened the established party machinery. New faces entering the structure would leave less room for established politicians. In addition, the very foundations of Bourbon black-belt power were under attack. As the conservatives realized these things, they tightened their ranks and swore to defeat the common enemy. Their opposition became stronger and new tactics were used.³⁹

In order to draw support from Kolb, the Bourbons put out a large field of gubernatorial candidates from different areas of the state. The nature of Alabama politics made this a clever maneuver, since local candidates drew very heavy local support in most elections. By this method, the conservatives hoped to gather enough delegates pledged to their candidates to control the 1890 state convention.⁴⁰ Toward this purpose,

³⁸Thomas Goode Jones, "The 1890-92 Campaigns for Governor of Alabama," *Montgomery Advertiser*, September 17, 1911, reprinted in *Alabama Historical Quarterly*, XX (1958), 662; *Mobile Register*, March 13, 1890; *Tuscaloosa Gazette*, March 6, May 1, 1890, citing *Mobile Register*; *Tuscaloosa Times*, May 7, 1890.

³⁹Senator John T. Morgan to Robert McKee, May 24, 1890, Robert McKee Papers, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery; Thomas Goode Jones to John Dale, January 8, 1889, Official Correspondence of Governor Thomas Goode Jones (hereinafter cited as Jones Papers), Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery. See: Sheldon Hackney, *Populism to Progressivism in Alabama* (Princeton, N. J., 1969), 10.

⁴⁰Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 98. See: V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York, 1949), 37.

the *Advertiser* put up, among others, Thomas Goode Jones of Montgomery and "Honest Jim" Crook, a Calhoun County farmer-politician who had been the agrarian spokesman on the original Alabama Railroad Commission.⁴¹ Heading the long list of other possible mentioned by the Bourbons were a number of prominent Democrats from all regions of the state: Joseph F. Johnston, Birmingham banker; Probate Judge William Richardson, Huntsville; H. D. Davidson, Perry County planter; and Congressman William C. Oates, Henry County.⁴²

Seeking to capitalize on their representations of the Kolb-Alliance threat to Democratic solidarity, the Bourbons also injected strong emotional issue into the campaign. Kolb was charged with purposefully disrupting the party, thereby endangering white rule. The *Advertiser*, convinced of the truth of this allegation, criticized him daily and predicted his defeat. Criticism of the Alliance centered on its association with Negro local alliances and the execrable menaces that that engendered. Furthermore, conservatives said the Negroes were reacting as expected to the billowing factionalism among whites. Instances supposed to reveal increasing black insolence to white women and lack of the proper docility among Negroes received wide press coverage. To some Democratic editors, the dark spectre of Negro participation in politics seemed to be looming across the skies. All the myths of black reconstruction were added to the growing atmosphere of aroused racism. And Bourbon newspapers, showing the state's voters they stood on the side of white supremacy, reiterated the role of the Democracy in restoring white rule and reminded the Negro of his place in Alabama society, while lecturing him on his inability to participate intelligently in politics, and warning him of the dangerous ground upon which he tread.⁴³

Commissioner Kolb soon reacted to the conservative re-

⁴¹Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, March 6, 1890, citing *Montgomery Advertiser*; Allen J. Going, "The Establishment of the Alabama Railroad Commission," *Journal of Southern History*, XII (1946), 378.

⁴²Summersell, "Kolb and the Newspapers," 381-382.

⁴³Thomas Goode Jones to John Dale, January 8, 1889, Jones Papers; *Montgomery Advertiser*, January, 1890, *passim*; *Tuscaloosa Gazette*, May 29, 1, 1890. The Democratic editor of the *Gazette* pointed out that one Negro so adamantly resisted ejection from a railroad car reserved for whites that his eyeglasses had to be smashed in order to make him more cooperative. See: *Tuscaloosa Gazette*, May 1, 1890.

sistance. Previously, he had expressed his loyalty to the Democracy and to white supremacy, and he had sought to avoid connection with the St. Louis Demands. But incessant Bourbon attacks forced him to defend the Alliance ideals in a broad manner. Therefore, he adhered consistently to the principles of the brotherhood, but refused to campaign on the basis of the Demands. Kolb in fact, was giving his position a vagueness probably needed in Alabama. To help accomplish that objective, he gave a simplified explanation of the Alliance goals that was meant to appeal to the sense of disadvantage among the agrarians. After calling for Alliance support, while using his farmers' institutes more widely now for political purposes, the commissioner proclaimed that farmers should band together behind his leadership to promote their interests. Finally, in an effort to give his campaign a central theme, Kolb exhorted the people of Alabama to rise up and cast off the Bourbon machine.⁴⁴

Faced by growing press opposition, Kolb criticized the Bourbon newspapers and called into question the motives of their conservative editors. Following Kolb's lead, S. M. Adams, while making it clear he was and would remain a loyal Democrat, declared an Alliance boycott of Bourbon papers, and sharply denounced the *Advertiser*, saying it was printing a wide assortment of lies in an effort to destroy the brotherhood. Adams' boycott failed to affect the *Advertiser*, and most other established papers, but it did create problems for many hard-pressed smaller conservative organs. On the negative side, it served to weld the Bourbons together, causing them to redouble their resistance. At the same time, papers endorsing Kolb and supporting the Alliance received intensive economic pressure: businessmen withdrew advertising; banks called in loans and foreclosed mortgages. Consequently, many Alliance organs failed, while others soon reversed their former stance and opposed Kolb.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Montgomery *Advertiser*, February 13, August 16, 1890; Clark *Populism in Alabama*, 99.

⁴⁵Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, February 16, January 16, February 6, 1890; Northport *West Alabama Breeze*, November 6, August 14, 1890. On February 2, 1890, the Montgomery *Alliance-Herald*, the largest newspaper supporting Kolb, fell under a levy due to financial difficulties. The Alliance Exchange, however, paid its debts and continued publishing. See: Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, February 6, 1890.

By spring there were five announced candidates for the Democratic nomination. Besides Kolb, Thomas G. Jones, Joseph F. Johnston, William Richardson, and James Crook had thrown their hats into the ring.⁴⁶ The *Advertiser* leaned gradually toward open support of Jones, calling his party loyalty unimpeachable and praising his conservative stance. But it carefully avoided polarizing the Bourbon forces by finding all candidates — except Kolb — to be acceptable.⁴⁷

Jones epitomized Bourbon sentiment. He gave sympathy to the proposals of the Alliance and approved the right of farmers to organize. Yet he adamantly opposed the Alliance entry into Alabama politics, maintaining that the farmers should seek redress for grievances from the established party machinery. Jones's position is understandable, for he had been seeking the nomination for years through the properly constituted Democratic hierarchy, and he did not wish to see that hierarchy destroyed. He pointed out that the agrarians had no reason for challenging the Democracy, for the party, he said, held their interests close to heart. Why else had the Democrats established the railroad commission and lowered taxes? Jones, in referring to the St. Louis Demands, opposed the subtreasury as an unconstitutional measure designed to benefit speculators. He apparently vacillated on the money issue, giving some favor to both free silver and tariff reform as methods of solving the money question.⁴⁸

With the selection of delegates to the state convention soon to begin, the Bourbon press increased its attacks on Kolb. After groping for a way to denounce the commissioner without rending the party more than already had been done, the conservatives finally resorted to vicious personal assaults, thereby excluding discussion of other issues.⁴⁹ Vitriol was a non-economic, non-ideological verjuice they could pour on as thickly as possible.

⁴⁶Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, April 3, 1890.

⁴⁷Summersell, "Kolb and the Newspapers," 381.

⁴⁸Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, May 29, 1890; Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 99-100. See: Carolyn R. Huggins, "Bourbonism and Radicalism in Alabama: The Gubernatorial Administration of Thomas Goode Jones, 1890-1894" (M.A. thesis, Auburn University, 1968).

⁴⁹Most Alabama Democratic newspapers seldom gave more than superficial opinions on political questions. And after the personal charges against Kolb were introduced, they dominated political discussions appearing in the Bourbon press.

Because he had not resigned his office before opening his campaign (contrary to Democratic party customs), Kolb was labeled as a self-seeking politician. His administration was condemned as wholly political, critical references to his use of the farmers' institute were made, and questions arose in regard to his personal honesty. Democratic charges, which were based upon letters and sworn statements printed in Bourbon newspapers, held that the commissioner had committed fraud in a real-estate transaction twenty-five years earlier, and created enough talk to force an explanation.⁵⁰ Although he related the details of the transaction and satisfactorily maintained his innocence of any wrongdoing in an open letter, Kolb's statement was called "a lengthy document . . . made up wholly of denials unsupported by proof."⁵¹ On the basis of his refuted clarification, the *Register* branded Kolb a "self-confessed criminal."⁵² One Democratic paper expressed its conviction of his "want of fitness for the exalted position of Governor of Alabama."⁵³ But a far more damaging accusation dealt with Kolb's use of free passes on the state's railroads. When this information came to light, Bourbon papers throughout the state carried detailed stories revealing how Kolb had travelled for free but had charged the state for his expenses.⁵⁴ And as the campaign entered its final stages, conservative obloquy reached the point of absurdity: Kolb was accused of not paying the rent on

⁵⁰Montgomery *Advertiser*, August 16, 1890; Tuscaloosa *Times*, March 12, 1890; Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, April 3, March 13, 1890.

⁵¹Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, March 27, 1890.

⁵²Mobile *Register*, March 16, 1890.

⁵³Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, March 13, 1890.

⁵⁴Mobile *Register*, March 11, 16, 1890; Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, March 20, 1890; Tuscaloosa *Times*, March 5, 12, April 2, May 7, 1890. Kolb issued the following statement:

I have had passes on several of the railroads of Alabama, on some of them before I was commissioner of agriculture. I have had these passes since I have been commissioner. When I have been on my individual business, I have used the passes. When on business for the department, I have paid the fare. I have not felt that I ought to use railroad passes in my official capacity.

Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, February 6, 1890, citing Birmingham *Age-Herald*. Kolb was being condemned for a practice that was not unusual at the time. Furthermore, at least one of his opponents, Thomas Goode Jones, held a railroad pass in the future. See: James F. Doster, *Railroads in Alabama Politics, 1874-1914* (University, Ala., 1951), 37-38.

his watermelon patch.⁵⁵ Finally, the *Register* pictured him as a merchant posing as a farmer to attract votes and found him to be "the veriest demagogue that ever bowed before an audience; reckless of his promises, treacherous to the honest principles of his party and aiming at success with any weapon convenient to his reach."⁵⁶

Brought to a fevered state by the heat of their incessant revilement, the conservatives declared Kolb politically dead. The effects of their brickbatting, however, proved far less favorable than they could have foreseen. Kolb generally ignored the Bourbon attacks and left his defense to his followers, many of whom refused even to read or to hear the accusations.⁵⁷ The commissioner, himself, preferred to remind the voters of increasing receipts, from various sources, to the agriculture department and of the economy practiced under his administration. Following Kolb's lead, a zealot writing as "Farmer" judged:

His office is to-day of more financial and practical benefit to the people of this state, (and) brings more money back for that expended than any other in the gift of the people.⁵⁸

Kolb partisans also defended his integrity by saying it would be difficult to find anyone in politics who had no stains on his record. One supporter found it curious that twenty-five-year-old crimes should be discovered by Kolb's enemies in an election year. He pointed out that the misdeeds surely had been known to the critics before, and that the same men had praised Kolb since the crimes were supposed to have been committed.⁵⁹ Many sympathizers reacted more emotionally, calling the charges lies spawned by Bourbon greed and determination

⁵⁵Tuscaloosa *Times*, May 14, 1890. Kolb was pictured as a ruthless business cheat by the *Mobile Register*. See: *Mobile Register*, May 10, 22, 1890. The *Tuscaloosa Gazette*, May 15, 1890, accused Kolb of opposing the Alliance!

⁵⁶*Mobile Register*, May 23, 1890.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, May 10, 1890. Kolb's partisans did counter with some charges, many against Johnston, but they were ignored by the Democratic press. See: *Montgomery Advertiser*, April 18, 1890.

⁵⁸*Tuscaloosa Gazette*, April 3, 1890. See: *Tuscaloosa Gazette*, February 6, May 15, 1890.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, March 20, 1890. The *Gazette* cited the Atlanta (Georgia) *Constitution* as authority that Kolb had lost strength due to the numerous charges.

to crush the Alliance.⁶⁰ To many of Kolb's supporters he became a martyr suffering blows aimed by the Bourbon enemy at the beloved brotherhood. As a result, the Democracy was strongly polarized into two camps — Bourbons and "Kolbites."

Against a background of sweltering partisanship, delegates were chosen to the crucial Democratic State Convention. Bitter divisions produced split local conventions and contesting delegations, but a clear pattern of strength for each candidate developed. All the antagonists gained support in the proximity of their residences. Kolb took Barbour County, his recent home, in a convention marked by violence, and, with the exception of Johnston, was the only candidate revealing statewide appeal. His delegate-count included men from northern hill counties, central and southern counties, and the black-belt. Johnston carried Dallas — his former residence — in a primary, and Jefferson by the same method. Richardson won his home county (Madison) and gained backing in other rural, northern hill counties, including Blount. While also dominating his home delegation (Calhoun), Crook picked up additional support in north central Alabama. And Montgomery county, following the pattern, pledged for Jones.⁶¹

By convention time, in late May, Kolb reportedly controlled 215 delegates, about 50 shy of a majority, while Johnston, Kolb's nearest rival, was credited with 100. The remaining delegates were divided among Richardson (87), Crook (53), and Jones (50),⁶² With 264 votes necessary for the nomination, the Bourbons controlled enough delegates to dominate the convention; and they were drawn tightly together in their desire to dominate that body in order to resist Kolb and the Alliance. Moreover, the Democratic State Executive Committee was anti-Kolb. Even the entire Alabama congressional delegation opposed Kolb and feared the political threat of the Alliance. In

⁶⁰Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, February 6, 1890; Tuscaloosa *Times*, May 14, 1890. The Montgomery *Advertiser* predicted that Kolb would pose as a martyr. See: Tuscaloosa *Times*, May 21, 1890, citing Montgomery *Advertiser*.

⁶¹Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 98-99.

⁶²Montgomery *Advertiser*, May 25, 1890. The Birmingham *News*, May 8, 1890, reported the totals as Kolb (82½), Johnston (63½), Richardson (40), Crook (32), Jones (30).

fact, the total Bourbon machine was poised against the agrarians and their champion.⁶³

As the delegates began collecting in Montgomery, it was apparent that the 1890 Democratic State Convention would differ from recent conventions. For farmers comprised a majority of the delegates. But the old line politicians were present in full force. In view of the inexperience of most of the farmers in politics, and the intransigent antagonism of the entrenched, battle-tested Bourbons, it was unlikely that the agrarians could dominate the proceedings.⁶⁴

Kolb, nevertheless, called a caucus of his supporters in order to fuse them together and to prepare strategy for the convention. Meeting in the Montgomery County Courthouse May 29, the night before the convention balloting was to begin, 242 sympathizers heard rousing speeches espousing traditional Democratic ideals and proclaiming Kolb as the man best suited to be the next governor. Among others, H. D. Clayton, Kolb's campaign manager, and Kolb, himself, presented the virtues of the commissioner. A resolution was offered, but rejected, that would have pledged the delegates to iron-clad support of Kolb at all costs. Finally, it was agreed that they would just "stick by" Kolb.⁶⁵

When the convention convened, Bourbon control was quickly implemented. A firm Kolb opponent, H. C. Tompkins, Chairman of the Democratic State Executive Committee and a director of the Bank of Montgomery, called the delegates to order and appointed W. H. Denson — a Crook supporter — temporary chairman. A credentials committee was then named to rule on the seating of contesting delegations from Shelby, Lee, and Chilton counties. The convention soon adopted reports on the contesting delegations that were unfavorable to Kolb's forces, thereby revealing the presence of a clear-cut majority of anti-Kolb delegates.⁶⁶

⁶³Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 103-104.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*

⁶⁵Northport *West Alabama Breeze*, June 5, 1890; *Tuscaloosa Times*, June 4, 1890; *Montgomery Advertiser*, May 24, 1890. Kolb feared a combination of the Bourbons against him.

⁶⁶*Birmingham News*, May 28, 1890; *Montgomery Advertiser*, March 20, 1889, May 30, 1890.

As the balloting began, the strength of each candidate became apparent. The first tally showed Kolb with 235 votes, Johnston with 104, Richardson 88, Crook 53, and Jones 45. After two days of voting and thirty-eight ballots, Kolb's total had not climbed past 241, with only minor changes in the rest of the field. Following adjournment on the second day, Johnston's managers called for a conference between representatives of the Bourbon forces to find a way to stop Kolb.⁶⁷

Bourbon managers, meeting in an all-night session, sought to merge their aggregate vote behind an agreeable candidate. Johnston, of course, controlled the most delegates, but one fact made his nomination impossible. Jones's Montgomery County delegates were pledged to Kolb as a second choice; and if Jones were withdrawn their votes would push the commissioner over the top. Johnston and the other conservative candidates could hold their delegates and deliver them to Jones, if necessary. Jones's seeming weakness, and the strength of Bourbon determination to defeat Kolb, produced conservative coalescence behind Jones.⁶⁸

The following morning Johnston, Richardson, and Crook withdrew from the race, leaving only Kolb and Jones. On the next ballot Jones was nominated, receiving 277 votes to Kolb's 245. Before announcement of the results, however, H. D. Clayton withdrew Kolb's name and moved that Jones's nomination be made unanimous — as was done. In his acceptance speech, Jones called for Democratic solidarity to preserve home rule, white supremacy, and prosperity. Kolb followed, pledging his loyalty to the Democracy, and to its principles, and

⁶⁷Tuscaloosa *Times*, June 4, 1890; Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 105-108. Kolb was feverishly trying to trade votes with candidates for lesser offices in order to put himself over the total needed for nomination. See: *Montgomery Advertiser*, May 31, 1890.

⁶⁸Summersell, "Kolb and the Newspapers," 35; J. L. Sheffield to O. D. Street, June 2, 1890, O. D. Street Papers, Amelia Gayle Gorgas Library, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa. Sheffield wrote of the convention:

While I was no Kolb man, I think he was defeated by unjust rulings by the chairman, every stratigy [*sic*] and device that could be thought of was resorted to. I heard great mutterings among the Kolb men. Some said they did not consider it anything but a mob, and would not support Jones.

promising to stump the state for Jones in the forthcoming state elections.⁶⁹

As the Democrats smoothed over their differences, their normal opponents, the Republicans, gathered in convention in the same city. After calling the assembly to order, Dr. Robert A. Moseley, Jr., Chairman of the Republican State Executive Committee, delivered the keynote address. Denouncing Democratic frauds, he said they kept the Republicans from assuming their legitimate position as the dominant party in Alabama. He called for a free ballot and a fair count — a cry that would be heard increasingly in the years to come — and endorsed the ideal of a protective tariff. After Noble Smithson of Birmingham was found ineligible, Benjamin M. Long of Walker County became the Republican candidate for governor.⁷⁰

By 1889, fusion with independent groups and the rise of industry had increased Republican numbers in North Alabama. Also contributing to party growth was the national Republican policy which favored cooperation between state Republican parties and independent parties in the South. The same policy, however, also called for recognition of lily-white factions within the party. In Alabama, Republicans received black votes but failed to give Negroes a fair share of patronage and political recognition. The rise of a lily-white faction and the effects of discrimination spawned a rift between black and white in the Alabama Republican party.⁷¹

A group of state Republican leaders, who were not out of step with national party policies, developed a movement to oust the Negroes from the party and to cooperate with independents. Meeting under their leadership in Birmingham in April 1889, a large contingent of the party formed the White

⁶⁹Tuscaloosa *Times*, June 4, 1890; *Mobile Register*, June 1, 1890. The Northport *West Alabama Breeze*, June 5, 1890, proudly announced that the opposition of the press had brought about Kolb's defeat.

⁷⁰Tuscaloosa *Times*, June 11, 18, 1890. The remnants of the Alabama Greenback party held a convention in July and nominated Judge L. C. Goulson of Jackson County for governor. See: *Montgomery Advertiser*, July 8, 1890. The insignificant Alabama Prohibition party cancelled plans for a convention. See: *Tuscaloosa Times*, June 11, 1890.

⁷¹Allen J. Going, "Critical Months in Alabama Politics, 1895-96," *Alabama Review*, V (October, 1952), 271-272, and *Bourbon Democracy*, 49-54; Vincent P. DeSantis, "The Republican Party and the Southern Negro, 1877-1897," *Journal of Negro History*, XLV (April, 1960), 71-72.

Republican Tariff League. Negro Republicans met simultaneously and declared that they would resist and, ultimately, prevent expulsion. Robert A. Moseley, the former Talladega postmaster who headed another faction that favored retention of the Negroes, defied the Lily-Whites, joined the Negro assembly, and formed a coalition of Black-and-Tans. Since his group represented the majority of Alabama Republicans, Moseley soon became state boss of the party.⁷²

However, there remained a great deal of suspicion among the blacks of Moseley's motives; and by 1890, some Negroes were openly accusing Moseley of using their votes, and of failing to dole out the desired patronage. They announced that they would support Kolb, on the basis of the St. Louis Demands and his opposition to the Bourbons, if the Republicans did not put out a ticket.⁷³ Moseley managed, for the time being, to preserve his power and to keep his coalition alive by allowing a Republican slate to be drawn up in 1890 and by refusing to accept the offer of merger that was tendered by the remnants of the Alabama Greenback party. But the condition of the party still remained uncertain due to the presence of the Lily-Whites. In fact, one historian, speaking of the period before the 1890 elections, has said:

two Republican parties existed in Alabama, one relying on the Negro vote and the other anxious to divorce itself from Negro support and to co-operate with whatever dissatisfied white groups might wage political war on Democracy.⁷⁴

Because the Republicans were suffering from internal strife, the Democrats could have expected an easy victory, and they might have chosen to conduct a relaxed campaign, if 1890 had not been also a year of Democratic internal difficulties. The very existence of their differences made the Democrats eager to put up a united front in a strong campaign against the Republicans. To show their unity, the Democrats opened their 1890 campaign in Eufaula—Kolb's former home. W. H. Denson, temporary chairman of the recent state convention, while setting the issues in a lengthy and repetitious tirade against the Republicans, said:

⁷²Going, "Critical Months," 271; Rogers, *One-Gallused Rebellion*, 50.

⁷³Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, May 29, 1890. Moseley did appoint some Negroes to minor offices. See: Tuscaloosa *Gazette*, April 24, 1890, citing Eutaw *Mirror*.

⁷⁴Going, *Bourbon Democracy*, 54.

NO MATTER WHAT ORGANIZATION YOU BELONG TO, YOU OWE AN ALLEGIANCE TO THE DEMOCRACY OF THE SOUTH. THOSE WHO ARE AGAINST US ARE TRAITORS TO OUR INSTITUTIONS AND OUR RELIGION. LONG AND THE NIGGERS ARE TRAITORS TO OUR WIVES AND DAUGHTERS. THE MAN WHO VOTES FOR BEN LONG IS A TRAITOR, A SCOUNDREL AND AN OUTLAW AGAINST THE BEST INTERESTS OF OUR SOCIETY AND AGAINST THE GOD WHO GAVE HIM LIFE.⁷⁵

True to his convention pledge, Kolb endorsed the party nominees and travelled across the state making speeches in favor of Jones, for which he received the praise of most of the Democratic press. However, the *Mobile Register*, still permeated by the heat of months past, warned that Kolb's actions stemmed only from political expediency.⁷⁶

While Alliance candidates appeared on Democratic tickets in most areas, fourteen-cent corn and five-cent cotton, and interest rates often above ten percent, angered the farmers, who vented their wrath on the normal Democratic candidates. In many white counties, where a large Negro vote of doubtful legitimacy was not available to help them, Bourbon politicians often were cast out and agrarians placed in their stead. As the campaign progressed, local alliances adopted resolutions calling for legislation that they wanted their candidates to support. The measures advocated included some that were economic: exemption of farm implements from taxation, a maximum legal interest rate of six percent, and abolishment of the fertilizer tax. Others appeared progressive, such as increased appropriations for education, longer school terms, and the direct election of United States Senators, Railroad Commissioners, and the Commissioner of Agriculture. And others appeared unsavory or reactionary, including legal provisions for separate railroad cars

⁷⁵Birmingham *Age-Herald*, July 27, 1890.

⁷⁶Rogers, *One-Gallused Rebellion*, 184-185; Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 111. The Northport *West Alabama Breeze*, June 5, 1890, also refused to be conciliated. It said, "we do not think any more of Kolb now than we did before the convention. We believe he is the same man today that he was twenty years ago when he swindled old man McRea [*sic*] out of \$6,000."

for whites and Negroes, and a ban against running freight trains on Sundays.⁷⁷

The perspicacious Republicans, in a vain attempt to drive a wedge between the factions of the Democracy, appealed to the agrarians by endorsing the St. Louis Demands; but the results of the August elections made bare the bankruptcy of their plea. Thomas G. Jones overwhelmed his hapless opponent, accumulating 138,525 votes to 42,136 for the Republican Long.⁷⁸ The Republicans carried only Lawrence and Winston Counties, their traditional North Alabama strongholds. More significantly, although the next Legislature would be heavily Democratic, it also would be composed of a majority of Alliancemen in the House, and nearly one-third in the Senate.⁷⁹

Of course, the Democratic victory generated little surprise among political observers at the time. To the historian, however, the 1890 election is significant for the unrest displayed by the agrarians in their support of Kolb—a man called a traitor by his own party. Also significant is the excellent showing of Alliance candidates for the General Assembly.

The agrarians obviously had voted the way they did in the expectation that they would gain relief for their grievances. And the conservatives recognized the need to make some appearances of replying to the agrarian grumblings. Therefore, in his inaugural address, Governor Jones called for ballot reforms, without property or educational qualifications for voting, and advised that the convict lease system be reformed. Furthermore, he advocated better education for the masses of both races. Although his overall tone was quite conservative, and he declared the promotion of industrial prosperity to be the major task lying before his administration, Jones had infused his address with a measure of progressivism not present in recent inaugurals. And his cautious reform proposals dove-tailed nicely with his well-known position on the demands of the farmers: farmers should present their grievances to the Democracy and the party would listen. Moreover, in 1890 the Bourbons declared that they understood the needs of the Alliance

⁷⁷Shannon, *Farmers' Last Frontier*, 319; Rogers, *One-Gallused Rebellion*, 185.

⁷⁸*Manuscript Election Returns, Alabama Gubernatorial Election, 1890*, Files of the Secretary of State, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery.

⁷⁹Clark, *Populism in Alabama*, 111-112; Woodward, *Origins of the New South*, 203.

and listed them as organization among the farmers, defeat of the trusts, and procurement of equitable taxes. Of course, a Democratic party led by the Bourbons was presented as the agency through which all those needs and all other needs of the agrarians could be realized.⁸⁰

But Governor Jones and his party essentially failed to come to grips with the problem before them, for neither Jones nor his Democracy had the capability to react properly to fundamentally economic issues. For controlled as they were by laissez faire philosophy, they could not espouse governmental remedies for agricultural distress. The conservatives, therefore, offered the agrarians only strained sympathy, faulty understanding of their needs and goals, and the restrained reforms found in Jones's inaugural. The Bourbons, chained to a policy of party unity that bound them to avoid divisive issues, were forced to resist broad-based political movements that were rooted in discontent and based on new, magnetic ideas.

Conservative thought, viewed as the correct thought by its adherents, assumed that there would be no wide-spread challenge to the established system, and quite naturally, offered no alternatives to that system. Dedicated as they were to industrial progress, the Bourbons could not and refused to acknowledge the friction against their outlook created by the drag of agricultural deterioration in Alabama. Jones and the conservatives, moreover, derived additional cause for promoting industrial progress *from* agricultural distress. They assumed that agricultural prosperity would follow in the wake of business prosperity and, therefore, called for the farmers to follow them in the quest for progress.⁸¹

The agrarians, however, were involved in a crusade of their own making. To them agricultural prosperity heralded all other good times, so the basic assumption of their thought was antithetical to that of the conservatives. The result was that the agrarians could not be led by the Bourbons; nor could the conservatives follow the agrarians.

⁸⁰Tuscaloosa Gazette, December 4, 1890; Joseph R. Hollingsworth, *The Whirligig of Politics: The Democracy of Cleveland and Bryan* (Chicago, 1963), 8.

⁸¹Hugh Charles Davis, "An Analysis of the Rationale of Representative Conservative Alabamians, 1874-1914" (Ph. D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1964), 252-256.

In Alabama, the white man's Democracy was the parent of both the Bourbon and the agrarian outlooks. Because the two viewpoints were crowded together within the same party structure, they could remain together either so long as the appeals of tradition and of white supremacy allowed that structure to be expanded to include both strains of thought or until the increasing agrarian numbers cramped the edifice to the point of collapse. In 1890, and again in 1892, the Bourbon leadership refused to permit expansion of the top-level party structure to include agrarian leaders such as Kolb. But by 1892 the agrarian contingent had grown too large, and had experienced success too great and even failure too close, while their leaders had developed ambitions too strong, for the group any longer to suffer the constraints of the conservatives. Therefore, they collected the baggage reminiscent of their common heritage with the Bourbons and, with it in tow, separated themselves from the untenable union. The initial step toward that schism occurred in 1890 when the Alliance entered its large, dissatisfied agrarian following in the lists of Alabama politics.

BOOK REVIEWS

Edward K. Eckert. *The Navy Department in the War of 1812*. University of Florida Social Sciences Monograph Number 48. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press. 1973. Pp. vii, 77. \$2.00.)

Studies of the administration of the United States Navy Department during the early decades of its existence have been few, so few that the standard work remains Charles Oscar Paullin's series of articles published in the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* early in the twentieth century. Thus the appearance of a monograph dealing specifically with the Navy Department in the War of 1812 should be pleasing to students of United States naval history and to those interested in the early republic.

Eckert's work, written originally as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Florida, is based on official records and secondary materials. Most important, he was able to use the personal papers of William Jones, now held by the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Indeed, the dissertation was entitled "William Jones and the Role of the Secretary of the Navy in the War of 1812," and that title, cumbersome as it is, states succinctly the content of this monograph.

Briefly, Eckert contends that the Navy Department had developed haphazardly since its establishment in 1798, particularly during the period 1801-1812 when Robert Smith and Paul Hamilton were secretaries. The latter, who drank heavily, allowed affairs to lapse into a chaotic state even as warships of the United States Navy were winning their principal victories at sea. At the end of 1812, President James Madison received the resignations of the secretaries of war and the navy—Eckert does not explore the question of whether the resignations were requested—and quickly offered the latter position to William Jones, a Philadelphia merchant and sometime master mariner and congressman who had declined Thomas Jefferson's offer of the Navy Department in 1801. After a few days of thought, Jones accepted and became an effective secretary of the navy although hampered by the highly inefficient organization of his Department, which he was powerless to change during the course of the war.

To prove his point, Eckert considers Jones' performance in the areas of strategy, personnel, and materiels. The first is summed up by the statement that the secretary was an administrator, not a strategist—he found the means to carry out the President's strategic policies. Jones was more impressive in his dealings with the naval commanders, many of whom had been acting almost independent of any direction. He required careful accounting of expenditures and demanded that their activities be fully reported. With regard to materiel he took a keen interest in the design and fitting out of new warships, curbing the tendencies of the individual commanders to rig their ships according to their own ideas.

William Jones emerges from this monograph with an enhanced reputation, but a thorough study of the Navy Department in the War of 1812 has yet to be written. If Eckert can bring himself to make the Department itself rather than a single secretary the subject of his research, he may write this work. Until that time, we must continue to rely on Paullin.

Robert Erwin Johnson
University of Alabama

The Kemper County Rebel: The Civil War Diary of Robert Masten Holmes, C.S.A. Edited by Frank Allen Dennis with a foreword by Thomas L. Connelly. (University, Miss.: The University and College Press of Mississippi, 1973, Pr. XIX, 115. \$4.95.)

The Kemper County Rebel is yet another of those Civil War diaries covering a brief period of the conflict. This work is the diary of Robert Masten Holmes, C.S.A. and covers the short period from November, 1862, through May, 1863. During this six-month period Holmes was a private in the Army of Tennessee under General Braxton Bragg, following its retirement to middle Tennessee from the Kentucky campaign of 1862.

The volume is beautifully edited by Professor Allen Dennis of Cleveland, Mississippi. Mr. Dennis admits in the beginning that the diary sheds no new light on the history of the Army of Tennessee, but he defends the value of the publication as a worthy primary source written contemporaneous. Also he argues that it will prove to the Neo-Confederates that the Civil

War was not "some sort of valorous game free from sorrow and hardship. . . ." To this reviewer a better defense might be its geneological value. The editor has carefully shown numerous kinships in addition to an historical sketch of the Holmes family and Robert Holmes in particular. To those whose ancestors may have served in the area described the volume should have particular value.

Much as is true of other Civil War diaries of the foot soldier, this diarist spends much of his time in discussing the weather. To one who, as I have, has spent several years as a resident of middle Tennessee, the descriptions of the sudden changes, the bitter cold, and rain were very real. For one with only a blanket or tent as cover, weather was obviously uppermost in his thoughts.

It is surprising that Holmes' diary does not reflect more strongly the growing discontent in the Army of Tennessee. There was increasing criticism of General Bragg and expressions of the lack of confidence in him. This was particularly true after his retreat from Kentucky and ever more so after his failure to win a clear victory at the battle of Murfreesboro. This growing lack of confidence is duly recorded in other diaries of the foot soldier of the period. Holmes does appear to have been something of a model soldier, however, in that his complaints were kept to a minimum. Perhaps a critical comment on his superiors was unthinkable.

The excellent editing of Dennis is clearly evident in the thorough research and documentation found in the preface and the extensive footnotes. Mr. Thomas L. Connelly of the University of South Carolina has written a very appropriate foreword which adds much to the volume. An appendix and good index add value and utility to the publication. The publishers have produced an attractive and beautifully bound little book for the ever-growing collection of Civil War source material.

Gordon T. Chappell
Huntingdon College

Joseph E. Brown and the Politics of Reconstruction. By Derrell C. Roberts. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1973, Pp. 166. \$6.00.)

Joseph E. Brown and the Politics of Reconstruction is a brief biography of one of Georgia's most famous governors, one who was able to accomodate himself to the swiftly changing times of the 1860's and 1870's. Indeed, he was a political chameleon: a secessionist Democrat in 1860, a states' rights Confederate in 1861, a Johnson Unionist in 1865, a scalawag Republican in 1868, A Liberal Republican in 1872, a Bourbon Democrat in 1876.

Professor Roberts, dean of Kennesaw Mountain Junior College in Marietta, Georgia, surveys Brown's entire life and concentrates on his Reconstruction career. This study finds that Brown's antebellum career as a Georgia legislator and governor foreshadowed his narrow states' rights stance during the Civil War and his interest in education and railroad development during Reconstruction. After a four-year tug-of-war with Jefferson Davis and the Confederate government, Brown accepted the Confederacy's collapse and was conciliatory toward the federal government. While active in Georgia's post-war economic development, he increasingly supported Republican Reconstruction, and the author believes that this support arose from his concern about his substantial investments in Georgia real estate. Brown often spoke of a new era for the South and urged that Northern men and money be welcomed. In early 1868 Brown openly joined the Republicans, but his political activities continued generally to be behind the scenes. His only significant office as a Republican was that of chief justice of the Georgia Supreme Court. By 1874 he began to move toward the Democratic party, and in 1876 he was dispatched to Florida to help unravel the dispute over the electoral vote of that state. This activity cemented his position in the good graces of Georgia Democrats, and his revived popularity ultimately won him a seat in the U.S. Senate, 1880-1890.

Brown's career illustrates the familiar stereotype of the opportunistic Southerner who joined the Republicans when Democratic prospects were dim, only to flee the Republican ship when it began to sink. His career also contradicts the familiar stereotype of the scalawag as the trashy, poor white farmer, devoid of political experience prior to Reconstruction.

Professor Roberts has used extensive primary sources for the study, especially voluminous manuscript collections. These

are cited in his footnotes which his economical publisher has placed at the back of the book. Also included is a useful appendix listing Georgia governors and U.S. Senators and Representatives.

This study is a brief factual account of Brown's economic and political careers. Unfortunately, one leaves the book acquainted with his career but not the man, as there is little here to explain what made Brown tick or why he was a political chameleon. The study would also be improved with more information on the position of scalawags in the Georgia Republican party. Such material would provide some frame of reference for evaluation of the activities of Brown.

Joseph E. Brown and the Politics of Reconstruction is particularly valuable since the only other full-length biography of Brown focused on him as a states' rights Confederate. Professor Roberts' study of a scalawag who as also a highly successful businessman provides a new dimension to our knowledge of Brown and supplies another piece of the puzzling picture of Reconstruction history.

Sarah Woolfolk Wiggins
University of Alabama

Churches in Cultural Captivity: A History of the Social Attitudes of Southern Baptists. By John Lee Eighmy with an Introduction and Epilogue by Samuel S. Hill, Jr. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1972. Pp. xvii, 249. \$11.50.)

The title of the late Professor Eighmy's book accurately conveys the theme he develops. Several years of research and an easy flowing narrative devoid of narrow denominational concepts and ecclesiastical jargon mark his survey of Baptist responsiveness (or lack of it) to social issues from colonial times to the present. He argues well that Southern Baptists have been bound to their conservative orthodox regional culture since 1845, although he claims that the social gospel destroyed Baptists' uniform defense of "a cultural establishment" and promoted a growing tradition of social concern as to war, the economic order, and race relations. Because the evangelical tradition has remained dominant in Southern Baptist life,

Eighmy must deal with the minority of Baptists who have developed social concern. In short, the author tells the story of how Southern Baptists have lagged, not led, in social Christianity. His work in itself represents a growing if belated interest among Baptists in the social gospel.

Eighmy finds that Southern Baptists' defense of slavery, their "tragic" interpretation of Reconstruction, and their commitment to Bourbon regimes fixed regional cultural values in Baptist policy in the nineteenth century. He does, however, consistently present the views of dissenters within the Baptist establishment.

The social gospel did come South at the turn of the century as part of the progressive movement, although "long-standing problems of illiteracy, farm tenancy, and racial injustice were in themselves sufficient cause for an aroused social conscience." Only a few Baptist clergymen and laymen were caught up in social Christianity, however, and Southern Baptists never produced an Edgar Gardner Murphy nor an Alexander McKeleway. Eighmy concludes that in the light of Baptist "religious individualism, theological conservatism, decentralized authority, and denominational isolationism" it is remarkable that the social gospel influenced Southern Baptists at all. It did in the prohibition crusade, the introduction of Christian sociology courses at The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, and the founding of the Social Service Commission (1911). Southern Baptists accepted liberal commission report on occasion, but never implemented them. The founding of such an agency, however, "even with its shortcomings, marked a growing feeling among Southern Baptists that serious attention must be given to their social responsibilities." The traditions of personal evangelism and collective action continued their "coexistence . . . in denominational life [and] produced varied and sometimes contradictory responses in the social issues of the twentieth century."

Eighmy describes the Social Service Commission throughout its history as a "noble gesture" reflecting the denomination's obsession with personal conversion rather than social Christianity. World affairs, not philosophical abstractions determined the commission's position on war and peace; it never questioned white supremacist racial values; its pro-labor stance

of the 1930s was a departure from its laissez faire norm; and it continued its dry campaign. The commission represented a "half-way covenant" with social Christianity.

From 1935 to 1945 the simplistic Baptist social ethic manifested itself most strongly in opposition to federal aid for religious institutions, seen as part of the general southern reaction to the liberalism of the later New Deal. The Joint Committee on Public Relations, including Northern, Negro, and Southern Baptists, was created to safeguard the separation of church and state. The liberal social views of its first secretary, Dr. J. M. Dawson, were obscured by the agency's singular devotion to religious liberty.

After World War II, Dr. Jesse Weatherspoon, as Secretary of the Social Service Commission, made his name as a leading Baptist statesman of the century by "outlining a working philosophy that would enable the commission to deal with controversial social problems without appearing to stray from the convention's strictly religious purposes." Such was not the case. It became apparent that in facing the dominant social issues of the 1950s and 1960s—integration, federal aid to Baptist schools, and the election of a Catholic President—the evangelical clergy and laity controlled Baptist policy. Weatherspoon recommended that the Social Service Commission (renamed the Christian Life Commission) "proceed with caution" on divisive issues.

As Professor Samuel S. Hill, Jr. of the University of Florida ably observes in the Epilogue, Eighmy's book has two thrusts: it reveals that the social gospel affected Southern Baptists very little; and from 1913 to the present the Southern Baptist Convention has "deepened its commitment to social ministries." Furthermore, the breadth of Eighmy's study provides a much needed context for such recent and excellent scholarly works as Rufus B. Spain's *At East In Zion: A Social History of Southern Baptists. 1865-1900.*

Hugh C. Davis
Baylor University

The Two Faces of Janus: The Saga of Deep South Change. By J. Oliver Emmerich. (University, Miss.: University and College Press of Mississippi. Pp. 163. \$5.95.)

There is nothing especially novel about the theme with which J. Oliver Emmerich, the distinguished Mississippi editor, opens this absorbing little volume of essays and personal reminiscences, but it is a theme that bears repeating ever so often, if only for the benefit of this new generation of urban Southerners.

Emmerich's basic thesis is that cotton has been the determinant factor in Southern history and that cotton might be likened to the Roman god Janus, a creature of two faces, one face which curses and the other which blesses.

But the irony is, Emmerich believes, that this Cotton Janus inflicted all of his curses upon the South—the curse of “a philosophy intolerent of anything short of conformity; a philosophy of provincialism; a philosophy hostile to change because cotton in the beginning was accepted as for now and evermore; a philosophy of prejudices because it failed to distinguish right and wrong.”

By contrast, whatever blessings the Cotton Janus bestowed went to the American North and even to England, where Southern-produced cotton supplied the raw material for the beginnings of industrial society, not to speak of the capital gained by exporting the product.

Emmerich opens with a brief but fascinating chapter covering the history of cotton, but, after all, the Cotton Janus is as impersonal as the old Roman god himself, so the author moves swiftly into his subject—a scholarly discussion of the residual effects of Janus' curse upon the human population of the region.

Emmerich's subtitle for the book is “The Saga of Deep South Change,” but it becomes quickly apparent that for him, it is a saga of personal change as well.

He has, for example, a chapter entitled “three unforgettable characters.” These turn out to be (three) town blacks he remembers from his youth, and Emmerich's charming vignettes on them are faintly reminiscent of J. G. Baldwin's classic 19th

Century account of life in Alabama and Mississippi, *Flush Times*. One was a comical religious con man of sorts, another the genial town drayman, and the third a woman whose towering strength must have approached that of Ma Joad in *The Grapes of Wrath*. But it was only much later in life—long after the characters were dead—that Emmerich came to realize that each in his own way was struggling, and with some measure of success, to snatch a shred of dignity from a life spent in a scarcely-disguised form of slavery.

Why did he not recognize this when he first witnessed it? Let Emmerich speak for himself:

“To have been born and reared in the Deep South was to accept and embrace its prejudices, not deliberately, nor consciously, not even knowingly, but subconsciously, just as the white-blossomed dogwoods, the redbud trees, and the longleaf yellow pines are accepted as part of the Deep South scenery and as the midnight chorus of the mockingbird and the morning calls of the towhee, the wren, the brown thrasher are accepted as the sounds of the region. The alternative to conformity was to live under the suspicion of disloyalty.”

It is abundantly clear that throughout his life, Emmerich had little tolerance for reactionaries who opposed dipping livestock as a means of stopping the tick epidemic or for vulgar demagogues like James K. Vardaman and Theodore G. Bilbo — on which he has an arresting and often hilarious chapter. And yet, he allowed himself to be swept along by the more respectable reactionaries, those who, while using more polite political rhetoric, nevertheless misled the South around the middle of the Century no less than the demagogues who misled it a few years earlier.

And thus, in part, “The Two Faces of Janus” is a personal confessional error on the part of the author. Although he was among the delegates who bolted the Democratic Convention in 1948 — the celebrated “Dixiecrat year” — Emmerich now regards this dramatic act as sheer folly, dedicated more by emotion and blind adherence to tradition than by logic. When he examined his decision in the cold light of reality, he came to the inevitable conclusion that both political and moral

imperatives of our times dictated that we extend to every citizen the dignity promised him by the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the American tradition.

Having once made this personal commitment, he was the natural person to help lead his community out of the turbulent wilderness of resistance that characterized the early 1960's when his little community of McComb became ignominiously known as "the dynamite capital of the world."

So quite possibly the lasting historical value of this little book will be Emmerich's dispassionate personal account of his lonely personal crusade, in face of boycotts to his newspaper and physical danger to his person—he was once savagely attacked by a stranger in front of his newspaper—to bring about orderly change to a terrorized community. The beauty of the story is that it turned out to be a successful crusade, and Emmerich believes that McComb is a microcosm of what happened in the whole South.

He concludes his odyssey by returning to the Janus theme, but this time casting Janus in the mold of the god of Conformity—which, incidentally, was also a major theme of W. J. Cash's incomparable *Mind of the South*.

"Contrary to what many people believed," he concluded in reflecting over the past 20 troubled years, "a majority of the Deep South residents were not racists. The population was divided between racists and conformists. Included among the racists were the extremists. It is the historical pattern. And not to be forgotten is the fact that conformity is part of the philosophy of backwardness . . .

"What has happened in this region in recent years must be accepted as the achievement of a new enlightenment. It also provides a new freedom for white people who were tied to a pattern of militant conformity. Conformity, unrestrained and uninhibited, becomes a form of slavery. Conformity becomes a master. On numerous occasions throughout the year I have had good men whisper to me at time of heated debates, 'You are right but don't mention my name.' Escape from this master means a new freedom for the white people who were enslaved by it."

I was struck by one brief but remarkable episode related by Emmerich during his battles with the church-bombers. One night a cross was burned on his lawn—by coincidence, a few hours after his elderly mother had died. Shortly afterward an anonymous soul called him to apologize. “We would not have burned that cross in front of your home had we known of your mother’s death.”

And so perhaps there is another Janus—a Janus of the Southern character, so to speak—a creature with one body and two heads, capable of spastic, mindless violence on the one hand, and yet full of poignant compassion and civility and plain decency on the other.

Ray Jenkins
Alabama Journal

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
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Milo B. Howard, Jr., Editor

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LIEUTENANT THOMAS CAMPBELL'S SOJOURN
AMONG THE CREEKS
NOVEMBER, 1764 - MAY, 1765

by

Robin F. A. Fabel

Robert R. Rea

The most pressing concern of the infant colony of British West Florida, following the occupation of Pensacola and Mobile in 1763, was the establishment of stable and cordial relations with the Indian tribes of the interior. The Choctaw and Chickasaw, recent allies of the French, had to be won to a new loyalty, but even more critical was the attitude of the powerful Creek Nation whose lands lay between the westward thrusting Georgians and the new British posts in East and West Florida.

In spite of the influence of the French at Fort Toulouse, in the heart of the Creek country, that tribe had maintained a nervous neutrality during most of the Seven Years War, for British trade goods weighed more than French medals. The hostile attitude of the pro-French chieftain The Mortar was counterbalanced by the friendship of the old Wolf King whose town of Muklasa, just east of Fort Toulouse, both shielded British traders and threatened the French position. Hailed (quite inaccurately) by the British as King of the Upper Creeks, the Wolf King was frequently entertained at Savannah and Charleston during the war.¹

The elimination of French and Spanish authority east of the Mississippi by the Peace of Paris, and the British arrival on the Gulf Coast, created new tensions among the Indian tribes. No longer could the Creeks pursue their traditional exploitation of European rivalry. In November, 1763, the Wolf King attended a conference summoned by John Stuart, the new Southern Indian Superintendent, at Augusta, Georgia; and, consistent with his past conduct, the old Creek supported the boundary settlement for Georgia which Stuart there pro-

¹David H. Corkran, *The Creek Frontier, 1540-1783* (Norman, Oklahoma, 1967), 185, 187-188, 196, 199, 216.

posed.² Immediately following the Augusta meeting, the Wolf King turned south, and at the end of the year he joined several other chiefs visiting Mobile to receive their last presents from the departing French and their first gifts from the new masters of West Florida.

British troops under Major Robert Farmar had occupied Fort Conde at Mobile on October 20, 1763, immediately prior to the French Indian congress which met from November 1 through December 27. Thus Farmar found himself in the midst of some two or three thousand redskins and embarrassingly short of gifts with which to woo their favor. Happily, the French did everything they could to smooth relations between their old allies and the British, and Farmar discovered in the Wolf King a friend who offered sound advice. Well aware of the delicate balance of interests among the Creeks, the old chief warned Farmar against attempting to occupy Fort Toulouse. Although Farmar's instructions directed him to send troops to all the French posts, and he did order a detachment to the fort on the Tombecbe, Farmar concluded that his forces were insufficient to occupy Toulouse and contented himself with authorizing the Indian trader James Germany to reside in and maintain the English interest at that abandoned fort.³ The Creek chieftain's amity did not go unrewarded. To insure the Wolf's continued good will Farmar gave him handsome presents which included a hundred pounds of salt, two kegs of rum, three gallons of claret, two pounds of tobacco, some powder, shot, rope, two large horse bells, a pair of hose and a pair of shoes.⁴

From Mobile, the Wolf King traveled to Pensacola where he and his numerous warriors were entertained by Major William Forbes. Again there were declarations of friendship, but the Wolf made it quite clear that the lands north of Pensacola were Creek hunting grounds and any encroachment by the

²*Ibid.*, 238-239. Louis de Vorse, Jr., *The Indian Boundary in the Southern Colonies, 1763-1775* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1966), 151.

³Farmar to the Secretary at War, January 24, 1764; Farmar to James Germany, January 10, 1764: *Mississippi Provincial Archives, 1763-1766, English Dominion*, ed. Dunbar Rowland (Nashville, Tennessee, 1911), I, 10-12, 18. Hereafter cited as *MPAED*. See also Robert R. Rea, "The Trouble at Tombeckby," *Alabama Review*, XXI, (1968), 21-39.

⁴*MPAED*, I, 70-72.

English would probably lead to war.⁵ Realizing that without access to the interior, Pensacola could not support a growing population, and that traders and settlers could not be kept out of the Indian country, Forbes and his successor, Captain Robert Mackinnen, invited the Creeks to Pensacola in September, 1764, and won from the Wolf King a few territorial concessions. Unfortunately their agreement was almost immediately repudiated by both sides: on the British because Mackinnen had no authority to conclude such a treaty, on the Creek because no chieftain could so dispose of tribal lands without the concurrence of his fellows.⁶ In fact, it would seem that the Wolf King's actions in September, 1764, cost him his leading role among the Upper Creeks, and his generosity toward the British actually strengthened the influence of his rival and Britain's enemy, The Mortar.⁷

In October, 1764, the direction of West Florida Indian affairs passed into the hands of the newly-arrived Superintendent John Stuart and Governor George Johnstone. Stuart, engaged in establishing the southern Indian boundary, had no choice but to reject Mackinnen's treaty even though, as Johnstone observed, they were surrounded by several thousand "insolent" natives who could scarcely be held at bay by the mere 250 redcoats fit for duty. The Creeks were "extremely out of humour." The Mortar was leading his nation toward war, and, the Governor moaned, "The Wolf has lost his power."⁸

Johnstone and Stuart set to their work, engaged the former French commander of Fort Toulouse, Montault de Monberaut, as a deputy superintendent, and dispatched "various embassies" to the Creek Nation. The only one of these missions to attract scholarly attention was that of Louis Augustin Montaut, who succeeded in reaching the Mortar and persuading him to attend the great Creek congress at Pensacola in May and June,

⁵Forbes to the Secretary at War, January 30, 1764: *ibid.*, I, 114.

⁶Mackinnen to General Thomas Gage, September 20, 1764: Gage Papers, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. See also Milo B. Howard, Jr., and Robert R. Rea, eds., *The Memoire Justificatif of the Chevalier Montault de Monberaut* (University, Alabama, 1965), 11. De Vorsey, *The Indian Boundary in the Southern Colonies*, 205-206.

⁷Johnstone to the Secretary of State, October 31, 1764: Colonial Office, 5/574, ff. 58-59 (photostats in Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.).

⁸*Ibid.*

1765.⁹ A second party, sent to the Wolf King and the Tallapoosa villages, enjoyed comparable success in bringing in a number of other chiefs whose friendship was no less critical to the ends of British Indian diplomacy. It also produced a remarkable and rarely noticed description of the Creek lands and customs which merits closer scrutiny.

The author of this interesting document and the historian of the mission to the Upper Creeks was the young Lieutenant of Marines Thomas Campbell. No mention of his experiences will be found in the standard works of Clinton N. Howard,¹⁰ Cecil Johnson,¹¹ John Alden,¹² or Milo B. Howard and Robert R. Rea¹³ — an embarrassing oversight as Campbell's report was previously published in raw and unedited form by Edgar Legare Pennington in the *Florida Historical Quarterly*.¹⁴ Pennington noted that "The original of this letter is preserved by Sir Arthur Grant of Monymusk, Scotland."¹⁵ Pennington's lack of interest in the significant background of Campbell's letter and his unfortunate transcription of the recipient as "Lord Deane Gordon," consigned the item to scholarly limbo. It was rescued by David H. Corkran¹⁶ who drew upon a copy at the University of Edinburgh to illustrate the life and customs of the Creek tribe but chose not to pursue its origins and author. The version utilized by the present writers was noted by Lawrence H. Gipson¹⁷ and located by Robin F. A. Fabel in the Charter Room, Blair Castle, Blair Atholl, Perthshire, where it is identified as Atholl MS. (6) 99. It is here cited with the kind permission of His Grace the Duke of Atholl. The same document was used by Pennington and Corkran, but differences of transcription exist; spelling and punctuation have

⁹Howard and Rea, *The Memoire Justificatif of the Chevalier Montault de Monberaut*, 36-37.

¹⁰*The Development of British West Florida, 1763-1769* (Berkeley, 1947).

¹¹*British West Florida, 1763-1783* (New Haven, 1943).

¹²*John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier* (Ann Arbor, 1944).

¹³*Op. cit.*

¹⁴"Thomas Campbell to Lord Deane Gordon: An Account of the Creek Indian Nation, 1764," *F.H.Q.*, VIII (1930), 156-163.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 156.

¹⁶The Creek Frontier, 1540-1783. The authors are indebted to Mr. Corkran for his gracious assistance in pursuing an elusive subject and running it to earth.

¹⁷L. H. Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, Vol. XV: *A Guide to Manuscripts Relating to the History of the British Empire 1748-1776* (New York, 1970), 354.

here been modernized for the sake of consistency and convenience.

Junior officers in His Britannic Majesty's services, after the Seven Years War, occupied an unpromising position. Peacetime assignments offered little opportunity for distinction and promotion, and most would settle into a quiet obscurity that as effectively hid them from contemporary notice as from that of modern historians. Thomas Campbell was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant of Marines on July 26, 1756, and promoted to First Lieutenant on November 15, 1759. Assigned to shipboard duty he served in the West Indies in succeeding years, and on August 3, 1763, he was transferred from the 60th to the 61st Company.¹⁸ A year later Campbell was aboard H.M.S. *Tartar*, under Commodore Sir John Lindsay. On August 6, 1764, *Tartar* sailed from Port Royal, Jamaica, bound for Pensacola. As a passenger she carried Lord Adam Gordon, Colonel of the 66th Regiment of Foot, who was embarking upon a "grand tour" of the American colonies, and during the fortnight's passage there was ample opportunity for the distinguished traveler to make the acquaintance of a Marine officer and fellow Scot. Arrived in West Florida, Gordon visited both Mobile and Pensacola, made copious observations, and was treated with great deference by all. Gordon and Campbell were both in Pensacola when the Wolf King and some 300 braves came down to talk with Mackinnen, and Lord Adam was most favorably impressed by the strict control the chief exercised over his followers. "The Wolf seemed a Sensible Old Man," wrote Gordon; and the Indian, who apparently looked his age, told the Scot that "he might be a hundred years old."¹⁹ When George Johnstone landed at Pensacola, October 21, he conferred with Gordon, and it seems likely that his Lordship brought Campbell to the Governor's attention, perhaps forwarding his assignment to the Creek mission, before the peripatetic Colonel's departure on November 1. Campbell certainly got on well with Johnstone who subsequently observed that "all his remarks were judicious," and commended him "as a most de-

¹⁸*Army Lists* (London: J. Millar, 1757-64). Campbell remained a First Lieutenant for ten years before retiring on half-pay in 1769, only to return, briefly, to active service between 1771 and 1772.

¹⁹Lord Adam Gordon's *Journal in Travels in the American Colonies*, ed. Newton D. Mereness (rpt., New York, 1961), 381, 385, *passim*. The Wolf King was still alive and resident at Muklasa in 1772, but he was then extremely feeble.

serving young man.”²⁰ Sir John Lindsay, Campbell’s commanding officer, worked harmoniously with Governor Johnstone, himself a sailor by profession, and allowed adventurous young lieutenants a great deal of freedom.²¹ There being little call for the services of Marines at Pensacola, Campbell undoubtedly leaped at the opportunity for high adventure and possible distinction offered by the Governor’s plan to send agents into the Creek country in the winter of 1764-1765. If Campbell was a sort of military attache lending the color of authority to the mission, the operation was undoubtedly guided by the Pensacola trader, John Hannay. Hannay was the brother of a well-established London merchant, Samuel Hannay, whose petition for West Florida lands Johnstone had supported prior to his departure from London in the Spring of 1764.²² John Hannay’s services and connections would soon win him appointment as Naval Officer, Register of the colony, and Deputy Provost Marshal, for Johnstone described him as “the person who went into the Creek Nation to bring down the Mortar[!], and to whose abilities and courage, in venturing himself among them while in that desperate state, we owe, in great measure, the peace with that Nation.”²³ Such was his stature in the affairs of West Florida that in November, 1765, John Hannay was named to membership on the Governor’s Council.²⁴

The mission to the Upper Creeks was instructed by John Stuart, and on November 19, 1764, the Superintendent drafted “talks” to be presented to the Mortar and the rising young

²⁰Johnstone to Conway, June 23, 1766: *MPAED*, I, 513.

²¹For another example see Robert R. Rea, “A Naval Visitor in British West Florida,” *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XL (1961), 142 ff.

²²Petition of Johnstone, Hannay, and John Mackintosh, June 19, 1764: CO 5/574, f. 42. Samuel Hannay made a fortune selling quack medicine at his shop in Philpot Lane. His wealth was sufficient to enable him to become a Director of the East India Company, secure recognition as heir to a Scottish baronetcy, and win election to the House of Commons in 1784. In these matters he was closely associated with James Macpherson who was secretary to Governor Johnstone in West Florida in 1764. Johnstone was himself deeply involved in East Indian business in later years. See James M. Holzman, *The Nabobs in England: A Study of the Returned Anglo-Indian, 1760-1785* (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1926), 60, 83, 116.

²³Johnstone to Halifax, September 14, 1765; Conway to Johnstone, March 13, 1766: *MPAED*, I, 289, 297. Johnson, *British West Florida, 1763-1783*.

²⁴Minutes of the Council, November 2, 1765: West Florida Transcripts, State Department of Archives and History, Montgomery.

chieftain of Little Tallassee, Emistisiguo.²⁵ These were given to John Hannay and Thomas Campbell, and the two set out from Pensacola on November 20. "We were," wrote Campbell, eleven days upon the path, every evening putting up by some river or creek about sunset, where we turned out our horses, made a fire, dressed as much provisions as served us that night and next morning, spread our blankets and went to sleep. Early in the morning our guides would search [for], bring in and pack our horses. We generally set out about eight in the morning, were obliged to travel slow and continue it all day as our horses were very bad. Thus we traveled till we came to the Muckleassah village which bears north from Pensacola 213 miles.

Campbell's estimate of the distance to the Tallapoosa conformed closely with David Taitt's subsequent calculation of about 225 trail miles between Pensacola and the Cullamies, a village about three miles from Muklasa. Modern highway engineers have reduced the distance to about 180 miles. The route followed the well worn path to the Upper Creek villages charted on Taitt's "A Plan of part of the Rivers Tombecbe, Tensa, Perdido, & Scambia in the Province of West Florida" following his journey of January 30 - February 12, 1772.²⁶ The trail ran northwest from Pensacola, paralleling the Lagoon and following U.S. Highway 29 for nearly five miles, then swinging north-northwest and finally crossing the Little Scambia or Pine Barren Creek about where U.S. 29 does today, about twenty-seven miles north of Pensacola.

"As we went from the sea," Campbell continued, the land improved in a slow and equal proportion, most perceptible by the sides of creeks and gullies, where both the trees and the canes as we advanced into the country increased in strength and number. Near the sea . . . is pine barrens with a few dwarf oaks, and in the swamps there are a variety of laurels, vines, live oaks and cedars. When we got about thirty miles [from] Pensacola Fort, where we halted the second night,²⁷ we found the swamp filled

²⁵Alden, *John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier*, 205.

²⁶MPG-6, Public Record Office, London. Taitt's Journal is found in Mereness, *Travels in the American Colonies*, 497-501.

²⁷Near Bogia, Florida.

with reeds, the leaves of which our horses fed upon very well. In shape they resemble the palmetto, but of a much livelier green colour.²⁸ At the same place we found a few chestnut trees and [a] great deal of sassiffrass and golden-rod. We found many large pine trees lying across the road which kept us from traveling about twenty miles a day; they seemed to have been blown down as the roots were torn out of the ground. About fifty miles from Pensacola²⁹ there is a pine barren, two or three miles of which is entirely clear above; and the many pine trees which grow lie most irregularly upon the ground, where they appear to have been driven by some violent hurricane or earthquake. We crossed a great number of creeks, but only swam our horses over two, and found a large tree laid across each, on which we carried over our provisions and blankets.

Having followed a course roughly paralleling U.S. Highway 29 from Pensacola to Flomaton, the Creek path veered left, keeping to the west bank of the Escambia, until it reached the approximate line of U.S. Highways 31 and I-65, which it then followed to about Greenville. From thence the path bent northeasterly toward Ada. Campbell continues:

When we got about a hundred miles up the country we passed over several hills, some pretty steep but none high.³⁰ We then passed through some large thick cane swamps near a mile broad, the canes near thirty feet high, with leaves and small branches from the root to the top. The horses and black cattle feed entirely upon them all winter, in the Creek Nation, and keep very fat. We passed different sorts of land, large tracts pretty clear of underwood, and filled with red and white large oak trees, the scaly and smooth hickory, dogwood and sassiffrass, chestnut, spruce and yellow pine trees; sweet maple or the sugar tree; mulberry and plum trees; large gum trees; cedar and cypress generally in the swamps, the last very large, and the bark is used for covering of houses. Between there and the cane

²⁸*Sabal minor*, the scrub or dwarf palmetto, is widely distributed in the Gulf coastal plain. It is a darker green than the saw palmetto which has yellowish green fans or leaves and is restricted to the sandy coastal area where ground water is very near the surface. Scrub palmetto is frequently browsed by both cattle and horses.

²⁹About Robinsville, Alabama.

³⁰Between Fort Deposit and Highland Home.

swamps are pine barrens, and about 50 miles before we came to the first village we passed through a most delightful country.³¹ The fields large, even and open and surrounded with thin strips of planten,³² and varied by long avenues running from east and west, of which we could never see either end. When we went up, the grass was all burned, but coming down it appeared most beautiful.

The travelers swung north through the Mount Meigs area to the Tallapoosa River, their destination the Wolf King's town of Muklasa. Known to the French as Mongoulachas, to James Adair as Amooklasah, it was located between two and nine miles east of Fort Toulouse and was said to be situated "on the left bank of a fine little creek." One of the most important Upper Creek villages at mid-century, it numbered between thirty and fifty fighting men in 1764.³³ There Campbell and Hannay found "that faithful stern chieftain" the Wolf King, in James Adair's words, "our old steady friend."

"Upon our arrival at the Muckleassah, the Wolf King's village," Campbell reported,

they had up English colours, and he and the old men came to the trader's house we put up at. A man who had been long among them spoke their language well and was appointed one of our interpreters.³⁴ After the Chief

³¹Lower Montgomery County. William Bartram traveled the Creek path from the Tallapoosa to Mobile in 1775 and described the Alabama countryside with a botanist's eye. See Francis Harper, ed., *The Travels of William Bartram: Naturalist's Edition* (New Haven, 1958).

³²Planten: a planting or uncut division of the fields by low growing bushes.

³³James Adair, *The History of the American Indians* (London, 1775), 263, 277. MPAED, I, 94. Louis de Vorsey, Jr., ed., *De Brahm's Report of the General Survey in the Southern District of North America*. (Columbia, South Carolina, 1971), 165-166. John R. Swanton, *Early History of the Creek Indians* (Washington, 1922), 207.

³⁴Swanton (*Early History of the Creek Indians*, 207) identifies the traders at Muklasa as James Germany and William Trewin. Germany was under instructions to live at abandoned Fort Toulouse, but at this date he may have preferred to enjoy the Wolf King's protection at Muklasa. Taitt found Germany at the Cullamies in 1772 (Mereness, *Travels in the American Colonies*, 509); Harper (*The Travels of William Bartram*, 642) identified the trader at Muklasa in 1775 as John Adam Tapley, but he was a young man. The trading house at Muklasa has been established about 1740 by John Spencer who was murdered in May, 1763, by followers of the Mortar (Corkran, *The Creek Frontier, 1540-1783*, 213, 235-236).

first, and the rest in turn, had taken us by the hand, we all sat down; and after remaining silent for some minutes in order to rest and recollect, a custom they never neglect, the Wolf told us, as we had traveled and must be fatigued, he could ask no questions that night to trouble us, but would go home and send us some refreshment. He took his leave and the rest followed and immediately sent us some very fine boiled corned beef, with sweet potatoes roasted which were very acceptable. Next morning they came to us, and after being acquainted with the intent of our coming among them, said they were glad to see us, but that most of their chiefs and other head men were hunting in the woods, and that there were none left in their towns and villages but old men and women and those unable to bear the fatigue of traveling, and it would be some time before they would come in and we should have an opportunity of calling them together.

Finding their diplomatic mission delayed by the requirements of Indian survival, Campbell and Hannay settled into the routine of Creek life. The young Marine officer enjoyed a unique opportunity to observe the native American in his natural state during the five months he lived on the banks of the Tallapoosa. By his account he visited most of the Upper Creek villages and saw for himself their social customs, noted their military tactics, and marvelled at the rich lands of central Alabama. His subsequent report antedates and supports the better known descriptions of the Creeks published by Adair, Bartram, the French adventurer Milfort, and those few others who visited the Creek country and wrote about it during the British hegemony.³⁵

The upper Creek villages lie mostly between and upon the Tallapoosa and Coosa Rivers, which form a bight of about forty miles broad, and join a little below the Alabama Fort [Fort Toulouse], from which place they run into the head of Mobile harbour. By this river the French set up large canoes and supplied their fort with guns, ammunition, and men. The banks of these rivers are in many places high and steep, and those parts which are low are mostly thick cane swamps; the ground is in general rich. The whole

³⁵See Corkran, *The Creek Frontier, 1540-1783*, 3-40.

nation is bounded by our settlements upon the east, by the Cherokees on the northeast, the Choctaws on the west, the Chickasaws on the north and northwest, and East and West Florida on the South. They have a great many small creeks that run across the country. Their villages and plantations are always near a running water. They begin to plant corn, beans, and sweet potatoes [at] the beginning of April and the end of March. All the men and women go into the field together without distinction and hoe and enclose for the use of the village, which is distributed when ripe to the different families in proportion to their number. Their grounds are very rich, as [although?] they seldom change and never manure them, and have generally good crops, and they depend so much upon it as to plant no more than just serves from one year to another. When they have a bad crop they must be in great distress, as Indian corn is their chief food all summer, which they use in many different ways. By beating to fine flour in a large wooden mortar they make bread of it; by parching before it is made into flour, they make hominy or potage; and by preparing it not quite so small, and boiling it with oak or hickory ashes, they make [a] thin drink which is mostly used all summer. The salts which are in the ashes make it ferment after boiling, which gives it an agreeable tartness, makes it cool, refreshing, wholesome and fit for that hot season.

About the beginning of April the fields begin to look very agreeable. The peach trees, plum trees of many different sorts, are in bloom. The dogwood trees, the sweet smelling shrubs of which they have great variety are in full bloom; the red birds, bluebirds and nightingales sing sweetly all day, and in the night the woods resound with the wild noise of beasts, birds, and reptiles. The beginning of May, they are obliged to weed from the Indian corn the wild onions which grow very thick among them. At this time the wild strawberries are ripe, of which fruit they have great plenty: they are very near as large as our common garden ones, very sweet, and have a delicate flavour. They have a great many mulberry trees, and so large that I have been obliged often to cut them down to come at the fruit. They have very good horses, between

the English and Spanish breed, and a great many of them run wild about the woods and increase fast. The black cattle, sheep and goats increase fast; they have not many at present as they got them but lately among them. The Wolf has got about two hundred head of black cattle, most of which he has given to his children for fear they should be killed after he dies. They have great plenty of hogs of good kind, which are best in December, when they live entirely in the woods upon acorns, chestnuts and roots. In every village they have fowls, and during the winter the rivers and ponds are filled with wild fowl. Their meats are many, but what they live mostly upon when hunting in the woods is deer, bear, beaver, buffalo and wild turkeys, but when they are hungry they will put up with possums, squirrels, racoons, foxes or any other creature that comes in the way. Their meats must be very much boiled or roasted before they will eat of it. The most common way they dress it is upon a stick, put up before the fire, and some distance from it, which dries out the juice gradually and makes it keep for months. They sometimes boil it into broth with Indian corn.

The men are in general of a middle size, well limbed and clean-made, with features serious, manly and agreeable. The women are short, thick, and strong in proportion, and some of them very handsome. They give their children great indulgence. Their sons they teach to bear with patience cold, heat, hunger, and to despise all fatigue, to lurk without fire or any other food except a little parched Indian corn for several days, when they have the least expectations of surprising an enemy, for they attack them, as their game, by stealth. When at war they generally are in parties of 20 or 30, sometimes fewer. They never ask any but their own family or clan to go with them, and those they only acquaint [that] they are going out against such a nation and will remain a certain time at such a creek or hill [where] those who have a mind will find them. Their prisoners they often kill in a very cruel manner, and the women assist and are worse than the men. This seems not, however, to be their natural disposition, for they are compassionate and assist each other when in distress and are hospitable to strangers where

they have no suspicions of their having designs against them. They are jealous of our growing power from the quick increase of inhabitants in our settlements and the cultivation of their neighbouring lands. They have been for several years past laying up stores of powder, ball and other necessities, knowing it is impossible they can continue long in peace, for no Indian is looked upon as a man till he has killed and scalped. They have within these few years killed several of our subjects and never given the least satisfaction. This makes the young men presumptuous and the old cautiously provide against the evil they cannot avoid. It lies with the family injured to revenge their own quarrel. If a man is killed, his family will revenge it upon him who committed the murder, but if he escapes they will kill one of his family, and none of the rest of the tribes will offer to interfere. The customs and superstitions among them are many, the laws few, but tho' in an irregular and confused manner, yet almost always put in execution. The women before marriage have a right to do or act with the men as they please, but if they should transgress after bound in wedlock, the parties concerned have their ears and hair cut off, and [are] beat often till left for dead; at certain times, the women neither eat, sleep nor live in the same house with their husbands. When they go out to hunt, none asks where they are going, or how long they intend to stay; that depends entirely upon the success they have. They take horses sufficient with them to carry their provisions, blankets, and wives.

The head men may call a public meeting, but any tribe may go to war without consulting the nation. None but near relations enquire after the sick, and the name of the deceased is never mentioned. When a man dies they bury his gun, shot pouch and blanket with him, shoot his horses and dogs, and put from their sight everything that was his.

. . . They have a great feast called the Busk, sometime in July, to prepare for which they fast, physic and keep from their wives four days. They then burn of the new corn, and of venison, and put out all the old fire and make a new before they will eat of the first fruits. The new fire is made by rubbing two dry sticks against each

other. There are many other ceremonies attending this great feast. A man may put away his wife, and a woman her husband, but she is not at liberty, whatever time she and her husband parted, till after the Busk. A woman must remain four years single after the death of her husband, and her freedom begins from after the Busk the fourth year.

With the approach of Spring, Campbell became particularly attentive to the public life of the villages as he and Hannay sought to stir their hosts to journey south. Writing of the tribal deliberations Campbell noted that

They have a public square in every village where all councils are held; the sides are about forty-five feet, and each is divided into three cabins covered with cane mats; they sit in these according to their different ranks, which they acquire by the number of scalps they have taken. They do not begin to speak immediately when they sit down in the square, and never upon public business till they have smoked and handed about a certain black drink called cassina; never but one speaks at a time; the rest give silent and serious attention.

Campbell and his colleague remained among the Creeks until the first of May, 1765. "When the head men were all come in," he wrote, "we called two public meetings and delivered to them what we had in charge, with which they were very much pleased, and most of the chiefs and principal men of both the upper and lower Creek villages came down with us to the Congress held at Pensacola the June following."

The Creek Congress proved to be a triumph for John Stuart and British Indian diplomacy. If the conversion of The Mortar to a more friendly attitude was the key to success, it was certainly abetted by the presence of those Anglophile chieftains who accompanied Campbell to Pensacola. The young officer is not listed among the notables who smoked the pipe of peace in celebration of the resultant treaty, but he was doubtless among the interested observers.

Campbell apparently found himself temporarily "on the beach" from June, 1765, until the end of 1766. The favor he enjoyed with Gov. George Johnstone enabled him to engage in

the most common provincial economic pastime, the acquisition of real estate. On August 13, 1765, he was granted a tract of land on Deer Point, and a further grant of 240 adjoining acres was made to him on October 3, 1766.³⁶ It is doubtful that Campbell made any effort to develop his properties, for he must have left the colony not later than the spring of 1767.

The record of Lieutenant Campbell's "journey among the Indians" was compiled while he sat in Portsmouth harbor in June, 1767. Attached to the guard ship *Dragon*, Campbell utilized his time to draft a letter, dated June 14, to Lord Adam Gordon, begging his Lordship's interest "to assist in my promotion." Having spent ten years in the Marines, Campbell had learned that promotion "entirely depends upon interest, of which I have very little or none." "Several officers have been put over my head," he sighed, "one lately who had been at Patagonia. If that was the certain road to promotion in our service I should be very happy in going." The wilds of South America would surely have provided further adventures for a man who had wintered with the Creeks in Alabama.

³⁶Clinton N. Howard, *The Development of British West Florida, 1763-1769* (Berkeley, 1947), 66, 78.

WILLIAMSON R. W. COBB:
RATTLER OF TINWARE AND CROCKERY FOR PEACE

by

David Ritchey

"Uncle Sam is rich enough to give us all a farm!"¹ sang Williamson R. W. Cobb,² as he campaigned for the Alabama House of Representatives in 1844 and 1845 and for the Congress where he was seated in the House of Representatives between 1847 and 1861. As Cobb sang this song which became one of the most popular songs in North-Alabama in the 1840's and 50's, he adapted to each audience. He would establish eye contact with members of the audience, wink, and punctuate "his phrases by chewing, with great gusto, a piece of onion and coarsest of corn 'pone.'" ³ Cobb's song, entitled "The Homestead Bill" and Alabama Bill Number 45⁴ which was designed "To exempt certain property from execution," provided him with the public support necessary to remain in the House of Representatives for thirteen years and to be the last Southern Representative to speak in the House before the Civil War.

The first bill Cobb proposed when elected to the Alabama Senate was a homestead bill (Alabama Bill Number 45), which provided that indigent whites could retain certain articles even though their possessions were sold for debts. He maintained in the bill that "there shall be reserved for the use of every family in this state, one dozen cups and saucers, one set of knives and forks, one dozen plates, one coffee pot, two dishes, and three cows and calves, and twenty head of sheep; also, all family portraits, and also two sets of plough gear."⁵ Alabama

¹Virginia Clay-Clopton, *A Belle of the Fifties* (London, 1905), 21.

²An artist's sketch of Cobb is in "The Last Delegation from Alabama in the Old U. S. Congress Before the War," *Harper's Weekly*, V (February 9, 1861), 81. This issue of *Harper's Weekly* is preserved in the James Pugh Collection, Department of Archives, Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama. A reproduction of the illustration is included in Malcolm McMillan, *The Land Called Alabama*, (Austin, 1968), 191.

³Clay-Clopton, *Belle of the Fifties*, 21.

⁴*Acts Passed at the Annual Session of the General Assembly of the State of Alabama; Begun and Held in the City of Tuscaloosa, on the First Monday In December, 1844* (Tuscaloosa, 1845), 28.

⁵*Ibid.*

legislators passed this bill with little discussion. Certainly, any family, no matter how poor, deserved its crockery and family portraits. Mrs. Clement C. Clay, Jr., whose husband lost to Cobb in one election, noted in her autobiography that whenever Cobb needed to pull votes, he would remind his poor constituency in Jackson County that he had proposed this home-stead bill. The cynics mused that when Cobb needed votes he resorted to "rattling the tinware and crockery."⁶

Born in Rhea County, Tennessee, June 8, 1807, Cobb and his family moved to Alabama two years later and settled on a cotton plantation. Cobb received a limited education, worked as a clock peddler for a while, and finally entered the mercantile business in Bellefonte (Jackson County), Alabama. In 1844, he was elected to the lower house of the General Assembly and re-elected in 1845. In 1847, he was elected to Congress and remained in the House of Representatives a week after Alabama had seceded from the Union. In 1865, he was elected to the Confederate Congress, but did not claim his seat. It was rumored that Cobb had received an appointment from President Lincoln as military governor of the state.⁷ This rumor was never proven. The rumor and Cobb's failure to claim his seat in the Confederate Congress, however, caused the Confederate Congress to vote unanimously to expell him. He died later that year when a pistol he was carrying accidentally discharged while he was repairing a fence on his property in Bellefonte.

Historians, contemporary of Cobb, provide a blurred image of the man. Mrs. Clay-Clopton described a rustic stump speaker. William Garrett wrote that during Cobb's tenure in the General Assembly he was "a man ridiculous enough in his manner and ideas to provoke merriment among his fellow members."⁸ Garrett noted that Cobb communicated regularly with his constituency by way of the mailbags, postoffice, and franking privilege. The author wrote that Cobb, in his speeches, "played upon their prejudices of poverty, and always presented himself as the especial friend of the poor man." Gar-

⁶Clay-Clopton, *Belle of the Fifties*, 21.

⁷W. R. W. Cobb file, Department of Archives, Montgomery, Alabama, contains one item, a "certificate to travel to all parts of the Confederate States," dated, May 26, 1864. This certificate may or may not have a relationship to the rumor that Cobb was Alabama's Military Governor.

⁸William Garrett, *Reminiscences of Public Men in Alabama* (Atlanta, 1872), 396.

rett went on writing that despite "his demagogism, he was vigilant and true in guarding and promoting the interests of his District and section." Cobb's interest in his district and the people in his district is made evident when Garrett writes that Cobb provided a valuable service to gentlemen from his state who visited Washington in that he would "call on them, show them round, accompany them to the departments, and introduce them."⁹

Willis Brewer described Cobb as "the most striking figure that has yet stood among the mountains."¹⁰ Brewer wrote that Cobb's "knowledge of human nature was thorough, and he was the perfect type of demagogue."¹¹

Unfortunately Cobb's papers are not available. Little is known of the man except the comments by Garrett, Brewer, and Mrs. Clay-Clopton. We may only speculate at the objectivity of these historians. However, Garrett provides a clue when he writes on Cobb's refusal to claim his seat in the Confederate Congress, "His conduct subjected him to severe criticism by Southern Men."¹²

Although Cobb's speeches in the House of Representatives were probably very different from his campaign speeches,¹³ his speeches in the House provide a view of a man trapped between a personal belief in the necessity for compromise in order to maintain peace, a constituency composed of wealthy

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 397.

¹⁰Willis Brewer, *Alabama: Her History, Resources, War Record, and Public Men, From 1540 to 1872*, (Montgomery, 1872), 286.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 287

¹²Garrett, *Reminiscences of Public Men in Alabama*, 396.

¹³In 1844, Cobb represented Jackson County, Alabama along with Robert T. Scott, James Williams, and Moses Maples. In 1845, he was elected to represent that county with Charles F. Williams and James Williams. In 1840 the county had a population of 13,863 whites and 1,852 blacks. Ten years later the population was 11,754 whites and 2,334 blacks. See Willis Brewer, *Alabama: Her History, Resources, War Record, and Public Men from 1540 to 1872* (Montgomery, 1872), 282 and 288.

¹⁴As a Representative in Congress, Cobb represented seven counties—Jackson, Madison, DeKalb, Marshall, Blount, and St. Clair. In 1854, St. Clair County was dropped from his district and Cherokee County was added. See *Alabama Congressional and Legislative Representation 1819 to 1960*, Historical and Patriotic Series, No. 17, 23 and 45. In 1860, Cobb's district had a population of 96,610, based on material in Brewer.

slave owners and poor white laborers,¹⁴ and a country which seemed to him to be bent on war.

Cobb's speaking in the House follows a very narrow pattern in theme and in construction. His theme was always the same — peace and state's rights under the constitution. In a brief comment made in the House, December 11, 1860, Cobb succinctly stated the theme that rang in all of his speeches: "I am not a secessionist. I desire peace . . . that my state may be awarded her rights under the Constitution. If that can be done, may God help us to remain in the Union so long as the sun shines."¹⁵

Although Cobb delivered only two major addresses and several "personal comments" in the House, the construction of the speeches and comments was similar. His speeches included long sentences in the florid style of the day. And, no doubt, he heard Clay, Calhoun, and Webster speak and was influenced by their delivery. He laced his emotional appeals to preserve the Union with personal appeals to colleagues, deceased public servants, and God. Cobb usually began his speeches by acknowledging his position in the controversy under debate and by reviewing the actions which brought him to deliver the address. He refuted verbal attacks on the South and parried Northern threats of war by inviting Northern soldiers to come South in peace. His pleas for "action," which, based on the context of the speech, may be interpreted to mean "negotiate" or "compromise." He always concluded his speeches with one sentence directed to the North, stating that the South would unite to fight if the slavery question were forced. Because this one final sentence is out of balance with the numerous pleas for peace which went before, one might assume that Cobb did not intend this final sentence as a threat of war but meant for it to serve one of two functions. First, perhaps Cobb intended to unite himself, those Southerners in the legislature who favored war, and his constituency. He was, after all, a Southern Representative and a Gentleman, and did have to return to Alabama occasionally. And, secondly, he may have implied in this final sentence another entreaty to the North to avoid war. His grim reminder of war might encourage both factions to compromise.

¹⁵*The Congressional Globe*, (36th Congress, 2nd Session), December 11, 1860, 59.

In his speech, "The Slavery Question," delivered June 3, 1850, in the House of Representatives,¹⁶ Cobb quickly dismissed the topic of the debate, the question of the admission of California to the Union, saying that he believed the territory would be admitted to the Union, perhaps not in this session, but soon. He then made references to threats by Northern Representatives to send soldiers into the South if the Southerners did not "submit" on the slavery question. Cobb answered, "We desire to receive them all, and welcome them to our sunny clime as brethern, bearing in their deportment the emblem of peace." Cobb next attempted to refute a statement by Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, who had "alluded to white laborers of the South in terms not only offensive to their representative, but highly disrespectful to themselves." Cobb reported that white laborers were treated with the same respect as slave owners and that they did not have to associate with Negro slaves. Cobb said that as a slave holder he abhorred any distinction between laborer and slaveholder. This type of magnanimity surely made him popular with his poor constituency.

Cobb began the last portion of his speech asking, "What is union of states without communion of the people?" He answered the rhetorical question by naming the cities in which Americans fought together spilling their blood for independence. He then visualized a unified America "where peace reigns, I see inscribed upon the highest pyramids, 'America! happy America! The Asylum for the poor, and a home for the oppressed! Mighty and great thou art, and shalt ever be!'" After almost 5,500 words for peace, union and justice, Cobb ended the speech with one sentence, not in the mood of the speech, a sentence challenging the North that if any provision is passed as to slavery laws in the territories "there will be but one voice in the South, that is, resistance at all hazard and to the last extremity."

Cobb spoke briefly in the House, December 11, 1860, in reference to a committee charged with action on President Buchanan's message relating to secession movements.¹⁷ Cobb interpreted the crowded gallery to mean that "the people are

¹⁶*Ibid.*, (31st Congress, 1st Session), June 3, 1850, 646-649.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, (36th Congress, 2nd Session), December 11, 1860, 59.

looking daily and hourly for this House to do something." The "something" he believed the people wanted was a plan for maintaining the Union. In the closing paragraph of the three paragraph statement, Cobb stated his position in simple language: "I am not a secessionist. I desire peace . . . that my state may be awarded her rights under the Constitution. If that can be done, may God help us to remain in the Union so long as the sun shines!" Cobb repeated this sentiment until his death.

January 7, 1861, Cobb asked the House for "a few moments to make a personal explanation."¹⁸ He noted that the *Baltimore Sun* announced that day that "The Alabama and Mississippi delegations held a conference last evening, and afterwards telegraphed to the conventions of their respective states, advising them to secede immediately . . . I want to say that I happened not to be one of those in that dispatch mentioned." His fellow Alabamian and Representative, George S. Houston interrupted Cobb to point out that only Senators met and sent the telegrams and that no one suspected Cobb, a Representative, of participating in the conference. Cobb's reply does not indicate a response to Houston: "That was their privilege; but I did not happen to be with them." And then Cobb spoke almost 1,000 words before he was interrupted by five different Representatives. Each objected to the long "personal explanation" which was merely a restatement of Cobb's personal reaction to the secession movement in his state. The Speaker of the House maintained order and gave Cobb the floor, whereupon he explained that the slavery question was one of the "rights of property in slaves." He argued that the Constitution had settled the slavery question and that the Supreme Court had decided "that property does exist in slaves." He noted that "the right of property in slaves was recognized in the treaty of peace between Great Britain and this country, in 1782, signed by John Adams and other distinguished northern men." He referred to Article VII of the Provisional Articles between the United States of America and his British Majesty and the Treaty of Peace signed by representatives of the two countries September 3, 1783, in which appear the words "negro or other property." Cobb noted that the treaty of 1815, carried the phrase "slaves or other private property." He reminded the

¹⁸*Ibid.*, January 10, 1861, 272-273.

assemblage that the Federal Government permitted the sale of slaves for debts due the government.

Then in one of his few attempts at formal logic, Cobb framed a syllogism: "The admission that slaves were property admitted everything." And the Federal Government is bound by the Constitution to protect property. Therefore, "the Federal Government is bound to protect slavery and slaves." Cobb quickly marked the area of contention, the major premise -- Are slaves property? He assured the audience that when that question was answered the states must abide by the decision. He predicted an outcome; the North will submit to the Southerners holding slaves.

Cobb began his conclusion with an emotional appeal for "gentlemen to come forward and endeavor to save the country." Creating a time honored analogy, he referred to the country as the "old ship of state . . . cargo of prosperity . . . dashing to pieces in the tempest." He challenged the Representatives to play the role of "wreckers" and to "repair her and make her sea worthy again." Cobb then made a personal commitment, "I am one of those who will . . . engage in repairing her . . . so that she may go on as before — prosperously." Concluding with a warning, he promised, "if this cannot be done, if equality cannot be maintained between the states north and south, then my people will not remain in the Union, nor will I advise them to do so."

On January 14, 1861, Cobb refused to vote when the House considered a bill to organize a militia for the District of Columbia. When the vote was called, he said, "I learn by a dispatch that the convention of Alabama has resolved that the state ought to secede from the Union; and, until I learn more on the subject than I know now, I must decline to vote."¹⁹

Only two weeks later, January 30, Cobb was the only Representative of a seceded state present in the House when he stood to deliver a 1,582 word withdrawal address.²⁰ Cobb mentioned early in the speech that the Representatives from South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Alabama had left Washington.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, January 14, 1861, 366.

²⁰*Ibid.*, January 30, 1861, 645.

The Alabama delegation had not appeared in the Congress since the state seceded a week earlier. Cobb said that he remained in Washington because that is where he wanted to be. He said that from the time of his colleagues withdrawal "I have absented myself from the deliberations and business of this body; and from that time I have not drawn one cent of pay. He admitted that he departed with reluctance; he hoped the Union would be preserved. He asked the House, especially the Northern Representatives to "let me not go without hope." And when he asked for an "action," something done to restore confidence between the different sections of the Union to indicate that "there shall be peace, harmony, and prosperity once more restored to this now divided and distracted country." A House stenographer recorded that at this moment there was applause. Perhaps the audience applauded for the sentiment, if not for Cobb's request.

Cobb noted that during America's years of growth and prosperity, "I have seen star after star fall from the galaxy of the brightest names in our country's history — a Clay, a Webster, a Calhoun, and others." And then Cobb called on these "bright luminaries . . . to raise their voices from the grave . . . and speak to those they left behind, and tell them what their duty is!" After the appeals to these demigods, Cobb called upon the deity, "I say with uplifted hands, God save my country!" He urged the Northern delegates to send messengers of peace to the south "and we will receive them with open arms and warm hearts." Again he stated the traditional position of the South that if the North attempts "to coerce and subjugate us, we must defend our rights, and protect our lives and little ones."

Returning to his earlier plea, he asked his "northern friends . . . to save the country." He reminded them that together they had walked in the House and attempted to establish friendships. His appeals grew with emotional fervor until he beseeched them to surrender their "assumed dignity and platform" and "come patriotically up to the call of your distracted country." He said that he must leave his friends in Washington to return "to my dear Alabama, where the bones of my father and my mother rest; to defend their ashes, and to share the fate of those to whom I am closely bound, be it for weal or

for woe," The House stenographer noted at the end of the speech "applause in the galleries." One may only speculate at the response of those Representatives still in their seats.

The effects of Cobb's appearance in the House were naught. His conciliatory statements did not prevent the war and did not delay its outbreak. His voice cried for peace in the capitol of a nation ready to do battle. The effect of the speeches was on the man and not on the nation. Cobb's political stand made his popular with Northern law makers. But when he returned to his home in Alabama however, he was viewed with suspicion by other Southerners. One may only speculate at his future if he had lived past the end of the war. Could he have again rattled the tinware and crockery and sung his way into public office?

WILLIAM BURNS PATERSON:
"PIONEER AS WELL AS APOSTLE OF NEGRO
EDUCATION IN ALABAMA"

by

Robert G. Sherer

In 1915 two leading Alabama educators died. Both had devoted most of their lives to developing and improving higher education for Alabama Negroes. Both had been president of a state college for Negroes for over a third of a century. Citizens, scholars, and statesmen have honored the name and career of one of these educators during his lifetime, at his funeral, and down to the present. Except for his family's friends and his former students few writers have done anything to keep the name of the other educator from sliding slowly into obscurity.¹

At first it seems ironic that in 1915 the Negro educator, Booker Taliaferro Washington, aroused such attention and admiration while the white educator, William Burns Paterson, made so slight an impression on the public consciousness. In addition to these men's deaths, other memorable events of 1915 included the release of *The Birth of a Nation* (a rabidly racist pro-Ku Klux Klan motion picture) and the revival of the Ku Klux Klan in the twentieth century.

Actually, the different reaction to the death of Washington and Paterson confirmed the paternalistic racism characteristic of the Progressive Period. In a time of increasingly rigid segregation whites could accept and even honor a Negro president of a Negro college. A white man who devoted his life to working in a Negro institution, however, invited neglect if not ostracism from white-dominated society.

The differing education philosophies of these two leaders was even more important than their race in influencing the

¹William B. Paterson was so unknown in 1972 that Louis R. Harlan's definitive study of the early career of Booker T. Washington refers to Paterson, a Scotsman, as "a Northern-born white man." Louis R. Harlan, *Booker T. Washington: The Making of a Black Leader, 1856-1901*, (New York, 1972), 166; hereafter cited as *Booker T. Washington*.

way contemporary leaders assessed these men's careers. By emphasizing industrial education for Negroes, Washington appealed to the economic-practical interests of Northern industrialists—philanthropists. At the same time this educational emphasis enabled Washington to woo and win the support of prejudiced Southern whites whose economic and social interests caused them to believe that what little education Negroes received should be basically different from education for whites.

Paterson had to accept segregated education, but he alienated many the Northern and Southern whites who supported Washington by refusing to accept the principle that Negro schools should differ from white schools in the kind of training offered. Although Paterson was a successful businessman at a wide variety of trades throughout his life, he directed Negro schools for a decade before he began an industrial program. Even then Paterson kept the primary focus of his college (like that most of white colleges at that time) on classical, literary, liberal arts education. Until Alabama abolished its Negro university, Paterson constantly urged the state legislature to fulfill its pledge of university education for Negroes, i.e. truly equal, if necessarily separate, education for Negroes. Paterson's espousal of such egalitarian education ideas during an age of increasing segregation aroused considerable animosity. At best, Paterson's idea led to a neglect of his school and to a determination to ignore the life, career, and thought of this maverick white man.

To understand fully the "Age of Booker T. Washington," it is important to deal with those educators who opposed the "Wizard of Tuskegee." There are several other important reasons for studying Paterson's life. Paterson provides an interesting variant on the story of the poor, immigrant lad who came to the United States soon after the Civil War and by determination, ambition, and hard work at a variety of jobs rose to a position of some influence. Unlike most such immigrants Paterson desired the personal rewards of teaching as well as the economic rewards of business. While he continued his business activities, he increasingly devoted his time to a rigorous schedule of teaching, administration, and fund raising. Paterson's business interest makes him important in the economic history of Montgomery, Alabama because he founded

one of that city's leading florists, Rosemont Gardens, which is still flourishing under the direction and ownership of his descendants.

Finally, Paterson's story reveals how one man overcame prejudice. In his early letters Paterson always refers to Negroes as "niggers" and he is only concerned with them as a source of cheap labor. Once he begins his school, the derogatory term disappears from his correspondence. Paterson's marriage in 1879 to a "Yankee schoolmarm" who had come south to teach Negroes confirmed and strengthened his concern for this oppressed race. Despite frequent antagonism from their white neighbors and troubles such as the abolition and relocation of their school, the Patersons continued their work with Negroes for the rest of their lives.

Washington deserves much of the popular and scholarly attention he has received. Paterson deserves more attention than his life's story has yet received.

Paterson's career had been "strange and chequered" when he so described it in 1872; and so it was to remain until his death in 1915. Immigrant, clerk and salesman, farmhand, carpenter, hod-carrier, contractor, contractor and builder, footloose wanderer, railroad construction worker, shipyard worker and sailor, immigrant agent and land developer, florist—Paterson tried all these roles in addition to the one for which he is best known, President of Alabama State College,² 1878-1915.

Paterson was born in Tullibody, Clackmannshire, Scotland, on February 9, 1849, to John and Janet Burns Paterson. In accordance with Scotland's compulsory education laws, the Paterson children attended school for the entire year except for two weeks during harvesting. William had to leave school after completing only three years because of poor health. Evidently his illness was aggravated only by closed places for immediately after leaving school he began working outdoors on the nearby estate of Lord Abercrombie where he received fifty cents a day for caring for the estate's lawns with his father, "a Scotch

²This has been the college's name since 1954. In addition to the names mentioned in the text, the school has been the State Teachers' College, 1929-1946; the Alabama State College for Negroes, 1946-1954.

Gardner of limited means." While working here William acquired the love for, and skill with, flowers which later enabled him to establish a very successful florist's business in Montgomery.³

Like their Viking ancestors (attributed to the Patersons by family histories), William and his brother, James, left their home to seek adventure in strange, new lands. James followed the more conventional course of enlisting in the British Army. William, however, struck out for America on his own as a freight ship's deck hand. William arrived in New York in 1867.⁴

Mary Frances Terrell, who graduated from Paterson's school and taught with him for twenty-four years, believed a missionary urge brought Paterson to America. She said that Paterson was so impressed by reading about the Scotsman, David Livingstone's work in Africa that Paterson "decided that he, too, would visit the benighted continent and work

³Mary Frances Terrell, "William Burns Paterson, A Life Sketch," *The State Normal Courier*, II (February 7, 1924), 4; hereafter cited as "William Burns Paterson." Although several items in the family papers said William was born in 1850, William, himself, in a letter dated May 23, 1870 said he was twenty-one years old, i.e. born in 1849. The Patersons believed that William's mother was a lineal descendant of John Burns, the brother of the poet, Robert Burns. Unidentified biographical sketch of W. B. Paterson. Letter from a son of John Paterson in Scotland to John W. Anderson, a teacher at Alabama State College for Negroes, December 11, 1952. W. B. Paterson to John Paterson, May 23, 1870. Walter B. Jones, "Off the Bench: William Burns Paterson, 1850-1915," November 3, 1952. Clipping. Paterson papers. Private collection held by W. B. Paterson's descendants. Brown, Clarence A., *Biographical Sketches of the Presidents of the Alabama State Teachers Association* (Montgomery: Alabama State Teachers Association, [1967]), 1. All letters in the Paterson collection are photocopies (except the one to Haygood and Wallace Paterson). The originals were in Scotland when these copies were made in 1952. This author's letters and a trip to Scotland in the Summer of 1970 as well as the efforts of the Manuscripts Librarian of the National Library of Scotland have failed to locate either the letters from which the photocopies were made or any relative of Paterson who had any additional information. This is extremely unfortunate since the photocopied letters dealt only with Paterson's early years in the United States.

⁴Mimeographed "History of the Pattersons [*sic*]: A Bit of History, Legend, and Tradition." The Paterson papers contain several letters from James to John and to "father" describing the places in Africa and India where James served and some of the battles in which he fought. W. B. Paterson to John Paterson, May 23, 1870, Paterson papers. Brown, *Biographical Sketches*, 1.

among the heathens." Unable to save enough money to go to Africa, Paterson decided to come to America instead.⁵

Paterson might have told or intimated this story to his students, or Miss Terrell might have invented the story; but his true reason for coming to America was less noble. In 1870 Paterson wrote to his brother, John, in Scotland ". . . to know how far I have succeeded, it is necessary to know the aim with which I started. I have been now three years in this country I wanted to see the world, and one can choose no better place to do so than America."⁶

Soon after arriving in the United States Paterson became a mail boy in a mail order house in New York. He quit after seeing his boss open a letter, take out the money in it, and discard the letter. Traveling by the Erie Canal to Buffalo, New York, he then went to St. Louis, Missouri to work on the railroad. Impressed with the freedom he observed in the West, in 1870 he wrote that he had found the freedom in the United States no greater than that in Britain except "in the Far West where there is no law except Lynch, and every one does as he thinks right."⁷

Paterson's next job was in the Navy Yard in Washington, D.C. At the Centry Market in Washington he "had his first 'square meal' after his tramp from St. Louis in 1868." He stayed in Washington from September, 1868 until April, 1869. Paterson then returned to the sea, working on ships that visited New Orleans and Mobile. From Mobile, he traveled up the Tombigbee River to Demopolis, Alabama where he spent six months working with a dredging crew on the Black Warrior River. In this unlikely situation Paterson began his teaching career by helping the Negroes in the ditching crew learn to read and write during their lunch hour. When he heard of a railroad being built between Selma and Greensboro, Alabama, Paterson left the dredging crew to work on the railroad.⁸

⁵Terrell, "William Burns Paterson," 4.

⁶W. B. Paterson to John Paterson, May 23, 1870, Paterson papers.

⁷C. M. Stanley, "A Scotch Lad's Gifts to Alabama," *Montgomery Alabama Journal*, Undated clipping; W. B. Paterson to Haygood and Wallace (his sons), no date but after 1897; W. B. Paterson to John Paterson, May 23, 1870, Paterson papers.

⁸Brown, *Biographical Sketches*, 1. Stanley, "A Scotch Lad's Gifts."

Paterson's rambling took him through all the states but five. While he made "numerous" trips of one to five hundred miles, he once travelled twelve hundred miles with only a dog, a gun, and a fishing line. During these footloose years he worked at a wide variety of jobs. In addition to those already mentioned Paterson also worked as a salesman, farmhand, carpenter, and hod-carrier. He wrote in 1870, "I have turned my hand to anything." During these travels he was able to save some money except for one year when the ague bothered him.

By 1870, having used up the three years "which was the time [he] allotted [himself] to ramble," Paterson felt that he was ready to give up his "romantic idea" of seeing the world and to settle down in Hollow Square, Hale County, Alabama. He was then working as a labor contractor of "as many niggers [sic] as [he could] get a hold of." He paid each worker \$1.25 a day plus four pounds of meat and a peck of meal per week. He thought he would make a profit of twelve to fifteen hundred dollars that year.

Paterson was then working on a plantation, living with the overseer, who was only two years older than Paterson. They got along "like brothers." Paterson liked his job and location. "I am as comfortable as I could be anywhere. . . . I am as happy as the day is long and I have every reason to be so. In the meantime I contract to do anything at which I can make money."

Paterson had no trouble finding jobs. By being "honest and [doing] what [he contracted] for [he was] sure of work as much as [he could] do."

Paterson was also doing well socially. His friends had introduced him to most of Hale County's families including some of the wealthiest people in the county. Although he felt it might be egotistical to say so, Paterson wrote that once he met someone he was "sure to be welcomed again." One basis of his popularity was his reputation as "one of the best arithmeticians around here."⁹

⁹Although we must remember that this was Paterson's half-joking assessment of his own ability, the comment is a sad commentary on the general level of education (white or black) in Hale County since Paterson had only three years of school in Scotland. William Burns Paterson to John Paterson, May 23, 1870, Paterson papers.

The only change Paterson considered in 1870 was a more lucrative job offer. A plantation owner offered him "1,200 dollars and perquisites, which would be 8 or 10 more" to become his overseer. Since Paterson wanted very much to return to Scotland that summer (which would have been impossible had he taken that job), he probably turned down this appealing offer.

In view of Paterson's later career in education, his attitude toward teaching in 1870 was surprisingly negative and materialistic, although even then the veneration accorded teachers by his family showed through. This inbred respect for teachers might have been one of the factors which later led Paterson to foresake his total commitment to the scramble for wealth and to devote much of his time to teaching.

Evidently in reply to a question about teaching from his brother, Paterson wrote that he did not agree with those people in Tullibody who thought that he should have become a teacher. Paterson felt that he could "honestly say that [he] would not change places with Mr. McMartin [the head of the school in Tullibody] today." Paterson's reason for not teaching was economic. He believed that he would have made as much profit at the end of 1870 as Mr. McMartin "has made altogether, and that without working a stroke. (I don't [sic] call watch-niggers [sic] work.)"¹⁰

While Paterson's remarks about teaching indicate that he was primarily concerned with making money, he was also aware of the social advantages of living in the United States. After having lived in the more stratified Scottish society, Paterson was delighted that he had found a place where he could be judged solely on his own performance. He knew that he would have had no real chance to raise himself socially in Scotland, "what [anybody in Tullibody] is now he will be twenty years hence." Had Paterson remained in Tullibody, people would have always addressed him with a nickname, "Juck, Wull Paterson, or at best they might have said Wellum." If he had showed any real ability, the villagers "would have expected that as a matter of course from [his] education." Then, if Paterson had sought a higher social status, his effort would

¹⁰William Burns Paterson to John Paterson, May 23, 1870, Paterson papers.

have touched off vicious gossip. His neighbors would point out that Paterson's father was just a laborer so William "need not hold [his] head so high." In the United States, however, he was "*Mr. Paterson.*" Here people judged him by his "abilities and conduct which [was] all [he asked]." He believed that "the former always speak for themselves and [he did not] think [he needed to] be ashamed of the latter."¹¹

This newly experienced equalitarianism which Paterson found so personally satisfying might well have influenced him to later treat Negroes according to *their* "abilities and conduct." But in 1870 Paterson's ideas about Negroes were prejudiced and contradictory, like the views held by many whites at the time. Paterson's 1870 letters referred to Negroes as "niggers." After 1870 he mentioned "the people" with whom he worked and who greeted him upon his return from Scotland, but he never again wrote "nigger." He showed the contradiction in his thinking about Negroes by writing in the same letter that "there is no distinction of race or color" in the United States and that "all *white* [sic] men are equal in the Southern States, no matter how poor he is, if he behaves himself as a gentleman he is treated as such."¹²

Paterson was evidently a born leader, promoter, and organizer. In 1870 he was already planning to establish a Scottish colony on a large plantation. He believed that he could easily have gotten sixty Scottish families for this project. At first Paterson's neighbors supported this land scheme. When some opposition developed, however, he decided to abandon the plan. To prove what he could have done Paterson did bring "several Scotsmen from the north who were then working in this country."

By November, 1870, Paterson had moved from Hollow Square to Candy's Landing to supervise the building of a freight shed. He saw this as a step up from labor contractor to building contractor. He employed one Scottish joiner and his "other hands [were] niggers[sic.]" Paterson had learned his trade by working as a joiner for three months in the North. Although he had evidently never been in charge of constructing

¹¹W. B. Paterson to John Paterson, November 14, 1870, Paterson papers.

¹²W. B. Paterson to John Paterson, May 23, 1870, Paterson papers.

a building before, he was confident of his ability to do so. He wrote that he could probably not pass a craftsman's test, but that he did not have to take one. He knew "how the work ought to be done and [had] the talent to carry it out." He was then taking as many jobs as a director of joiner work as he could find. By November 14, 1870, he had completed this job and had moved to Greensboro, Alabama, "where [he had] prospects of establishing [himself]."¹³

In 1871-1872, Paterson was concerned about the violence and disreputable politics of Greensboro, where everyone was "dabbling in politics." There had already been one fight over the November election which "promises to be quite lively." He reminded his brother that fights in America were quite different from those "you used to enjoy at home for where pistols flash and bowie knives flourish in the air it is rather serious. Every man and boy goes armed and most of the ladies to [*sic*]."¹⁴

Paterson deplored violence and courageously opposed it when it was perpetrated by extra-legal vigilance committees like the Ku Klux Klan, which did "pretty much as it [had] a mind to do" in Greensboro. The Klan had visited Greensboro twice that year. They came the second time to get one of the Klansmen out of jail. Although "the terror in which they are held" made it "difficult to get men to stand guard," Paterson and several other men had guarded the jail for one week. At midnight on Sunday one hundred masked men, fully armed "rode into town and demanded the keys of the jail from the turnkey. Their horses feet were muffled so that they moved along as quietly as a spectre." As soon as he saw them, Paterson fired his pistol into the air as a signal. In about ten minutes "two dozen men out with nothing on but their pants and a pistol in each hand" had surrounded the Klansmen. Like Paterson, these townsmen "were all good citizens who had sworn to resist all lawlessness and break up all secret organizations in the County." When the guard refused to give the keys to the Klansmen they brought up a battering ram to break into the jail. A firm stand by Paterson and his friends at this point, however, destroyed the influence of the Klan for a

¹³W. B. Paterson to John Paterson, November 14, 1870, Paterson papers.

¹⁴W. B. Paterson to John Paterson, September 24, 1871, Paterson papers.

time in Greensboro. Just as the battering ram was in place, the Klansmen "saw 50 revolvers levelled on them and knew the first stroke they gave would be the signal for us to fire; they desisted and remounting, marched off lucky in saving their scalps. They have not been heard of since in this county."¹⁵

In a country where "politics pervades everything," Paterson deplored political corruption as well as violence. In reply to a question about James Fiske, Jr., Paterson wrote that thousands were worse villains than Fiske, "but their tact and fear of disgrace keep it hid from the public view. It is a hard matter for any one who has never been in America and especially N. York to believe how low the people have sunk in moral degredation [*sic*]."¹⁶

Prior to 1870-1871, Paterson's story was much like those of thousands of immigrants who flocked to the United States after the Civil War to seek adventure and fortune. After landing in New York, Paterson toured much of the country, taking whatever jobs he could find. As late as 1870 his main interest seemed to be making as much money as he could. Although the economic opportunity and equalitarian social structure of America favorably impressed Paterson, the political corruption and violence appalled him. A decent, law-abiding man, Paterson was courageous and active in opposing extra-legal violence. The conflict he witnessed in these and later years was the basis for what Paterson's students remembered as one of his favorite quotations, "Happy is that country that has no history, because history generally is a chronicle of strife and turmoil."¹⁷

But something happened in 1870-1871 to turn this genial materialist with some ambition and opportunity for social advancement into a self-sacrificing teacher of a rejected race.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, one of the biographical sketches of Paterson said he was a member of the Klan. The author intended the membership as a compliment to Paterson since the reference came in a list of prominent people Paterson had known. According to this article, Brooks Smith had told of Paterson's membership in "the original Ku Klux Klan formed at Greensboro when it was a badge of honor to be identified with the reconstruction organization." Stanley, "A Scotch Lad's Gifts to Alabama," Paterson papers. In the light of Paterson's letter quoted above, any such assertion that Paterson was in the Klan seems ridiculous.

¹⁶W. B. Paterson to John Paterson, May 6, 1872, Paterson papers.

¹⁷"Notes for Mrs. Marie B. Owen." Paterson papers.

The transformation was even more startling since Paterson had specifically denied any such intention and stressed as late as May 23, 1870, that his main aim was to make money. In 1873, however, he wrote that he was doing well although the government had not paid their share to his school, Tullibody Academy, in Greensboro, Alabama for a year and a half. Although he had made some money from the school fees, the state then owed him "300 pounds." Even though Paterson expected to receive this amount after the taxes were collected that year, something must have happened for this hard-working, ambitious Scotsman to change his mind, begin teaching, and then to continue teaching for a year and a half without pay from the state.

The reasons which impelled Paterson to become a teacher, especially a teacher of Negroes with the social ostracism that implied, can only be inferred. Paterson never ceased to further his own education. He had "rambled a great deal since [he] left home but [he had] never neglected [his] intellectual improvement." Another factor was that elusive quality, status. Paterson was proud to be "considered one of the best arithmeticians around here." Already elevated to "Mr.," Paterson could become "Professor" by teaching. In describing a newspaper story about the closing exercises of his school Paterson wrote, "You would have been pleased I have no doubt at the eulogistic remarks on "*Professor [sic] Paterson.*"¹⁸ Finally, perhaps Paterson's organizing urge, thwarted in the project for a Scottish colony, asserted itself in his efforts to build up a school.

But all this does not explain why Paterson would choose to teach a Negro school, thereby alienating many local whites. Paterson's original decision was due to the specific circumstances in the South after the Civil War. When he moved to Hale County in 1870 he became a close friend of the McFaddens who owned a large plantation near Greensboro. Like many other plantation owners, the McFaddens faced the "problem of keeping Negroes on the plantation in reconstruction days." The means they adopted were an eloquent testimony to the fierce desire for education of the newly emancipated Negroes. Paterson helped the McFaddens keep the Negroes

¹⁸W. B. Paterson to John Paterson, July 24, 1873; May 23, 1870, Paterson papers.

on the plantation "by starting a school for Negroes on the plantation."¹⁹

In this school, started for purely economic reasons (to maintain a labor force on a plantation) at the request of a friend, converged all the factors which shaped Paterson's later life: his love of learning, his equalitarian attitude toward opportunity for each individual, his interest in leadership and organizing, his desire for appreciation of his abilities and for status, his opposition to political corruption and violence, his previous experience teaching Negroes on the dredging crew, and his first-hand knowledge of the overwhelming desire and need of Negroes for an education.

Paterson began his school on or near the McFadden plantation in a brush arbor. He then moved his school into a log house named Hopewell about four miles from Greensboro. In 1871 Paterson moved his school to Greensboro. He began in Greensboro with only five or six students "under the oaks, with logs for benches." He then utilized his talents as a builder in constructing his own schoolhouse, "a frame structure 65 x 45." Paterson named his school, Tullibody Academy, in honor of his home town in Scotland. He remained at this school until 1878 when he became the principal of the Negro school in Marion.²⁰

Several of Greensboro's whites protested when Paterson began the town's first school for Negroes. They opposed Negro education, especially if it would cost the whites anything. "'Let the Negroes educate themselves,' they said." Paterson had "a long and hard struggle" getting money to support the school. His friends, the McFaddens, and other "plantation owners and leading citizens" did all they could to help him with his school. With this support and much hard work, Pater-

¹⁹Stanley, "A Scotch Lad's Gifts to Alabama." Although the rest of the article is confused and often inaccurate, this explanation of how and why Paterson began teaching Negroes seems to be the most accurate of any in the Paterson papers or elsewhere. Other explanations, e.g. "seeing the need of education for Negroes," are inadequate in view of the reasons Paterson had for not beginning such work.

²⁰Brown, "Biographical Sketches," 1. Agnes J. Lewis, "A Sketch of Professor J. W. Beverly," *The State Normal Courier*, II (February 7, 1924), 11-12. Unidentified biographical sketch of Paterson, Paterson papers.

son gradually "won the respect and admiration and aid of the best people of that portion of the South."²¹ Thus, a few of Greensboro's more affluent whites paternalistically supported the school, but other whites in the community were indifferent or hostile to Negro education.

While Paterson was President of Tullibody Academy, he devoted most of his time and energy to the school. After a trip to Scotland for his father's funeral in 1875, he wrote that his relatives "would not be astonished at me enjoying a holiday" as much as he did if they knew his schedule at Tullibody. In Scotland he spent all his time after the funeral "frolicking" and enjoying himself. But "Business is business, and Pleasure is pleasure and better not mix them." Paterson believed that no one in Alabama worked harder at his business than he did. Before coming to Scotland, he had not taken a holiday from his school work for three and one-half years.

I teach common school 5 days normal school on Saturday Sunday School for two hours on Sunday besides attending church two or three times that day and six months every year I teach night school. All this besides various other business I have to attend to.

Later that month Paterson wrote, "I am attending to my business here which takes all my time. . . . I occupy my time almost wholly in teaching day, evening, and Sunday School." Despite this rigorous schedule Paterson was quite pleased with his work. "I make enough and am as happy and contented as can be."²²

²¹Terrell, "William Burns Paterson," 4. Walter B. Jones, "Off the Bench." Undated clipping, *Montgomery Advertiser*. Jones did say, however, that the opposition died down in a few years. Jones, "William Burns Paterson," quoting Jesse B. Hearin, *The Gulf Breeze* (New Orleans), October, 1952. Undated clipping. "Notes for Mrs. Marie B. Owens." Stanley, "A Scotch Lad's Gifts." Paterson papers. Stanley had already revealed, however, (as noted above) that any aid the McFaddens gave was based, not just on any real concern for the intellectual development of Negroes, but primarily on a desire to keep field hands on their plantation or at least in the county.

²²W. B. Paterson to John Paterson, October 11, 1875. Paterson found Greensboro somewhat dull after his trip to Scotland in 1875. He was, however, pleasantly surprised at the reception he received on his return. "I could not describe the welcome they gave me." W. B. Paterson to John Paterson, October 23, 1875. Paterson papers.

By September, 1873, Paterson (probably aided by one or more assistants) was planning to offer reading, writing, arithmetic, geometry, music, drawing, Latin, Greek, German, French, Spanish, Hebrew, chemistry, and philosophy. The Methodist college in Greensboro in 1873 indicated its confidence in Paterson's teaching ability by offering him a professorship, but "for a whim of [his] own" he refused it.²³

In 1877 a local paper, the *Alabama Beacon*, judged the Tullibody Academy "among the better Negro schools." At that time it was "a well organized school with a faculty of four teachers and the principal."²⁴

On July 26, 1878, Paterson left Tullibody Academy to accept the Presidency of the State Normal School and University for Colored Students and Teachers in Marion, Alabama. Like medieval scholars John William Beverly (Paterson's best student, later fellow teacher, finally his successor) and perhaps other Tullibody students followed Paterson to Marion and continued their studies with him there. Tullibody operated until at least 1886 since Beverly served as the school's principal from 1882 until 1886.²⁵ Evidently Tullibody closed or merged with the public schools when Beverly left in 1886.

State Normal had begun as an American Missionary Association school, Lincoln, in 1867. In 1871 Alabama gave the school its first annual appropriation and it became Lincoln Normal School. In December, 1873, Alabama took full control and responsibility for Lincoln when the Board of Education "authorized the permanent establishment . . . of a State Normal School and University for Colored Students and Teachers." The A.M.A. acquiesced in this decision and gave the land and building to the state on the condition that Alabama maintain

²³W. B. Paterson to John Paterson, July 24, 1873, Paterson papers. In view of the later debate about industrial education it is interesting to note that no mention of the subject occurs in the Paterson correspondence and that no source mentions industrial training at Paterson's school until some time after he assumed the presidency of the state school at Marion.

²⁴Glenn Nolan Sisk, "The Alabama Black Belt: A Social History, 1875-1917," (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Duke University), 188. There is no record of the names of these other four teachers or when they joined Paterson's faculty

²⁵Brown, "Biographical Sketches," 5.

Lincoln as a normal school and university, a promise Alabama was later to break.²⁶

In 1874, Alabama amended the original law to make clear its intent to make Lincoln a true university, "it being the intent and purpose of this act to provide for the liberal education of the colored race in the same manner as is already provided for the education of the white race in our university and colleges." These acts created "the oldest state institution in America established for the function of teacher education and liberal arts education [for Negroes]" since the earlier Negro state institutions, Lincoln University of Missouri (1866) and Alcorn College in Mississippi (1871) were land-grant, agricultural and mechanical colleges.²⁷ Although the name, Lincoln, lingered on, the Marion school was really State Normal after 1874.

In 1878 Professor George W. Card, the principal of State Normal since 1874 and the only white man besides Paterson ever to serve as principal of a state-supported Negro normal school in Alabama, retired. Paterson then became president of the school, a position he held until his death in 1915.

State Normal then had only one building and an enrollment of 127. Like Tullibody, State Normal had four teachers in addition to Paterson. The school's curriculum was classical only. "There was no provision for industrial work, athletic training, and other Departments of Culture that add to literary

²⁶*Lincoln Normal School, Marion, Alabama* (New York), 1. *The Alabama State College for Negroes, Montgomery, Alabama: Freshman Handbook, 1950-1951*, 12. Mimeographed copy. Hooper Councill Trenholm, *Yearbook of the Alabama State Teachers' Association, 1949* (Montgomery, 1949), 24. For a full study of Lincoln School under the A.M.A. before and after Alabama took control of the school, along with a fuller treatment of the history of the State Normal School and University see Robert Glenn Sherer, "Let Us Make Man: Negro Education in Nineteenth Century Alabama" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1970); hereafter cited as "Negro Education in Nineteenth Century Alabama."

²⁷*Freshman Handbook*, 12. Trenholm, *Yearbook, 1949*, 15, 25. H. B. Williams, "Legal Provisions for the Education of the Negro in the State of Alabama, and How They Affect the Program of Negro Education from 1873-1949," (Unpublished masters thesis, Alabama State College for Negroes, 1950), 16-17; hereafter cited as "Legal Provisions."

development." The main emphasis of the school were on "vocal music and literary training."²⁸

In 1879 Paterson added a life-long teacher to his staff when on June 5, in Selma, Alabama, he married Margaret Bingham Flack, daughter of Newton R. and Annie Bingham Flack of Canfield, Ohio. After graduating from Oberlin, "Maggie" joined hundreds of other "Yankee schoolma'ms" by coming south to teach. The "grit" and determination Maggie inherited from her Irish ancestors stood her in good stead as she faced the trials of the Yankee school teacher in the South.²⁹

In addition to his teaching and administrative duties Paterson performed many other services to improve his school. He spent much of his time trying to raise money for State Normal.³⁰ He was an active, and often successful, lobbyist in the Alabama legislature. But Paterson spent most of his time, especially in the early years, promoting State Normal in the Negro community. Paterson "did extensive traveling among [Negroes], visiting churches and various communities throughout the state, lecturing and preaching in the interest of the school." As a result of such trips, "the school was well advertised, and was greatly aided in building up a good and regular attendance of students as well as in adding many substantial friends among the colored and white people to its roster of supporters."³¹

By 1885 Paterson had increased the faculty to ten and the student body to over three hundred. Equally important were Paterson's efforts to improve the quality and level of education in the school. In partial refutation of conservative white charges that the leaders of Negro schools pushed programs of higher education before some of the students were completely ready for such work, Paterson had not begun a full university program until he was sure he had enough students

²⁸Sarah H. Koyton, "State Normal's First Graduating Class," *The State Normal Courier*, II (February 7, 1942), 5.

²⁹Unidentified biographical sketch of W. B. Paterson. Jones, "Off the Bench." *Rosemont Gardens*, printed folder. Jones, "William Burns Paterson," quoting Hearin, *The Gulf Breeze*. Stanley, "A Scotch Lad's Gifts," Paterson papers.

³⁰Jones, "William Burns Paterson," Paterson papers.

³¹A. S. Plump, "State Normal as 'the Lincoln Normal University' at Marion," *The State Normal Courier*, II (February 7, 1942), 6.

to profit from this level of training. By 1885, however, Paterson was sure that he did have enough students sufficiently prepared to warrant the establishment of a complete university program. In his annual report in November, 1885, Paterson called on the legislature to redeem their pledge to the A.M.A. and to Alabama's Negro citizens to provide them with equal university education. Paterson told the legislators that "the time is at hand when one of the objects of the school . . . to be a state 'university for colored students' . . . will have to be recognized and sufficient support given to carry out this object."³² But Alabama's legislature had no intention of making the school into a true university in fact as well as name in 1886. Indeed, the basic issue for State Normal was not to be its improvement, but whether it was to even exist or not.

In 1887 an incendiary fire destroyed State Normal's main building. This incident was indicative of a growing hostility toward the school, especially on the part of the cadets of Howard College (Alabama's white Baptist college then located in Marion). When Marion's white merchants joined in the movement to get rid of State Normal, Marion's Negroes retaliated with a boycott which forced three merchants, Mason, Drake, and Irpy into bankruptcy. But the whites won out when the Alabama legislature broke its commitment to the A.M.A. to maintain a Negro school in Marion by passing a unique law which forbade the use of any of the buildings for Negro education and provided that Alabama's Negro University could "be located anywhere except at Marion."³³ At the insistence and with the help of Marion's Negroes, the A.M.A. re-established a Negro school at Marion, but it was not able to offer truly college level work.

After the legislature banished State Normal from Marion questions still remained about the nature of the school and where it was to be located. By 1887 even those white leaders such as Thomas Seay (Governor, 1886-1890) and Thomas Goode Jones (Governor, 1890-1894) who were most sympathetic to Negroes' education were opposed to the Negro University as

³²*Ibid.*, 6-7.

³³May L. Phillips, *Lincoln Normal School, Marion, Alabama*. ([American Missionary Association, 1905]), 1. [Montgomery] *Herald*, January 8, 1887. Huntsville *Gazette*, March 26, 1887, quoting the [Selma] *Independent*.

it had been originally established.³⁴ Although the school's Board of Trustees had originally consisted of two whites and five Negroes, Seay chose only whites to serve on the board in 1887.³⁵ T. G. Jones, one of Seay's appointees and a defender of the college, stated emphatically why he believed an all white board was necessary.

The protection of our wives and children from insult rests on something mightier and nobler than whether a Negro shall learn algebra or have a particular school here.

The absolute control of the Trustees over the institution ought to convince anyone that it could never become a hot bed of rudeness and insult. Education controlled and directed by our own people will repress not merely the expression but thought like [Montgomery Negro editor] Duke's and produce on the contrary, politeness, good will, respect for authority and good deportment.

Jones also made it clear that the school was an university in name only when he pointed out that State Normal was to be "an industrial school."³⁶

The relocation of the school aroused controversy among Negroes and whites in Alabama. Whites in the two most likely new locations, Montgomery and Birmingham, worked hard to keep the school out of their town. Negroes in each city did all they could to get pledges of land and money to bring the school to their town. The major exception among Negroes was Booker T. Washington who worked primarily against the loca-

³⁴These men are "friends" of Negro education only insofar as they opposed those whites who disapproved of any education for Negroes, especially on the college level. Men like Seay and Jones did not favor truly equal education for Negroes, but at least they did not feel that even inferior, different Negro education was inconsistent with white supremacy.

³⁵Horace Mann Bond, *Negro Education in Alabama; A Study in Cotton and Steel* (Washington, 1939), 109; hereafter cited as *Negro Education in Alabama*. At least one Negro editor called for a majority of Negroes on the board while other Negro editors at least wanted Negroes represented. *Huntsville Gazette*, July 2, 1887. Several eminent Negroes in Montgomery finally agreed to serve on an advisory board to aid the trustees.

³⁶Interview with T. G. Jones, *Montgomery Advertiser*, August 21, 1887.

tion of the school in Montgomery because it would then compete with Tuskegee for students.³⁷

If his school had to leave Marion, Paterson preferred Montgomery as the new location. In late 1886 and early 1887 he approached his friends in Montgomery and urged them to work to have the school established there.³⁸ After the Board of Trustees chose Montgomery as the site for the school, Paterson did not hold any grudge against Washington for his opposition to locating the school in Montgomery. In January, 1888, he wrote Washington that he "would be pleased to talk to [the Tuskegee] students" and suggested several possible topics for his speech.³⁹

In the end it was not Washington, Paterson, or the Negroes of either city who determined the location of the Negro University. Along with the Governor and the Superintendent of Education, the Board of Trustees first favored Birmingham as the location, but decided to delay their decision until their second meeting in July. At this second meeting, someone pointed out that Howard College was planning to move to Birmingham and suggested that the Negro University should not be located too near this college. After hearing this argument, "there was a change of views on the part of most of the trustees; and when the matter again came up, Montgomery was chosen by a unanimous vote."⁴⁰

White opposition to the location of the school in Montgomery did not cease after the board's decision. Two white

³⁷Huntsville *Gazette*, June 26, July 16, March 26, July 30, 1887. Montgomery *Herald*, August 6, 1887. Although neither possibility was seriously considered by the trustees, Marion's and Selma's Negroes also sought the school for their town. M. J. Stevens to Booker T. Washington, May 24, 1887. S. Childs to Booker T. Washington, February 10, 1887. Booker T. Washington Papers (Library of Congress). Although Washington's actions did not affect the outcome, a good summary of his opposition to locating the school in Montgomery appears in Harlan, *Booker T. Washington*, 166-168. Since Washington and his faculty worked so openly against locating the school in Montgomery, we do question Harlan's emphasis on Washington's secret maneuvering.

³⁸Jesse C. Duke to Booker T. Washington, January 20, 1887, Booker T. Washington Papers.

³⁹William B. Paterson to Booker T. Washington, January 11, 1888, Booker T. Washington Papers.

⁴⁰Arthur L. Brooks to Booker T. Washington, [1887], Booker T. Washington Papers. T. G. Jones, Interview, Montgomery *Advertiser*, August 21, 1887.

citizens of Montgomery, Alexander Troy and William E. Elsberry, took their request for an injunction to stop the school to the Alabama Supreme Court. In February, 1888, in *Elsberry v. Seay* the court ruled that the law establishing the Negro University was unconstitutional. Since the Negro University was not under the Superintendent of Education, it was not a part of the public school system and, therefore, it could not receive school funds. As a result of this decision the only money the school received in 1887-1888 was \$500 from the Peabody Fund and \$2,500 of the \$7,500 granted it by the 1887 law. In 1888-1889 it received no funds from the state.⁴¹

Against this background of white opposition and legal conflict, Paterson moved to Montgomery and began seeking a site for the college in the summer of 1887.⁴² He met with "some of the leading citizens of the city" and then called a mass meeting at the Old Ship African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church. At this meeting Paterson announced that the state would build the school if the people of Montgomery would buy the land and donate it to the state. This meeting was well attended and "much interest [was] manifested in the proposition" because Montgomery then did not have sufficient Negro schools to meet the needs of the school age Negro children. Weekly mass meetings began in the churches of Montgomery to arouse interest and to raise the necessary funds.

Seeing this response, Paterson decided to try to open the school at once and he sought a temporary location. He accepted Rev. William Jenkins' offer of the Beulah Baptist Church on Norton Street and Genetta Ditch. Paterson used the church for assembly rooms and as a chapel. He obtained classrooms by renting rooms in four houses and two former store buildings.

One of the leading Negro Baptist churches in Montgomery, the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church, showed its support for the school by contributing its basement for registration. Then, on October 3, 1887, "about four hundred children together with their parents and friends gathered within the walls of 'Beulah' Baptist Church "for the opening day of the Alabama Colored

⁴¹Williams, "Legal Provisions," 17.

⁴²Terrell, "William Burns Paterson," 4.

People's University. In addition to Paterson, the first faculty consisted of nine teachers.⁴³

All the teachers on the first faculty at Montgomery "labored at a great sacrifice, receiving little or no salary" since the students could not pay very much tuition. The strain was particularly severe in 1888-1889 when the Alabama Supreme Court's declaring the law establishing the school unconstitutional made the teachers almost entirely dependent upon tuition. During this period the school subsisted on public subscriptions and a tuition fee of \$1 per student per month. The teachers and students gave entertainments to raise the money to buy the school's first musical instrument, an organ. Teachers also raised money by the sale of the products of the girls' classes in plain sewing and fancy work.⁴⁴

During the first term in Montgomery, Paterson grouped the 358 students into Grammar Grades and four classes in the Normal Department. By 1888, despite the legal setback, the enrollment had grown to five hundred students in the Normal, Preparatory, and Industrial Departments. Paterson hoped to establish a Collegiate Department, but "no students presented themselves of sufficient attainments to profit by a college or university course of study." During the 1888-1889 term, Paterson added a primary department, the Model School, not just to give teaching experience to the Normal students but to relieve "the congested conditions of the public schools." Paterson acquired four houses on South Ripley Street for this Model School.⁴⁵

After the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court in February, 1888, Paterson's school received no state aid for one year. Then, on February 23, 1889, through the influence of men like T. G. Jones and Thomas Seay, the Alabama Legislature created the State Normal School for Colored Students to be located in Montgomery.⁴⁶ As the new title indicated, the school

⁴³Frances Reynolds, "Reminiscences: The First Years at Montgomery," *The State Normal Courier*, II (February 7, 1924), 7; hereafter cited as "Reminiscences." *Alabama State College Bulletin: Montgomery, Alabama: 1967-1968*, V (July-August, 1967), 21.

⁴⁴Reynolds, "Reminiscences," 7. James S. Julian, "Reminiscences: The Period of 1890-1894," *The State Normal Courier*, II (February 7, 1924), 8.

⁴⁵Williams, "Legal Provisions," 16-17. Reynolds, "Reminiscences," 7.

⁴⁶Williams, "Legal Provisions," 18.

was not to offer collegiate work, but could only give secondary classes and teacher training. The state of Alabama thereby betrayed its pledge to its Negro citizens to provide them with collegiate and university education, the condition on which the A. M. A. had given land and a building to the state in 1874. Not until the third decade of the twentieth century did Alabama begin to redeem this pledge.

The actions of the Alabama Legislature and Supreme Court, 1887-1889, clearly showed their changing attitude toward education and Negroes. Beginning in 1889, Alabama formally declared its determination to have special education for Negroes; not only separate and unequal to white education, but also education of a quite different kind. Negro education in Alabama was not to have its capstone — college and university training. This decision, the consequences that flowed from it, and the 1891 Apportionment Act⁴⁷ indicated a basic re-orientation of white Alabama leaders regarding Negro education. The fundamental decision was that "Negro education" was special education for second-class citizens who had no need for collegiate training.

Once the legislature appropriated the money for establishing and maintaining State Normal, the board of trustees began meeting with an elected, advisory, local Negro board to select a site for the school. On May 8, 1889, the state board formally accepted the donation from Montgomery Negroes of \$3,300 and a campus site of six and one-half acres located east of South Jackson Street between Tuscaloosa and Thurman Streets in Montgomery.⁴⁸

Even though the school act of 1889 represented a drastic official redirection of Negro education, State Normal needed funds so desperately that even the news of this assistance

⁴⁷This act specified that school funds would be distributed among the races in proportion to the amount of taxes paid by Negroes and whites. Even where school officials honestly and impartially followed this formula, the money appropriated to Negro normal schools (Montgomery, Huntsville, and Tuskegee) came out of the Negroes' share of the school fund, further reducing the amount received by local Negro teachers and schools. The money for the University of Alabama and white colleges, however, came from specific appropriations by the legislature, not out of the public school fund.

⁴⁸Julian, "Reminiscences," 8. Bertie L. Hall, "A Bit of History," *The State Normal Courier*, II (February 7, 1924), 8. *State College Bulletin: 1967-1968*, 21.

touched off a celebration among the faculty and students. Paterson summoned all the students and faculty into the assembly room at the Beulah Baptist Church. After Paterson read the "official announcement . . . scenes of the wildest excitement and exhibitions of unbounded joy and happiness were for a time indulged in." Singing, prayers, and addresses turned the rest of the "morning of serious study . . . into a holiday of celebration and thanksgiving."

Although State Normal had an appropriation and a site, the buildings were not finished by the fall of 1889 so the school had to open once again in "Beulah Bottom." Mr. Garrett, head of the Industrial Department, and some of the male students completed the remaining minor work like installing desks. In a few weeks the students were able to move into the new buildings.

The curriculum now consisted only of "a Normal course . . . but a very liberal one." Before the new trustees took over, however, "the course included a full college course, or rather was so intended." With a new purpose as well as new quarters the State Normal School for Colored Students at Montgomery graduated its first class of six young men and two young ladies in 1890. (No classes graduated in 1888 and 1889 because of the confusion surrounding the move and the appropriation.)⁴⁹

In 1890-1891, Booker T. Washington at Tuskegee, William B. Paterson at Montgomery, and William Hooper Council at Huntsville — the heads of the three Negro normal schools in Alabama — sought the money provided in the Second Morrill Land Grant Act for a Negro land grant college in Alabama. At first these three men tried working together to avoid a "squabble" over the share of the money each school would receive. When they realized that only one school could receive the money, however, the competition began in earnest.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Julian, "Reminiscences," 8-9.

⁵⁰ Booker T. Washington to W. H. Council, August 30, 1890. W. H. Council to Booker T. Washington, September 2, October 9, 1890. W. B. Paterson to Booker T. Washington, October 30, 1890, Booker T. Washington Papers. For some reason Harlan's biography of Washington neglects this entire incident.

Alabama's senators in Washington, James Lawrence Pugh and John Tyler Morgan, intended for the Negroes' share of the money to go to Tuskegee. They made this clear in arguing for an amendment to the Morrill Act which would allow the money to go to Negro schools which did not have "college" in their official title.⁵¹ Also, Washington's good rapport with local and national leaders, the absence of any trouble at Tuskegee, the proximity of Tuskegee to the white land grant college at Auburn (which would facilitate co-operation between the two schools), and other factors clearly gave Washington the edge in the competition. But on February 3, 1891, Washington delivered a speech before a Negro Convention in Montgomery. In this speech he condemned the Appropriation Act (passed the day before) and attacked a bill being considered by the Alabama House which would have required segregated transportation.⁵² The sensational, distorted, prejudiced coverage the Alabama papers gave this speech evidently ended Tuskegee's chances for the land grant money.

In the ensuing struggle between Councilll and Paterson, both men had some liabilities. Conflict with whites caused Paterson's school to leave Marion and move to Montgomery in 1887. In the same year, however, Councilll had to resign his presidency for one year to save his school after an uproar involving two incidents in which he, and then some of his students, attempted to sit in "white" railroad cars.⁵³ In this atmosphere an unscrupulous or desperate man could use the race issue in the controversy over the land grant money with telling effect.

Unfortunately, Councilll succumbed to this temptation. In 1891 he won the money for his school by stirring up the prejudice of the legislators against a white man who would serve as the president of a Negro college. A year later, Washington admitted to Paterson that "of course I knew that Mr. Councilll in speaking before the legislative Committee used your color to prejudice the members against you." To his credit, Wash-

⁵¹Juanita Lee Williams, "Federal Legislation Relating to Negro Land Grant Colleges" (Unpublished masters thesis, Howard University, 1933), 71-72, 76.

⁵²Bond, *Negro Education in Alabama*, 158.

⁵³For a full story of these incidents, see Sherer, "Negro Education in Nineteenth Century Alabama."

ington refused to use this tactic. In a letter to Paterson, Washington insisted that he had instructed Mr. Warren Logan and all those who were seeking the money for Tuskegee "that if we could not get [the money] without ['passing' crossed out, 'drawing' written in] the color line not to fight for it."⁵⁴

Councill continued his attacks on Paterson even after Huntsville received the land grant money. Councill said that since Paterson was white, he should not be in the Alabama State Teachers Association (Negro) and that Paterson should not be president of the State Normal School.⁵⁵ Paterson deeply resented Councill's remarks about the S. T. A. because both men had been among the founders of the organization in Selma in 1882.⁵⁶ Indeed, Councill's attack might have been partly motivated by envy and resentment because he was never elected president of this body, whereas Paterson was the unanimous choice of the delegates as the S. T. A.'s first president. During his presidency, Paterson had stressed "racial solidarity and self-reliance," a rather unusual theme for the white president of a Negro organization. Paterson had been active in the S. T. A. ever since its founding.⁵⁷

Because of these personal attacks, Councill considered dropping out of the S. T. A. and refused to attend the 1892 meeting in Huntsville, Councill's home town. Councill seized on Paterson's absence to attack him further at this meeting. In 1893, P. H. Patterson (a member of a Montgomery Negro law firm and not related to W. B. Paterson) wrote Washington declining an invitation to be on the program of the S. T. A. "in consideration of the treatment of the Pres. and Faculty of the State Normal School by the State Teachers' Association during its session, last year."⁵⁸

⁵⁴Booker T. Washington to W. B. Paterson, May 4, 1892. Washington was telling Paterson the truth. During the fight he had written Logan, "Do not go into the dirt with Patterson even if we lose the money." Booker T. Washington to Warren Logan, December 11, 1890; Booker T. Washington Papers.

⁵⁵Booker T. Washington to W. B. Paterson, May 4, 1892, Booker T. Washington Papers.

⁵⁶*Report of the Commissioner of Education for the Year, 1882-1883.* (Washington, 1884), 9.

⁵⁷*Yearbook on Negro Education in Alabama in 1930-1931.* (Montgomery, 1931), 68.

⁵⁸Booker T. Washington to W. B. Paterson, May 4, 1892. P. H. Patterson to Booker T. Washington, August 26, 1893. Booker T. Washington Papers.

Again, in contrast to Council, Washington worked hard to persuade Paterson not to leave the S. T. A. just because of Council's attacks. Washington noted that ten of the eleven meetings of the S. T. A. had not offended Paterson and urged him not "to judge all the future by one meeting in view of the past."⁵⁹

Washington also assured Paterson that he did not believe that Paterson should step down from the Presidency of State Normal. Washington condemned Council, saying that Negroes "should be the last people in the world to draw the color line." He opposed putting a Negro into a position just because of his race "or removing a white man from a position where he is doing well simply because of his color." Washington insisted that he had never, in private or in public, "said or intimated that [he] was against [Paterson's] holding [his] present position." Instead, Washington fully supported Paterson. "If I had it in my power to say who should be president of the Montgomery school I should certainly give my vote to you."⁶⁰

Paterson and his supporters at Montgomery were reconciled with the S. T. A. by at least 1899. That year and in 1900 Paterson's former student, assistant, and successor as president at State Normal (upon Paterson's death in 1915), John W. Beverly, became the President of the S. T. A.⁶¹ While Paterson was never an officer of the organization again, had there been any remaining antagonism on either side one as close to Paterson as was Beverly would neither have been elected nor would he have served in this position.

A difference in educational philosophies may have heightened the ill feelings between Paterson and Council, although a similar disagreement between Paterson and Washington never marred their relationship. Council and Washington believed that Negro schools in the South should focus primarily on vocational, industrial training. Paterson, along with the white teachers of the American Missionary Association schools

⁵⁹Booker T. Washington to W. B. Paterson, June 12, 1893. Booker T. Washington Papers.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, May 4, 1892.

⁶¹Personal Data Sheet of John William Beverly, Brown University Archives.

and many of the Negro heads of Negro schools in Alabama, believed that Negro students should get precisely the same classical, liberal arts collegiate education as did white students in most colleges and universities in nineteenth century America. Since the early days of Tullibody Academy, Paterson insisted on including Latin, Greek, and modern foreign languages in his school's curriculum.

Paterson's stress on the traditional college courses in his school did not mean that he was bound by traditional teaching methods. At the organizational meeting of the State Teachers' Association [Negro] in 1882 Paterson showed that he kept up with the latest educational developments when he chose to tell the teachers about the "Quincy Plan," a new educational program developed in Quincy, Massachusetts, by Francis W. Parker, the "father of Progressive education," according to John Dewey. While there was no evidence that Paterson actually adopted the Quincy Plan in his school, he did show a continuing interest in educational methodology. In his annual report in 1899, for example, he deplored the exclusive discussion of the *what* of education if this made educators overlook the importance of the *how* or manner and quality of education.⁶²

While Paterson had more experience at a wider variety of jobs than either Councill or Washington, Paterson refrained from establishing an industrial department at State Normal until 1883-1884. Even then, he refused to divert money from the academic program. Only when Jabez Lamar Monroe Curry of the Peabody Fund and Atticus Greene Haygood of the Slater Fund furnished the money did State Normal begin an industrial program in 1884.⁶³ Even after the establishment of industrial work at State Normal, Paterson kept the primary focus of the school on its academic program. In 1890 during the congressional discussion of the Morrill Act, Senator J. T. Morgan contrasted Paterson's school, "a fine literary college," with

⁶²*Report of the Commissioner of Education, 1882-1883*, 9. Cremin, Lawrence A., *The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876-1957*, (New York, 1961), 129. Cremin outlines Parker's educational ideas on pp. 128-135.

⁶³Willis Gaylord Clark, *History of Education in Alabama, 1702-1889*, Circular of Information No. 3, 1889. Contributions to American Educational History, edited by Herbert Baxter Adams (Washington, 1917), 275.

Washington's school, "a normal mechanical and agricultural school."⁶⁴ Since Morgan believed that Tuskegee offered the proper kind of training for Negroes, his praise of State Normal is even more impressive than that of friends of the school.

Paterson, then, believed in giving Negroes all the education along classical lines that they could assimilate. Only after the legislature removed any provision for university-level work from the school's charter in 1889 did Paterson cease planning and lobbying for collegiate and university training for Negroes. One who taught with Paterson for twenty years recalled his attitude toward the necessity for students to do manual labor. "He said little to the students about work, but could be seen doing something almost daily. The boys who were not afraid to work enjoyed laboring with him." This idea of teaching the importance of manual labor by example only certainly contrasts strongly with Booker T. Washington's incessant exhortations to his students about the value and importance of manual labor.

Although he drove himself hard, Paterson always found time to oversee the planting and care of trees and flowers on the campus. As a result, the campus "put forth many hues in spring and summer while the office and chapel were always fragrant with cut [flowers]." Paterson shared his flowers by sending free flowers to important public gatherings.⁶⁵

This interest in flowers led Paterson into yet another career after he came to Montgomery. The catalytic event was the wedding of the daughter of one of Paterson's friends in 1890. A wagonload of chrysanthemums, which Paterson and his wife sent to their friend "attracted so much attention that their donors were persuaded to commercialize the raising of flowers." The Patersons came to see growing flowers commercially as a means of providing "a business for their growing family. It was their ambition to create something beautiful and profitable." From its beginning in a sixteen by fifty foot greenhouse on a five-acre plot in 1890, Paterson's Rosemont Gardens grew to become one of the largest florists in Mont-

⁶⁴Williams, "Federal Legislation Relating to Negro Land Grant Colleges," 76.

⁶⁵Jones, "William Burns Paterson." Trenholm, *Yearbook*, 1949, 26. Terrell, "Reminiscences," 4-5.

gomery. Over a half century after Paterson's death, his direct descendants still conduct the business. To share his interest and knowledge of flowers Paterson helped found and became a charter member of the Alabama State Horticultural Society.

Throughout his life Paterson remained sentimental about Scotland. When a group of Scots organized in Alabama to celebrate the anniversary of Robert Burns, they elected Paterson as Secretary and chose him to give an address at their third meeting.⁶⁶

In addition to his teaching, Paterson did what he could for and with Negroes in many ways. He was one of the organizers and first president of the Negro teachers' group in Alabama, the State Teachers' Association. He aided in some way "every church (colored) in [Montgomery]." He gave larger churches donations. He donated specifically needed items from chandeliers to heaters to several smaller churches. "His purse was always open toward 'Old Ship' [A.M.E.Z.] Church, for he said, 'The school had its birth there.'"

Paterson was also concerned about individuals, especially his students. "Every child reported to him was helped." Paterson knew by name all the pupils in the school. He called the younger pupils his "buds of promise" and he enjoyed watching them grow up. One of his students believed that Paterson's high moral standards influenced many of the people (white and Negro) which he met.

The one thing that Paterson most looked forward to at Commencement was the Alumni Reunion. At this time every year he could get some feeling for the difference that State Normal had made in many lives. On one of these occasions he remarked, "'My prayer is Lord, make it fifty years.'" Paterson had no regrets about his career. He wished his epitaph to be, "'He taught Negroes fifty years.'" Paterson was only five years away from this goal when he died on March 14, 1915.⁶⁷

⁶⁶L. D. Hale, ed., *The Courier Courtesy Magazine*, IV (February, 1927), 3. Jones, "William Burns Paterson." Quoting Hearin, *The Gulf Breeze*, Jones, "Off the Bench." "Third Celebration of the Anniversary of Robert Burns," Montgomery, Alabama, 135th Anniversary, January 25, 1894, Program, Paterson Papers.

⁶⁷Terrell, "Reminiscences," 5.

Hooper Councill Trenholm, Secretary of the State Teachers' Association in 1931 and Paterson's second successor as President of State Teachers' College (1925-1962), aptly summarized Paterson's career when he wrote that Paterson was "the pioneer as well as the apostle of Negro education in Alabama."⁶⁸

While this is something of an overstatement of Paterson's contributions, he was an important figure in Negro education in Alabama. Paterson symbolized all those Negro and white teachers in Negro schools who believed that Booker T. Washington's program of stressing industrial to the detriment of academic education for Negroes was a mistake. Paterson and those like him continued to insist that Negro leaders needed the same kind of academic training as did whites. This message made the Paterson group unpopular in Alabama and kept their schools from receiving the substantial philanthropic contributions lavished upon Tuskegee. But Paterson, his successor, John W. Beverly (B.A. Brown University, 1894) and others like them were eventually to prevail in the twentieth century.

Another of Paterson's legacies, the example of white working in Alabama's state Negro colleges, with all the implications this carries for ultimate equality and integration, lay dormant for several decades after his death. During the civil rights struggle of the 1960's, however, this ideal flourished and is still growing. If we remember Paterson for what he stood for as well as what he was able to accomplish in an age of increasing segregation and prejudice, he can be seen as one of Alabama's most outstanding educators.

⁶⁸Hooper Councill Trenholm, *Yearbook of the Alabama State Teachers' Association, 1931* (Montgomery: State Teachers' College, 1931), 68.

"WILL THE FREEDMEN WORK?

WHITE ALABAMIANS ADJUST TO FREE BLACK LABOR"

by

Sylvia H. Krebs

When the Civil War finally ended in the spring of 1865, the attention of the national government and the Northern public was focused on the dramatic problems of political and social adjustment necessitated by the events of the preceding four years. For Southerners, however, white and black alike, the most pressing problems were those associated with the more mundane business of making a living, and the majority of Southerners still depended on farming for their livelihood. Although the agricultural situation was not hopeless, neither was it good. Land, buildings, fences and tools had suffered the destruction of military action or deteriorated from want of attention. In the same way the number of farm animals had been seriously reduced. Even though available cash and credit facilities were drastically limited, the problem that seemed to weigh most heavily on the minds of white Southerners was that presented by the emancipation of the slaves and the subsequent disruption of the traditional labor system. The complexities of a problem which carried political, social, and economic implications were boiled down to a simple question: will the freedmen work?

In June 1865 Josiah Gorgas, former Confederate chief of ordnance, observed in his diary: "But the world will wag on and his [the Negro's] freedom will cling to him and the master will continue to cultivate his land, with black labor or that failing with white."¹ Few white Alabamians were as casual as Colonel Gorgas about the labor system although there was no consensus as to the prospects. John Richard Dennett, traveling in Alabama and other parts of the South for *The Nation*, reported the various viewpoints that he encountered. The views ranged from the pessimistic conviction that, without slavery, no cotton could be grown at all to the optimistic be-

¹Dairy of Josiah Gorgas, June 2, 1865. Gorgas Collection (University of Alabama Library, Tuscaloosa).

lief that free black labor would be superior to slave labor.² Whether optimistic or pessimistic, white Alabamians generally assumed that some means of control over the freedmen would be a necessity. F. W. Kellogg, collector of internal revenue in Mobile, reported that "all classes of society are willing to submit but regret the abolition of slavery and believe that some system of compulsory labor must be established. . . ."³

On the other hand, not all Alabamians were as willing to submit as Kellogg thought. There were those who were unwilling to accept the death of the peculiar institution. Brigadier General Christopher Andrews testified before the Joint Select Committee on Reconstruction that "the majority undoubtedly cherished the hope of having the [Emancipation] proclamation, in some manner, revoked."⁴ Andrews' estimate was undoubtedly exaggerated, but there were diehards. William C. Jordan, a planter in Bullock County, ignored the order to free his slaves and was charged with parole violation by the military authorities. In defending his actions, Jordan insisted that he could not have been guilty because the Thirteenth Amendment had not been ratified at the time and that the validity of Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was doubtful.⁵ When the state convention met in September 1865, some delegates were unwilling to accept the Thirteenth Amendment unconditionally. However, the opponents of the amendment seemed to be primarily concerned with leaving the way open for possible later compensation for the loss of their slaves.⁶

Even those white Alabamians who were willing to accept the destruction of slavery were influenced in their approach to the problems of free labor by certain traditional assumptions about blacks. One such assumption was summed up by an

²John Richard Dennett, *The South As It Is: 1865-1866*. Ed. by Henry M. Christman. (New York, 1965), 289.

³Statement of F. W. Kellogg, Collector of Internal Revenue, Mobile, September 9, 1865. Andrew Johnson Papers (Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.).

⁴U. S. Congress, House, *Reports of the Committees*, No. 30 "Goergia, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas," 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (Serial Set No. 1273), 148.

⁵Henry E. Sterkx, "William C. Jordan and Reconstruction in Bullock County, Alabama," *Alabama Review*, XV (1962), 63-64.

⁶*Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention of the State of Alabama held in the City of Montgomery on Tuesday, September 12, 1865* (Montgomery, 1865), 29.

editorialist in the *Eufaula Daily News*: "A negro will be a negro in spite of h--l; and there is no use talking."⁷ Another assumption was stated by Governor Robert M. Patton in his first address to the state legislature. Echoing President Andrew Johnson, Patton said: "... it must be understood that, politically and socially, ours is a white man's government. . . . the State affairs of Alabama must be guided and controlled by the superior intelligence of the white men."⁸ Although the governor specified political and social matters, the assumption of superiority by whites condemned blacks to a second class status in every aspect of life including the economy.

White Alabamians' worst fears about free labor were often reinforced by the conditions existing in the remaining months of 1865 after the surrender of the Confederate armies. In the place of slavery's guaranteed labor supply, there was a body of free blacks unwilling or unable to work. Among Alabama blacks the initial reactions to emancipation varied. However, there was a general inclination to celebrate their new status and to test freedom by rejecting both work and controls.⁹ Rumors of land division kept the hope of independent farming alive for many blacks until early 1866. Such hopes were entirely justified; federal troops, members of Congress, and even white Southerners (expressing their fears of what might happen) had spoken of confiscation and redistribution of land.¹⁰ The new status of black women gave them the opportunity to choose their own housework rather than farm labor. Such debilitating diseases as tuberculosis, venereal disease, yellow fever, and small pox not only further depleted the labor supply but also convinced some whites that blacks might become extinct in a short time. As late as March 1866, the *Huntsville Advocate* estimated that, if all available labor were employed, only two-thirds of the tillable land would be

⁷*Eufaula Daily News*, October 14, 1865.

⁸*Journal of the Session of 1865-6 of the House of Representatives of the State of Alabama* (Montgomery, 1866), 159.

⁹See John B. Meyers, "Reaction and Adjustment: The Struggle of Alabama Freedmen in Post-Bellum Alabama, 1865-1867," *Alabama Historical Quarterly*, XXXII (1970) 6-7, for a discussion of initial black responses to emancipation.

¹⁰Oscar Zeichner, "The Transition from Slave to Free Agricultural Labor in the Southern States," *Agricultural History*, XIII (1939), 23.

in use, but under the existing labor conditions only one-half of the land would be cultivated.¹¹

The deep distrust of free black labor reinforced by existing conditions led many Alabama whites to believe that other sources of labor must be found. Thus efforts were made to induce white immigrants from the northern states and Europe to come into the state. There was even a proposal that Chinese laborers might be imported. Newspaper editorials recounted the opportunities available for white laborers, and when it became obvious that such publicity was not enough, various public and private plans were suggested for encouraging immigration.

It was proposed that Alabama adopt a plan similar to one used in Virginia and the Carolinas. These states had authorized a commissioner to advertise available land, open information offices, distribute pamphlets, and station agents at various places in Europe. Such a scheme, its supporters suggested, could be financed privately in Alabama.¹² When a state-wide plan was not adopted, individuals saw a business opportunity in providing white laborers for those who wanted their services. Mobile, Montgomery, and Huntsville newspapers advertised the services of these agencies.¹³

Despite the public's interest in immigration, the legislature that convened in November 1865 did not adopt a broad plan for attracting new workers. However, it did enact limited legislation directed to the same general purpose. The legislature passed "An act to encourage immigration and to protect immigrant labor" which was primarily concerned with regulating the relations of prospective employers and employees by protecting both parties to labor contracts.¹⁴ A second act incorporated the German Association, the purpose of which was to promote immigration.

¹¹Huntsville *Advocate*, March 24, 1866.

¹²Eufaula *Daily News*, October 14, 1865.

¹³Mobile *Advertiser and Register*, February 1, 1866; Huntsville *Daily Independent*, June 9, 1866; Montgomery *Advertiser*, August 25, 1865, November 28, 1865.

¹⁴*Acts of the Session of 1865-6 of the General Assembly of Alabama*. (Montgomery, 1866), 62-64, 254-55, hereinafter cited as *Acts of the General Assembly, 1865-6*.

Immigrants did come to Alabama, but there was no large scale influx and white laborers were never sufficiently numerous to replace black labor. The *Montgomery Advertiser* reported in April 1867 that only 200 of 13,000 immigrants entering the port of New York during March indicated any intention of coming to the South.¹⁵ No immigrants arrived at the port of Mobile between the end of the war and September 30, 1866. European immigrants had avoided the South in the antebellum period, and the postwar situation was scarcely more attractive. Like the rest of the South, Alabama could not compete with the West which did not have the supply of cheap black labor and where political conditions were more stable.

Less than a month after it had made one of numerous appeals for publicity about immigration, the *Montgomery Weekly Advertiser* stated: "... until the perfect restoration of order and the complete rehabilitation of the people, no considerable current of immigration will set in this direction."¹⁷ Although some efforts to encourage immigration continued, white Alabamians generally realized by 1867, if not before that they had to come to terms with free black labor.

Despite misgivings about free black labor, individual citizens had begun to make personal adjustments to the new situation shortly after the war ended. Since the farming season had just begun, it was necessary to make some arrangements to avoid a total loss. Two cases illustrate the practical arrangements that were made in the summer of 1865. Sarah Espy, a widow who managed a plantation in Cherokee County, recorded in her diary a contract with a black couple. The man and woman were to receive food, clothing, and the produce of their garden. In return they would continue to perform the same duties they had as slaves.¹⁸ In June 1865 Dr. Basil Manly, Sr., former president of the University of Alabama, reported contracting with the field hands and house servants on his Tuscaloosa County plantation for a share of the crop

¹⁵*Montgomery Advertiser*, April 16, 1867.

¹⁶U. S. Congress, House, *Executive Documents*, No. 39, "Immigration," 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Serial Set No. 1289), 68-69.

¹⁷*Montgomery Weekly Advertiser*, May 14, 1867.

¹⁸Sarah Rodgers Espy Diary, July 3, 1865 (Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery).

plus food, clothing, shelter, fuel and medical care.¹⁹ In both contracts the services provided by the employer differed little from ante-bellum practices. Both also provided for a share of produce to be given to the employee rather than wages.

The early agreements were often unsatisfactory to both parties. In an attempt to remedy this, General Wager Swayne, assistant commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau, issued orders in May and August of 1865 regarding the making of contracts. Contracts of a month or more duration were to be in writing and approved by a Bureau agent. Employers were responsible for providing adequate food, clothing, and medical care in addition to any monetary compensation which might be agreed upon. The contract served as a lien on the crop, not more than half of which could be moved until wages had been paid in full.²⁰

The Bureau regulations fell far short of solving contract problems. Many blacks were still unwilling to negotiate any contract at all, and they remained unwilling until the end of the year when the expected Yuletide land distribution did not materialize. Much misunderstanding and mistrust developed between blacks and whites regarding the details of payments and obligations. Carl Schurz, who was sent by President Johnson to investigate conditions in the South, included in his report to Congress a statement that some employers were driving blacks off the plantation as soon as the crop was made.²¹

Matters were further complicated by the uneven enforcement of the regulations by Freedmen's Bureau agents. Dennett reported a conversation with a young planter from western Alabama. The planter, who had arranged to pay his workers fifty cents a day, had had no trouble getting the contract approved. The local Bureau agent, the young man said, allow everyone to do as he liked, even to whipping "a nigger."²²

¹⁹W. Stanley Hoole (ed.), "The Diary of Dr. Basil Manley, 1858-1867," Part V, *Alabama Review*, V (1952), 142.

²⁰U. S. Congress, Senate, *Executive Documents*, No. 6, "Freedmen's Affairs," 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Serial Set No. 1276), 4.

²¹U. S. Congress, Senate, *Executive Documents*, No. 2, "Condition of the South," 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (Serial Set No. 1237), 82.

²²Dennett, *The South As It Is: 1865-1866*, 291-92.

Such attitudes on the part of the agents were hardly conducive to promoting a mutually satisfactory labor situation.

General Swayne's motives and role in Alabama's labor situation is not entirely clear. He was the only Southerner among the Bureau's assistant commissioners, and he remained at his post longer than any of the others. Some evidence suggests that he complied with the wishes of the planters to the detriment of the blacks.²³ If Swayne were lenient in enforcing regulations or unconcerned with freedmen's rights, it could have affected the attitudes and actions of his subordinates. More than likely the breakdown in execution of Bureau policies was due to a lack of efficiency and enthusiasm on the part of some agents.

Whatever concessions were or were not made to planter interests, there were many white Alabamians who were only too anxious to be rid of the Bureau and particularly of the Northerners who staffed it. This encouraged some scattered efforts to regulate labor through local associations. The first and apparently the most successful of these groups was the Monroe County Agricultural Association which was formed in late 1865. Monroe County, located in the southwest part of the state on the Alabama River, had more than 50 per cent blacks in its population, a fact which probably made local control particularly important to the whites. The association authorized the executive committee to see that contracts were made and carried out fairly, to draw up contracts when requested to do so by the parties involved, and to act as an arbitrator in contract disputes with the decision subject to appeal to the association president. Contracts for a term exceeding one month were to be put in writing. No contract could be negotiated while another was operative, and any member found guilty of encouraging such practices would forfeit the protection of the association. An important feature of the plan was the provision for the appointment of the president as the local Bureau agent. The association did not intend to confine its attention entirely to the labor problem. It planned to aid in providing educational facilities for the blacks and homes for the aged and helpless. The work was

²³Swayne's role is discussed in William McFeeley, *Yankee Stepfather: General O. O. Howard and the Freedmen*. (New Haven, 1968), 77-78.

to be financed by dues which were not to exceed five dollars for each freedmen employed by a member.²⁴

The plan embodied in the Monroe County Agricultural Association met with the approval of General Swayne, and state newspapers endorsed it. The *Mobile Advertiser and Register*, on two occasions, cited advantages of the plan. It would help to alleviate distrust between planter and freedman, the editorialist declared, and by its official connection with the Freedmen's Bureau, it would be free from Northern attacks.²⁵ The editorialist assumed that replacing outsiders with local people would improve relations between the races (a common assumption not limited, of course, to the labor question). There was no apparent Northern disapproval, but this was probably due to the plan's limited operation rather than its connection with the Bureau. It may simply have been regarded as unimportant.

After Swayne officially indicated his approval by appointing the association president as the local Bureau agent, planters in Clarke and Conecuh counties held meetings and adopted constitutions similar to that of the Monroe Association. The Monroe County plan did provide an approach to the labor situation that might well have been successful had it spread and had it been carried out in good faith. The operation in Monroe County must have been at least partially satisfactory. It was praised, not only by local residents and conservative newspapers, but also by the Radical-oriented *Mobile Nationalist*. Reporting expectations for a larger than usual crop in Monroe, the paper attributed it to the "just policy" toward the freedmen operating there.²⁶

When the state legislature convened in December 1865, the continued uncertainty of the labor supply influenced its actions. The congregating of blacks in towns and cities and their continuing refusal to work led to the passage of two bills concerned with vagrancy. The first bill amended the 1852 Code by adding to the list of those classified as vagrants runaway servants, stubborn servants, and any person who habitu-

²⁴*Mobile Advertiser and Register*, December 19, 1865.

²⁵*Ibid.*, October 11, 1865; December 19, 1865.

²⁶*Mobile Nationalist*, May 24, 1866.

ally neglected the employment upon which he depends. This considerably broadened the range of persons who might be subject to arrest as vagrants. The second bill provided a system for those arrested and convicted as vagrants. It authorized county commissioners' courts to establish poor houses, the inmates of which could be hired out. The act also provided that persons convicted of vagrancy who were unable to pay a fine could be hired out as laborers, a practice that had been used in the ante-bellum period.²⁷ Governor Patton's approval of the two bills before the end of 1865 made it possible to coerce some blacks into the labor force.

Two other bills which failed to win gubernatorial approval are nevertheless indicative of the mood of the legislature. The first of these bills was a catch-all effort to deal with a wide range of problems by contract regulation. It specified the mode of drawing up contracts, provided penalties for violations by either party, and defined the enticing of a black person away from his place of employment as a misdemeanor.²⁸ General Swayne observed in a letter to General O. O. Howard, Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau: "We can get along in this state without a contract law of any kind and it is proposed to try it."²⁹ Patton evidently agreed with Swayne's views, or succumbed to his influence, because he did not sign the bill.

The most controversial measure was entitled "An act to regulate the relation of master and apprentice as relates to freedmen, free Negroes, and mulattoes."³⁰ It empowered justices of the peace to apprentice minors and those whose parents could not or would not support them. The most objectionable part of the measure to Northerners gave preference to former owners in apprenticing black minors. The Northern public interpreted this as an attempt to re-enslave the young free blacks of Alabama. The fact that the apprenticing was com-

²⁷*Acts of the General Assembly, 1865-6*, 116, 119, 121.

²⁸*Journal of the Session of 1865-6 of the Senate of the State of Alabama* (Montgomery, 1866), 104-05, hereinafter cited as *Senate Journal, 1865-6*.

²⁹Major General Wager Swayne to Brigadier General Oliver O. Howard, January 31, 1866, Freedmen's Bureau Records, Alabama, 1865-68, (Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, Record Group 105, National Archives, Washington, D. C.)

³⁰*Senate Journal, 1865-6*, 138.

pulsory was also criticized. Although Patton did not sign this bill, one very much like it did receive his approval before the legislative session ended.

The labor situation stabilized in the early months of 1866 despite the generally unsatisfactory public and private attempts at regulation. When the anticipated land division did not occur at Christmas of 1865, blacks were forced by necessity to make some arrangements to support themselves. Swayne reported in January 1866 that contracts were being made. The employees usually received food, shelter, and medical care plus ten dollars per month for men and eight dollars for women.³¹

Negotiation of contracts was a step toward stabilizing the labor system, but problems were not solved until the terms were fulfilled to the satisfaction of both parties. Alabama whites disliked the idea of paying wages to the freedmen from the beginning. The planters did not feel that wage labor could be adequately controlled for the length of time required to make the cotton crop.³² The lack of sufficient specie made wage payments even more undesirable for the planters, and the practice became increasingly unpopular. The Bureau orders providing for a lien on the crop for the laborer's wages sometimes led to complications. The employer usually had to sell the crop before he had the money to pay wages, but when the freedmen saw the crop being moved, they feared that they would not be payed and took action against the employer. Thus, it seemed more practical to contract for shares of the crop than for wages. The development of the share-crop system was further encouraged by the widespread belief among whites that, if a share of the crop were involved, blacks would be less likely to break contracts.³³

The United States Commissioner of Agriculture commented extensively on the Southern situation in his 1867 report. He

³¹Swayne to Howard, January 2, 1866, Freedmen's Bureau Records.

³²U. S. Congress, *Executive Documents*, No. 6, "Freedmen's Affairs," 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Serial Set No. 1276), 7. Zeichner, "The Transition from Slave to Free Agricultural Labor in the Southern States," *Agricultural History*, XIII (1939), 30.

³³Walter L. Fleming, *Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama* (New York, 1949), 436-37; *Mobile Advertiser and Register*, January 25, 1866; Francis W. Loring and C. F. Atkinson (eds.), *Cotton Culture and the South, Considered with Reference to Emigration* (Boston, 1869), 13, 103.

attributed the decline of the wage system to failures on the part of both blacks and whites — the idleness and inefficiency of the blacks and the inexperience of the whites in managing free labor. The Commission observed:

To presume that ignorant slaves, herded in masses, released from all control except the restraints of statute law, should at once become models of industry, frugality, and foresight, is to accredit to them a higher wisdom than could be expected of their masters in their new relations.³⁴

Success had been achieved, the Commissioner noted, by those planters who had the trust of their employees and who understood the new situation. Thus, necessity born of failure and an inclination to bind blacks as closely as possible to the land led to the share-crop system that was to burden whites and blacks of Alabama — and the other Southern states — for many years to come.

The adjustment to free labor would have been difficult even if other circumstances had been ideal. Unfortunately, the situation in Alabama was far from ideal. The mania for cotton planting tended to lock planters and small farmers alike into traditional agricultural patterns and stifled any innovative inclinations. The obsession with cotton production was particularly strong in 1865 and 1866 because of the high prices which the crop brought. Even when prices declined, the emphasis on cotton continued because it was the crop with which both blacks and whites were most familiar.

Unfavorable natural conditions also influenced the situation. A period of too much rain was followed by one with too little. Rust, caterpillars, boll weevils, and, in some cases all three, attacked the cotton crop in Marengo, Choctaw, and Sumter counties. The same dismal conditions prevailed across much of the rest of the state in 1866.³⁵ Unfortunately the grim agricultural conditions continued into 1867.

The question asked by whites was simple: will the freedmen work? By 1867 necessity had assured an affirmative an-

³⁴*Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture for the Year 1867* (Washington, 1868), p. 417

³⁵*Mobile Advertiser and Register*, April 7, 1866; *Grove Hill Clarke County Journal*, September 13, 1866.

swer in the vast majority of cases. More important in the long run were the terms under which blacks and whites would work together. The two years preceding the passage of the Military Reconstruction Acts saw the formation of patterns which provided an unfortunate continuity from ante-bellum to post-bellum years.

Adjustment to free labor in Alabama proceeded simultaneously along three lines. The first line, private individual action, was initiated as soon as persons realized that agricultural work could not continue if agreements were not made. Success or failure of such arrangements depended almost entirely on the nature of the slave-master relationship. A man known as a "good master" had little trouble hiring free blacks; conversely a "bad master" found hiring difficult at first. The second line of adjustment was that of private groups such as the Monroe County Agricultural Association. Because of the limited operation of this plan, one can only speculate about its value. However, given prevailing white attitudes toward blacks, the Monroe plan almost certainly would not have solved all the problems involved. The plan envisioned no real cooperation between whites and blacks. It was merely another means of controlling "free" labor.

The third line of adjustment was the official actions of the Freedmen's Bureau and the Alabama legislature. The Bureau proclamations and state legislation attempted to bring order to the situation. Some form of control was an integral part of these official actions; there was no idea of allowing the freedmen to have complete freedom in working out their economic lives. Too often official action merely reenforced traditional attitudes and practices without providing innovative leadership.

From the beginning, there was no question but that white Alabamians intended their state to remain a "white man's country." Socially and politically blacks were to be denied privileges enjoyed by whites. Black labor was necessary to the economy, but it too could be regulated by whites. Thus, by early 1866, blacks were making contracts out of necessity on white terms. Eventually these terms meant sharing the crop and blacks found themselves in a condition not too dif-

ferent from that of slavery. The policies of the later phase of reconstruction did virtually nothing to alter this situation.

Traditional white attitudes and difficult agricultural conditions worked to the detriment of black Alabamians. Without political leverage, they were unable to help themselves. Tragically, the Freedmen's Bureau proved almost equally helpless in regard to the labor problem. Whether because of Swayne's sympathies or organizational weaknesses, the Bureau did little to forestall the relegation of blacks to a second class economic status. Thus, by 1867, the basic pattern of black/white adjustment to the free labor system was completed on white terms.

A HONEYMOON IN 1850

by

Ralph B. Draughon, Jr.

In the summer of 1850, when Americans were watching with excitement the debates in Congress on the Compromise of 1850, these political matters did not much concern a young lady of Macon, Georgia, who had just married a Georgia physician and begun a wedding trip through the lower South. In Julia Marsh Patterson's diary, now in the Southern Historical Collection at Chapel Hill, she kept a record of a romantic journey through Georgia and Alabama with her husband and his valet, Toby, who drove their carriage on an extended and pleasant honeymoon. And not once in her journal did the bride mention anything about politics!

The young Mrs. Patterson was, however, a chauvinistic Georgian, and her initial impression of Alabama was most unflattering:

How different, and how dissonant then, the sterile scenery with which Alabama greets us. . . . The road was lonely, and the country so barren, that in mid-winter it might have been mistaken for the cold unfriendly shores of Siberia. . . . Here, and there at long intervals were seen, unsheltered from the burning blaze of the sun, the lowly 'log-cabin' that sufficiently betrayed the squalid poverty of their inmates. To me they appeared the inevitable abodes of wretchedness. . . .

Little else in East Alabama seemed to please the bride. She described "an accidental collection of buildings . . . dignified with a name — Cubahatchee," and she thought Crawford to be "a remarkably unostentatious looking place." As night began to fall the couple sent Toby to knock at a farmhouse door to ask for shelter, but he quickly returned so startled that his face was almost white. From the farmhouse the couple heard "the shrill voice of a woman calling out that 'it was only 4 miles to Auburn.' "

The bride was in despair and the groom was enraged by

this breach of southern hospitality. Indeed, the bride felt it her sorrowful duty to record that her husband had used some words that were not very "pious or elegant" in referring to the woman. "But where the use of vituperation?" the young Mrs. Patterson asked. "To Auburn we must go, & that right speedily, if we do not wish to be enveloped in the shadowy pall of evening. . . ."

Nevertheless, the moon rose and the night seemed "gloriously beautiful" to the newlyweds:

The effulgent splendor of the moon, now at its full, was undimmed by a single cloud, and through her leafy barrier poured a flood of such rich, silvery light that our pathway was illumined with almost the brilliance of day. It was not until nearly 10 o'clock that we first beheld the gleaming white residences, and steeples of Auburn, embosomed as they were among dark green, clustering trees. . . . Auburn as I first saw it, cannot soon be forgotten.

The bride was surprised to learn that "they boasted 3 or 4 Hotels in their lovely little town," but a Negro the couple encountered recommended the hotel by the railroad as the best. Happily ensconced there, the bride recorded, "Once domesticated we had no reason to regret the hospitality denied us by the shrew. . . ."

The next day the couple had another encounter with Alabama hospitality. It was Sunday, and as they proceeded on their journey they stopped at noon before "a large, pleasant looking mansion, whose well appointed arrangements sufficiently attested the affluence of its possessor." The owner and his wife had just returned by buggy from church, and the wife was wearing a black silk dress (it was midsummer and scorchingly hot), starched cap, and gold spectacles — "the very beautiful ideal of the dignified matron of other days."

Although the newlyweds did not receive an invitation to lunch, they decided to picnic nearby and asked a female servant if they could have some milk. She in turn consulted her mistress and returned shortly to ask if the honeymooners

wouldn't rather have clabber instead! They declined this offer, and the "feminine Shylock" grudgingly brought them a pitcher of milk. They drank it, and the doctor asked the servant the price. The bride wrote:

I must confess this was looked upon by me as a mere piece of necessary courtesy, and of course was quite surprised to hear the girl return with the message that 'the milk was a dime.' These rich gentry certainly practised Franklin's apothegm, 'take care of the pence, and the pounds will take care of themselves.'

As the couple passed through Mount Meigs the bride noted "one of the most princely mansions I had ever seen," but she also recorded a bit of local gossip about the owner of the mansion and his wife. The mistress of the house was said to be an adulteress whose husband had killed her lover in cold blood. This incident created quite a scandal in the supposedly sedate Victorian age, but it serves as a reminder that even then all marriages were not as happy as that of the young Mrs. Patterson and her groom!

At last the couple reached the home of the bride's uncle near Montgomery, and there the diary ends. As the bride recorded, "Montgomery was a city which I had long desired to visit, having made many delightful acquaintances from there at the Watering Places of Georgia. . . . Now I was within 5 miles of the city of my dreams. . . ." And in her happy location near Montgomery, amid a schedule of callers and musicales, tea parties and dances, she was able to forget about the occasional lapses of hospitality in East Alabama and concluded her account of what seems to have been a very idyllic honeymoon in 1850.

THE SOUTH MOURNS A LEADER: THE DEATH OF JOHN C. CALHOUN

by

William Warren Rogers

Among the notables who died in 1850 were Honore Balzac, Zachary Taylor, William Wordsworth, and Robert Peel. While their deaths were attended with appropriate testimonial and lamentations, none of these men received the plaudits accorded John C. Calhoun, United States Senator from South Carolina. It was not that such eminent men went unmourned, but more that Calhoun's death evoked from his fellow Southerners, particularly journalists (many of them educated in the classics), an outpouring of Victorian grief. A number of Southern newspapermen were also creative writers, and most had ability that went substantially beyond reportorial competence. Their skill in expressing sorrow with the printed word needed only a worthy subject, and their region had produced none more worthy than Calhoun.

Death came on March 31, 1850, a few days after Calhoun had sat silently through his last speech, delivered for him because of his illness by Senator James M. Mason of Virginia. Calhoun's final address had been a defense of the Southern position concerning slavery. To many people Calhoun *was* the South. Born in 1782, he served, prior to his last years in the Senate, in the South Carolina Legislature, in the House of Representatives, as James Monroe's Secretary of War, as Vice President during Andrew Jackson's first administration, and as John Tyler's Secretary of State. Such a record, spanning the years from 1808 to 1850, made this Scotch-Irish native of South Carolina's Abbeville District the South's unrivaled champion. "His name is breathed in reverence upon the mountain breeze," an awe-struck admirer recorded.¹ According to an Alabama editor he was "the living embodiment of Southern sentiment and feeling, the bold and independent leader of the defenders of Southern right and constitutional liberty. . . ."²

¹St. Augustine *Florida Sentinel*, July 9, 1850.

²Huntsville *Democrat*, April 11, 1850.

At public and private gatherings ministers, politicians, and friends paid tribute to the South Carolinian, but the largest audience was reached by Southern newspapermen. Always outspoken, frequently vindictive, the Southern press reached a temporary truce. Partisan differences were forgotten as Dixie journalists joined their talents to praise Calhoun. In doing so they sounded a chorus of Victorian accolades that might have drawn only reluctant approval from their subject. After all, Calhoun's fame was based in part on concise and compact logic. Still, as a Southerner, he would have understood that there are occasions when something more than incisive expression is permissible. In any case, Southern editors heaped encomiums on Calhoun which stand unchallenged in ante-bellum United States history as a unique collection of death euphemisms. Made possible by a rare combination of event, time, place, and people, the newspaper coverage was without precedent, and it would never be duplicated.

This article traces the manner in which Calhoun's death was reported in Southern papers. Within his native state the Charleston *Daily Courier* voiced a majority opinion when it remarked that Calhoun "towered among his countrymen, both morally and intellectually, in colossal and pyramidal grandeur."³ Newspapers in other Southern states were no less unstinting in their praise. The sheer volume of words written about Calhoun was testimony to his reputation in the South.

Calhoun had been ill for several months, but "the news of his demise," reported the Clarksville *Jeffersonian* from Tennessee, "was not looked for at this time. . . ."⁴ Avoiding the word "death" with adroit circumlocution, editorialists conveyed what North Carolina's *Charlotte Journal* called "the melancholy intelligence,"⁵ by noting that Calhoun was extinguished, dismissed, removed, eclipsed, blotted, fallen, struck down, no more, sleeping, gone, faded, lost, transferred, and set. He passed away, and if he ebbed, he also ascended.

³Quoted in Savannah [Georgia] *Morning News*, April 3, 1850. See also J. P. Thomas (editor), *The Carolina Tribune to Calhoun* (Columbia, 1857), *passim*. Robert E. Lee's death in 1870 might be cited as being more deeply mourned than that of Calhoun, but with Lee the feelings of sorrow were not only for a fallen hero but also for the Confederacy and the "Lost Cause."

⁴April 16, 1850.

⁵April 10, 1850.

Calhoun's voice, a Florida editor wrote, was "hushed in the abode of eternal silence!"⁶ He was stricken down like a "wounded eagle," according to the *Albany Patriot*, a Georgia newspaper.⁷ Homage was not long in coming to the man, who, as the Lynchburg *Virginian* expressed it, lay "cold and lifeless beneath the damp sods of the tomb."⁸

Inevitably, Calhoun's life was made analogous to celestial bodies. "A great light has gone out," declared the *Alabama Journal* at Montgomery, "from among the highest and most brilliant in our political constellation."⁹ The *Macon Georgia Citizen* observed that Calhoun's star "had been struck from our political firmament."¹⁰ Noting that a great mind had "cast aside the coils of humanity," Florida's *Pensacola Gazette* added, "One of the brightest stars in our political galaxy is blotted from the heavens."¹¹ In Alabama the *Huntsville Democrat* declared, "Like a fixed star in the zenith of the firmament, altho' occasionally obscured by clouds, he has remained at the lofty point, where he was first discovered, and has lost nothing in altitude or brightness during the lapse of years."¹²

Southern editors appropriated verse and chapter from the Bible to express their sentiments. In Florida, the *St. Augustine Ancient City* believed Calhoun's death would grieve South Carolina in the manner of "Rachael mourning for her first son and refusing to be comforted."¹³ From the nation's capital, the *Washington Daily Union* added to the ecclesiastical theme by asserting "A great man indeed has fallen in Israel."¹⁴ "Our Joshua sleeps with his fathers," wrote the editor of the *St. Augustine Florida Sentinel*.¹⁵

Calhoun's dedication and indefatigability were not neglected. He died "in harness" and "nailed to his post" (St.

⁶St. Augustine *Florida Sentinel*, July 2, 1850.

⁷April 5, 1850.

⁸April 8, 1850.

⁹April 9, 1850. For a similar opinion held by another Alabama newspaper see *Tuskegee Macon Republican*, April 11, 1850.

¹⁰April 11, 1850.

¹¹April 6, 1850.

¹²April 11, 1850.

¹³April 6, 1850.

¹⁴April 2, 1850.

¹⁵July 2, 1850.

Augustine *Ancient City*¹⁶); and "in the midst of his labors" (Macon [Georgia] *Telegraph*¹⁷). The image of Calhoun's suffering was evoked by a North Carolina newspaper when the *Raleigh Register* commented that "the angel of death has walked with him for some time past. . . ." ¹⁸ A similar point that "His life ebbed in its wasted tide," was made by a Virginia journal.¹⁹ "The feeble frame," in the words of the New Orleans *Daily Picayune* "at last dismissed the immortal tenant,"²⁰ and when this occurred the Mobile, Alabama, *Daily Register* proclaimed it a "national infliction."²¹ Another writer concluded, "The country has lost a statesman and patriot, and the South one of her ablest and most devoted friends."²²

Newspapers outside of the South reported Calhoun's death. In London *The Times*, expressing the English view, mentioned that the South had lost its foremost leader, one who "justly commanded the high respect even of those whose views were farthest opposed to his own."²³ Closer home, Northern journals offered more subdued appraisals than their Southern counterparts. Yet Horace Greeley's New York *Tribune* devoted a full column of its editorial page and two columns of its supplement to Calhoun's career. Greeley was not effusive about Calhoun's worth but remarked that "His private virtues have never been questioned by those [who] have personally and intimately known him."²⁴

Twentieth century euglogies seem positive understatements when compared to those written about the South Carolina statesman. Yet, if the editorial hyperbole was flamboyant, it was in good taste. While the examples cited here are only a sampling, they are representative. It seems clear that the free-wheeling use of metaphors was not strained, while there were, as well, expressions of gentle poignance. An Alabama editor wrote, "Peace be to his ashes, and a living, breathing,

¹⁶ April 6, 1850.

¹⁷ Quoted in Tallahassee *Floridian & Journal*, April 6, 1850.

¹⁸ April 6, 1850.

¹⁹ Richmond *Whig and Advertiser*, April 2, 1850.

²⁰ April 1, 1850.

²¹ April 1, 1850.

²² Montgomery *Alabama Journal*, April 9, 1850.

²³ April 17, 1850.

²⁴ April 1, 1850.

enduring monument to his memory in the grateful hearts of his admiring countrymen!"²⁵ Perhaps the best statement, one that would have pleased the intense, sharply-honed mind of Calhoun, came from the *Washington Daily Union*: "We trust that gracious providence will temper the wind to the shorn lamb."²⁶

²⁵Huntsville *Democrat*, April 11, 1850.

²⁶April 2, 1850.

BOOK REVIEW

John Ramsey. *Spain: The Rise of the First World Power*. (University: University of Alabama Press, 1973. 341 pp. Bibliography, and index. \$10.50.)

Professor Ramsey's book is the first of a series released by the University of Alabama Press on the Mediterranean world. Those interested in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Spanish history will welcome Ramsey's study since he clearly summarizes the major political, diplomatic, social, and economic characteristics of the kingdom of Ferdinand and Isabel.

The object of Ramsey's study is to discover and mark those elements which prepared Spain for her discovery of the New World and emergence as a major European power in the sixteenth century. In the process, he refutes arguments that the Spanish accidentally stumbled onto greatness in European and colonial affairs. One of the fundamental assertions of Professor Ramsey is that Spain reached its important status as a result of the experiences of reconquering the home land from the Arabs since this forced Spaniards to develop policies governing constantly changing frontiers inhabited by people of different cultural and religious backgrounds. The organizational skills and the creation of colonial policies were coupled with a religious zeal and a tradition of adventure which set the background for future Spanish exploits in the New World. Ramsey argues that Spain's experiences in the Middle Ages thus created "a will to empire, a willingness to undertake tremendous exertions, a shouldering of huge responsibilities, the unremunerative as well as the remunerative (p. 239)."

The volume is divided into two parts. The first serves as an introduction to Spanish history prior to the joint reign of Ferdinand and Isabel in which Ramsey suggests those problems and issues forcing Spain to become a unified nation with the skills and strength to drive on toward the acquisition of territories in Europe and America. The second half, containing the meat of the book, deals with the reign proper. He devotes chapters to the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabel, administration, religion, war against the Arabs, origins of

their American and European holdings, and the succession. In each case, the author clearly defines the central problems involved and marshals sufficient evidence to explain them.

Ramsey's book is a work of synthesis rather than a monograph relying on new or unpublished materials. Since few general histories of the reign of Ferdinand and Isabel are worthy of serious consideration, Ramsey's book is a welcome addition to Spanish historiography. His is a refreshing and balanced account based on available literature.

James W. Cortada
Florida State University

A Narrative of the life of David Crockett of the State of Tennessee. By David Crockett. Edited by James A. Shackford and Stanley J. Folmsbee. (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1973. Pp. xx, 211. \$7.95.)

For some years I have been waging intermittent warfare on Hollywood and television by firing off letters (always unanswered) to various producers pointing out instances in which historical facts have been massacred in cold blood. I have also been at pains to point out some of these travesties of history to my students in the classroom. If, for example, they should ever find themselves armed only with a hand gun and confronted with an Indian, rustler, or their mother-in-law, any one of whom is armed with a rifle, they should run for their lives. Only Paul Newman, Charlton Heston, or Joel McCrae can fire a pistol accurately enough to gun down a man at two hundred yards. Fess Parker (Daniel Boone) should not keep diving into rivers to rescue people because the historical fact that Daniel Boone couldn't swim might catch up with him some day and old Fess would go down like a rock.

Davey Crockett came in for special treatment. He was, I said, a loud-mouthed windbag who chickened out when it came time for Andrew Jackson to fight the Creeks at Horseshoe Bend. And at the Alamo there is reason to believe that the defenders did not fight to the last man. Five of them surrendered and one was Davey Crockett (Santa Anna executed

him anyhow). During one such dissertation a freshman student stalked out of the class room, furiously calling into question my ancestry as he departed.

The media should adopt a Fairness Doctrine for history, and I can think of no better starting point than a production on Davey Crockett based on this Tennesseana Editions publication of Crockett's *Narrative* (historical and technical consultant: Stanley J. Folmsbee, Professor Emeritus of History, University of Tennessee).

The late Professor James Shackford had already conducted a search which did much to separate the legend from the life of Crockett and Professor Folmsbee acknowledges his indebtedness to Shackford's scholarship. The introduction traces the intricate history of the *Narrative* in a story almost as fascinating as Davey's own. Numerous works that claimed to be autobiographical appeared in the one hundred years following Crockett's death and many were accepted as authentic by reputable scholars. But, as Professor Folmsbee ably demonstrates, only the *Narrative of the Life of David Crockett of the State of Tennessee*, published in Philadelphia and Baltimore in 1834 by Carey and Hart, can be said to have originated with Crockett himself. And the *Narrative*, by Davey's own admission was actually composed by Thomas Chilton, a congressman from Kentucky, as a campaign document in Crockett's unsuccessful bid for a fourth term in Congress. But if one allows for the frequent political allusions "the historical facts are generally quite accurate." (p. x.) In this facsimile edition Professor Folmsbee's careful scholarship provides the reader with the necessary understanding of political background and motivation.

The editor's scholarship is perhaps of greater importance in demonstrating the literary value of the *Narrative*. It was "a very early example of American humor, the first of the Southwest variety," and one of the first American autobiographies, especially of that genre which produced much of American folklore and folk heroes. It was also "of importance in the history of American English, being replete with dialectical usages, proverbial expressions, and spellings representing non-standard pronunciations." (p. ix.) The *Narrative* is there-

fore an important document not only for what it tells us about Crockett, but for what it contributes to the American folk legend of success. Professor Folmsbee's exhaustive annotations make this a rich contribution to the history of the Old Southwest.

As for me, I now appreciate the fact that Davey's boast and brag concealed more than a little political talent and acumen. But a man who set out to be "King of the Wild Frontier" should have made it to Horseshoe Bend.

John Pancake
University of Alabama

Louis S. Gerteis. *From Contraband to Freedman: Federal Policy Toward Southern Blacks, 1861-1865*. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1973. Pp. 255. \$11.50.)

In this well-documented account, Gerteis rejects the view maintained by many historians that the Civil War and the abolition of slavery brought about changes which significantly improved the status of Southern blacks. It is his opinion that the war and the emancipation of blacks did not lead to a social revolution nor to a dramatic change in the society and economy of the Southern states.

Gerteis states that the *de facto* emancipation of blacks and the initiation of a contraband policy began on May 23, 1861, after three slaves made their way to Union pickets at Fortress Monroe, Virginia, and requested protection from their owners. At the time there was no congressional or executive policy governing contrabands. As blacks in increasing numbers came to Fortress Monroe, General Benjamin F. Butler appointed a superintendent of contraband labor and began to use male contrabands in constructing breastworks around the town of Hampton.

Within a short period Union troops extended their control in six Virginia counties, the Sea Islands of South Carolina, and portions of North Carolina. Early in 1862 Confederate defenses on the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers and portions

of western Tennessee, Arkansas, and northern Mississippi, including the strategic cities of Memphis and New Orleans, were occupied. In July, 1863, Vicksburg was lost by Confederate forts.

By 1865 more than a million blacks in the Tidewater and the Eastern Shore of Virginia, the Carolinas, Louisiana, and the Mississippi Valley were in Union lines. Approximately 700,000 of these persons lived in the Mississippi Valley, but less than 238,000 of all contrabands came under organized federal control.

In 1862 the contract labor system was introduced by General Butler in Louisiana. By 1864 this system had spread throughout occupied sections of the South. In addition, confiscated and abandoned farms were used in providing land to lessees, and contraband farms and home farms under the supervision of federal officials were established.

Only a few of the lessees were blacks. Some were northerners, while others were "loyal" southerners. Blacks were also employed on private plantations. Occasionally they were allowed to cultivate small garden plots, and in rare instances a few blacks purchased small farms. The vast majority of contrabands worked for white lessees or on private farms as field hands. They were frequently exploited, cruelly treated, or otherwise victimized by their employers as well as by some Union troops and federal officials.

Gerteis believes that the emancipation of blacks was "a war necessity," and that the various contraband labor systems employed in the occupied areas of the South "succeeded only to the extent that they usefully served the Union's military needs." He adds: "Nowhere in the South did army commanders or government officials seek to liberate blacks from antibellum conditions or subordination and dependence." At the same time he concedes that the federal labor system did serve "in part to protect blacks from the ravages of war and the worst abuses of slavery."

The contract labor system laid the foundation for the emergence of tenantry and sharecropping after the war. Deci-

sions made during the war affecting contrabands "shaped postwar policies toward the freedman and in large measure precluded the possibility of racial and social reconstruction in the South."

The Freedman Bureau which was created in March, 1865, had only limited authority and did "little more than preside over the legislation of wartime labor programs while facilitating the restoration of antebellum property rights and the institution of a contract labor system throughout the South."

Several fresh conclusions regarding the federal contraband policy have been presented in this valuable study. It seems to this reviewer, however, that congressional and executive measures, as well as the actions of individual federal officials were motivated to a greater degree by humanitarian impulses than Gerteis is willing to concede.

Robert D. Reid
Auburn University

Lucille Griffith. *Alabama College, 1896 - 1969*. (Montevallo, Alabama, 1969. 297 pp. \$8.50.)

"As institutions serve, they change," observed Dr. Arthur Fort Harman, president of Alabama College a quarter of a century ago. Perhaps no school in the state has undergone more radical alterations or shown itself more adaptable to the changing times than has the recently renamed University of Montevallo. In *Alabama College, 1896 - 1969*, Dr. Lucille Griffith describes the steps by which the state industrial high school for girls was transformed into the four-year coeducation liberal arts college that received university status last year.

This volume is the result of painstaking research in every available source. It is written with commendable objectivity and is documented thoroughly. The index is not quite complete, but its omissions are minor. The early pioneering years have been studied with special care, and the case of the dismissal of Captain Henry Clay Reynolds, a Montevallo merchant

who served as the first head of the school, has been exhaustively investigated and impartially reported.

The plan of the history is a practical one. After the account of the founding and of the first administration, each chapter becomes a complete history of one aspect of the institution. Perhaps the most fundamental chapter is the summary of the principal events and special achievements of the eight administrations between those of Captain Reynolds and the recently inaugurated Dr. Kermit Johnson. Dr. Griffith has been able to convey something of the personality of each president and to indicate the color or tone of his administration. From the point of view of the extraordinary new directions the years have brought, no chapter is more significant than the one entitled "A Changing Curriculum." Although most readers will be conscious of the off-campus contributions of such distinguished faculty members as Dr. Hallie Farmer, the section on "Serving the Wider Community" is a revelation concerning many services the college renders to the state. The alumni, to whom the volume is dedicated, will probably relish most keenly the lively accounts of traditions (such as College Night) and of student life (including even typical menus of the past), matters that are the subject of the final chapters. They may find interest also in the lists of names in the ten appendices.

Besides its scholarship and its balanced presentation, this story of Alabama College is distinguished by its recognition of personalities. Unlike some historians of institutions, Dr. Griffith has not labored to keep her record impersonal. She is aware of the impact of many individuals, and as a result her narrative is laced throughout with names. Not only administrators appear but also certain trustees, many faculty and staff members, a number of students, and even a dormitory maid. Students' impressions of their teachers, collected chiefly by means of an alumni questionnaire, add a special dimension to the portrait gallery in the last chapter. The campus becomes a collective personality through the awareness of all these persons.

The author, professor of history at Montevallo, has already established a reputation for thorough and careful research through her published studies in American history. Her col-

lege is fortunate to possess a scholar of such ability for the important task of planning and composing the history of its first seventy-five years.

Rhoda Coleman Ellison
Huntingdon College

Jean-Rodolphe De Salis. *Switzerland and Europe: Essays and Reflections of J.R. De Salis*. Translated from the original German by Alexander and Elizabeth Henderson. Introduction by Christopher Hughes. (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1972. Pp. 316 with Bibliographical Notes and References. \$7.50.)

This collection of translated essays, a slightly earlier edition of which appeared in England (London, 1971), offers for the first time to English-language readers a sample of the thought and scholarships of the eminent Swiss critic and historian, Jean-Rodolphe De Salis. Included in the selections which the translators present us are a section of eight essays dealing with the history of Switzerland, the peculiarly historical nature of its identity as a nation and its place in the Europe of today. Two additional essays relating to Swiss history and contemporary European relations are also included which were originally critiques by De Salis of other writers. Less relevant to the titular theme of "Switzerland and Europe" are essays on the background of the European wars of the Twentieth century, "German History through Swiss Eyes," a long essay concerning the life and historical scholarship of the nineteenth-century Swiss historian Jean Simonde de Sismondi, and two narrative accounts by De Salis of visits to Prague and Vienna during the emergence of the postwar East-West division of Europe.

De Salis is a strong apologist for what he calls the "Swiss Way." His essays on his native country demonstrate the recurrent theme that the role Switzerland should play in the contemporary world of political and ideological polarization is to provide an historical example of the capacity to reconcile political, linguistic, religious and ideological conflicts. The Swiss historical achievement, as De Salis views it, lies in the

creation of nationhood through the historic development of the sense of political community, the participation of the individual citizen in the sovereign entity of the state. This accomplishment — in the face of the divisive forces of differing ethnic identities and religious influences — not to mention the particularist strains imposed by modern nationalism upon a multinational state — rests upon the shared consciousness of the past and upon shared values which are largely political in nature. History, for the Swiss, is essential for the maintenance of the sense of national identity and for the values which give coherence and validity to the community. The Swiss experience, De Salis argues, offers instructive examples in the ways by which order and cooperation can be achieved despite conflict and diversity.

De Salis' essays are models of didactic prose characterized by an urbane and serious style to which the translators appear to do full justice. For the American reader, their appearance is timely. De Salis' defense of his country's traditions, of its policy of neutrality in the Cold War and even of its economic and financial policies affords a thought-provoking and needed counterbalance to the current popular images of Switzerland as a greedy, "neutralist" state where the dishonestly gotten wealth of tax-dodging American businessmen and gangsters is harbored in unnumbered bank accounts.

Christopher Hughes provides an interesting, though too brief, introduction to this collection of essays; one might wish that he had included somewhat more detail regarding De Salis' major works on European history, which still await translation.

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Arch Fredric Blakey. *The Florida Phosphate Industry: A History of the Development and Use of a Vital Mineral*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973. Pp. xxi, 197. \$13.00.)


Arch Blakey's *The Florida Phosphate Industry* is a business history of significant contemporary interest. It contrasts

the missions of ecologist and industrialist in the Author's Preface. Easily understood, written in a mood of balance and fairness, the Preface traces the seemingly inevitable conflict of technology and environment; it tells us there is hope and points to realistic progress. Much as some parents come to be identified by their bright and interesting children, *The Florida Phosphate Industry* faces the risk of being known as the book in which one finds the *Blakey Preface*. This is far from lamentable. It is a result, not of inadequacy of writing or content within the body of the volume, but rather of the extreme brilliance of the Preface.

Phosphorus is essential to life. Florida is a major supplier of it to our country and to the world, and has been since the discovery and development of phosphorus in Florida prior to the turn of the century. This history fairly bristles with the polished facts of pains-taking research, yet is told as an appealing homespun-like story of a frontier industry that started, faltered, started again and grew to major status. A mining business by nature, it is described simply enough for one to savor, understand and appreciate the evolution of plant and equipment from 19th century pick ax to today's 72 cubic yard dragline buckets and multi-million dollar processing plants. The problems of labor strife, excess capacity, burdensome taxation, and land reclamation are explained in a bipartisan way as Blakey tracks the struggle of this industry for survival and maturity.

Nimrod T. Frazer

THE ALABAMA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY



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Milo B. Howard, Jr., Editor

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NAVAL OPERATIONS ON THE APALACHICOLA
AND CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVERS, 1861-1865

by

Maxine Turner

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I. INTRODUCTION: THE APALACHICOLA-CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER SYSTEM

The twentieth century has taught historians the term *cold war*. It hardly seems applicable to the heroic deeds of the American Civil War. It implies threats of action rather than actual engagements. It calls up images of men stationed in remote places where nothing ever happens except an occasional incident which heightens tension. It implies also the development of new weapons, government contracts, cost overruns. It seems to be a peculiarly contemporary term, yet there was a theatre of operations during the Civil War to which the term *cold war* could be applied, the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee River System.

As it related strategically to the Union and Confederacy during the Civil War, the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee River System included the area drained by the Chattahoochee River from Columbus, Georgia, to its confluence with the Flint River at Chattahoochee, Florida, and the Apalachicola River from Chattahoochee, Florida, to the port of Apalachicola, Florida, on the Gulf of Mexico.

To the Confederacy this entire area was of considerable importance. The port of Apalachicola had been an important commercial point prior to the war. As early as 1854, Apalachicola wharves loaded about seventy square-rigged vessels a year and shipped 160,000 bales of cotton. Finished cotton products from Columbus, Georgia, mills and raw cotton and other agricultural products from Alabama and Georgia were shipped along the river system by steamers to Apalachicola. Ocean-going vessels came into the port with coffee and other products for the area to the north.

The hundred-mile course of the Apalachicola River northward to Chattahoochee, Florida, is extremely winding. The river is bounded in many places by swamps and marshes and at many points deep creeks enter the river. Confederate blockade runners found anchorage in these tributaries during the early days of the war. There they received cargo before going downriver to the port.

Along the Apalachicola are locations which the Confederates fortified or considered as places to sink obstructions.

The first of these was Fort Gadsden, an elevated post twenty miles above Apalachicola. However, the Confederates were never able to provide heavy guns there, and the post was held by a picket guard. Two miles upriver from Fort Gaden was Owl Creek which provided anchorage for small vessels until a Union raid there in 1863.

Twenty-eight miles north of Apalachicola, the Chipola River enters the Apalachicola from the west. Navigable almost to the town of Marianna, Florida, a cut-off from this stream through Gum Swamp allowed river steamers to pass the obstructions which were placed in the Apalachicola in 1862. This series of obstructions was located at the Narrows, a five-mile series of sharp bends in the river thirty-five miles north of Apalachicola. Mocassin Slough, which runs roughly parallel to the river on the east, provided another by-pass for the obstructions for steamers enroute south.

Half way between the towns of Apalachicola and Chattahoochee was the busy landing of Iola. Eight miles north of that point was Ricko's Bluff, at first a transfer point for mail to the south and later a fortified garrison. It was important to the Confederates both as a fortification and as a supply depot for troops stationed farther to the south along the river. Between Ricko's Bluff and Chattahoochee, a railroad connected the river with Quincy, Florida, which was later the headquarters of the Confederate Military District of Middle Florida.

Blountstown Bar lay seventy-eight miles north of Apalachicola. The gunboat *Chattahoochee* was partially destroyed and sunk there by a boiler explosion in 1863. Six miles farther north is Alum Bluff where citizens of Columbus, Georgia, planned to obstruct the river. A Confederate battery placed there for a time in 1862 was later moved to Rock Bluff, eight miles to the north, where a second obstruction was laid.

The town of Chattahoochee, Florida, lies one hundred miles north of Apalachicola at the confluence of the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers. Below that point in the river system, Confederate efforts were centered upon obstructions sunk in the river and protected by batteries or picket guards.

Prior to the war there was a United States Arsenal at Chattahoochee, Florida, and the town itself was a point of some importance as a stop-over for steamers which traveled the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers to Apalachicola. After the Florida volunteers seized the Arsenal in 1861, Chattahoochee became a Confederate post and an official ordnance station.

From Chattahoochee, the Flint River lies northeast, descending along a winding course through the rich agricultural section of southwestern Georgia. Neither Bainbridge along the river nor Albany, the head of navigation at the time of the war, played a prominent role in the operations in the river system.

The Chattahoochee River was quite important to the Confederacy as a line of communication. Above Chattahoochee, Florida, on the river, the Confederates concentrated upon building ships which could go downriver to the Gulf to raise the blockade. At Saffold in Early County, Georgia, a point thirty-three miles north of Chattahoochee, Florida, the Confederate Navy Yard was an installation for constructing and repairing vessels.

Northward from Saffold along the Chattahoochee were many plantation landings where cotton was ginned and stored for shipment. These stores of cotton were a major impetus for initial Confederate defense efforts. Fort Gaines, Georgia, was a fortified point along the Chattahoochee; and Eufaula, Alabama, and Georgetown, Georgia, were thriving towns at the time of the Civil War.

At the fall line on the Chattahoochee River is the city of Columbus, Georgia. In 1861 it had a population of about ten thousand and was already called the largest industrial center south of Richmond. In addition to having the river as a commercial outlet, it was connected with the West Point and Montgomery Railroad, which in turn provided connections with Montgomery, Atlanta, Augusta, Richmond, and other Confederate centers. Columbus was of particular strategic importance as long as the Confederate capital was in Montgomery.

Soon after the onset of war, Columbus industries began to expand and new industries were created to supply the Con-

federacy. Cotton mills turned out uniforms, tents, knapsacks, and shirts. Two factories produced shoes, and Columbus mills were soon working day and night to provide meal and flour for the Confederacy. A music store manufactured drums and fifes for the army in addition to oil cloth for belts and cartridge boxes.

The Columbus Naval Iron Works became by far the most important installation in Columbus. Chief Engineer James H. Warner came to Columbus in 1861 to consolidate industries that had been manufacturing equipment for steamboats. Confederate Ordnance Chief Josiah Gorgas called this Columbus industry the nucleus of the Confederate Ordnance Department. Throughout the war, this industry produced guns and engines for vessels under construction in all parts of the Confederacy. In addition, the iron-clad *Muscogee* and a small torpedo boat were constructed there. The Columbus Naval Iron Works kept the river steamboats in repair during the war and repaired the gunboat *Chattahoochee*.

Other Confederate industries in Columbus produced swords, rifles, harness, ammunition, paper, glass, peanut oil, and wagons. The city was also a major Quartermaster Depot and, later in the war, a Confederate hospital center. Columbus was at the center of strategic plans for both Confederacy and Union in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee River System. From the beginning of the war, Union blockaders knew of Columbus and its importance to the Confederacy, but from the first they were hampered in their efforts to reach the city.

Apalachicola was a station in the command of the East Gulf Blockading Squadron. This division of the Union blockade extended from Cape Canaveral on the eastern coast of Florida to St. Andrew's Bay, some forty-eight miles by land from Apalachicola. Apalachicola was considered one of the principal ports in west Florida, along with St. Andrew's, Deadman's Bay, St. Mark's, Cedar Keys, Tampa, and Pensacola.

The port of Apalachicola is separated from the Gulf by a series of islands. To the east, opposite the city of Carrabelle, is Dog Island, which is separated from St. George's Island by a channel known as East Pass. St. George's Island

extends southwest from the mainland opposite Apalachicola. Although it is now a narrow, continuous body of land, at the time of the Civil War the western tip of the island formed a separate body of land called Sand Island. During the war, Union blockading steamers piled coal there.

A narrow passage between Sand Island and St. Vincent's Island formed West Pass, the main entrance to Apalachicola in 1861. St. Vincent's Island lies in a north westerly position from St. George's, completing the semicircle of islands opposite Apalachicola. The westernmost tip is separated from Indian Peninsula on the mainland by Indian Pass. During the war, both St. Vincent's and St. George's Islands had sufficient vegetation to support herds of wild cattle and hogs but little else. Until well into the twentieth century they were rather desolate stretches of land where Union sailors had had their exercise liberty during the war. The two islands were held by the Confederates until December 1861.

The islands bounding Apalachicola border three rather shallow bodies of water: St. Vincent's Sound to the west, Apalachicola Bay adjacent to the city, and St. George's Sound to the east. The depth of these waters, along with the soundings at each of the three passes, varies a great deal. Before the war, ships which entered the bay from the Gulf stood off St. Vincent's Bar near West Pass and were relieved of cargo and re-laden by means of lighters from the wharves. Although the Union had hoped to use Apalachicola as a sheltered roadstead for vessels, they found the depth of the bay insufficient even for the blockading vessels that were stationed there. This was a continuing source of frustration to Union commanders off Apalachicola during the war.

Throughout the Civil War the Confederates who occupied the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee River System knew that the blockade was off Apalachicola. Like all of the South, they felt the strictures of the blockade, and they worked to build vessels that could move down the rivers to raise it. Meanwhile, the Union naval force off Apalachicola was aware of the agricultural and industrial production in the areas of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama drained by the river system. The Union lacked means of ascending the rivers in their heavy

draft vessels, and the South could not muster a naval force to raise the blockade. As that situation prevailed, each side made efforts to strike a telling blow at the other.

II. 1861: PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

The year 1861 was primarily a time of preparation for operations in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee area. Although Florida volunteers took possession of the United States Arsenal in the area in early January, the Confederate Government faced the responsibility of manning and defending the territory which they occupied. Although Lincoln declared a blockade of southern ports in April, the Gulf Blockading Squadron faced the task of making the blockade of the port of Apalachicola effective.

As a matter of Confederate policy the defense of its coast line was a consideration of great importance. The cotton producers requested protection of their stores at Apalachicola and the citizens requested protection of their homes, but their interests represented only one location along a four-thousand-mile coast line and adequate defense could not be supplied overnight. The Confederates were hampered by lack of men, lack of arms and ammunition, and lack of artillery and officers to direct its use.

While the Union dispatched vessels to Apalachicola in June, they were ill-equipped to enter and maneuver in the shallow coastal waters. Expeditions of small boats into the waters of Apalachicola Bay and St. Vincent's and St. George's Sounds went out of the protecting range of the batteries on blockading vessels. Lacking proper equipment to tow prizes to sea, the Union force was compelled to burn prizes which were captured near Apalachicola. They were left with the expedient of standing outside the waters adjacent to the port trying to apprehend blockade runners as they entered and left one of the four passages to Apalachicola.

Operations in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee area began on January 5, 1861, five days before the secession of Florida. Governor John Milton ordered a group of Florida volunteers to seize arms, ammunition, and buildings in the possession of the United States at the Arsenal at Chattahoochee, Florida. The mission was accomplished at seven o'clock the following morning when the Union force in command of a sergeant

offered no resistance.¹ The volunteers took possession of a large store of muskets, rifles, and pistols at the installation which, in July, 1862, was made an official Confederate Ordnance Station.²

Citizens of Alabama who had shipped cotton to Apalachicola and citizens of Apalachicola, fearing that war would be declared, began to call upon the Confederate Government for attention to the defense of the port. In March, a letter from General A. C. Gordon of Henry County was forwarded to Secretary of War Leroy Pope Walker. Gordon reported that no cotton was being sold or shipped at Apalachicola even though the amount stored there was valued at a million dollars (at ten cents per pound). Asking that the attention of the President be called to the lack of defense at Apalachicola, the General concluded:

Something should be done, and that very soon, for the protection of that place and property. Alabama will suffer more than Florida will if that place should fall into the hands of an enemy. A large portion of the people of Southern Alabama ship their cotton to that port for market, and apprehend danger to their interests there.³

D. P. Holland, a resident of Montgomery, reported to Secretary of the Navy, Stephen R. Mallory, that the port of Apalachicola was without defense, having only two hundred muskets, sixty rifles, and no artillery of any kind. He added that the commercial importance of the city would probably make it "more than a point of ordinary interest to the United States Government. . . ."⁴

¹*The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1880-1901), Series I, vol. I, p. 332. Hereinafter cited as *Army O. R.*

²William A. Albaugh, III, and Edward N. Simmons, *Confederate Arms* (Harrisburg, 1957), 197. Although Albaugh and Simmons place the U. S. Arsenal at Apalachicola, *Army O. R.* and *Navy O. R.* maps designate U. S. Arsenal at Chattahoochee, Florida. A Union landing party reported on March 12, 1862, that "not a soldier, a cannon, or apparently any weapon of war" remained at Apalachicola. Confederate evacuation had been ordered earlier in the month and Apalachicola was not re-occupied by the Confederacy.

³*Army O. R.*, I, I, 448.

⁴*Ibid.*, 450.

The citizens of Apalachicola itself were more immediately interested in the defense of the port. They addressed a letter to Walker asking for help in its defense. Walker's private secretary answered their letter, assuring them of the Secretary's "deep concern" for their problem and informing them that "the proper defense of every assailable point of our coast is a matter most pressing upon the consideration of the Department." While adding that an artillery officer would be sent to Apalachicola as soon as possible, the secretary reminded the citizens "that the departments are but just organized, and that the pressure upon the Department of War is necessarily very great."⁵ For the spring of 1861, therefore, the people of Apalachicola were left largely to their own devices. They organized themselves into four volunteer companies comprised of two-thirds of the men able to bear arms. By public subscription they purchased two thirty-four-pound cannons from the state of Florida.⁶ The summer months, during which work at fortifying Apalachicola progressed very slowly, allowed the Union time to lay the foundation for its blockade of the port.

The Union blockading operations off Apalachicola began on June 11, 1861. Under orders from Flag-Officer William Mervine of the newly-organized Gulf Blockading Squadron, the *USS Montgomery* arrived off Apalachicola about noon of that day. The 787-ton screw steamer had a complement of sixty-six men and five guns under the command of Commander T. Darrah Shaw. Having no chart to direct his ship in the unmarked waters, Shaw directed a very careful entry through West Pass with frequent soundings. The vessel almost ran aground before coming into position to command the entrance to the port.⁷

Shaw's first mission was to announce the blockade. He had with him Mervine's announcement which read:

To all whom it may concern:

I, William Mervine, flag-officer, commanding the

⁵*Ibid.*, I, I, 485.

⁶*Ibid.*, I, VI, 286.

⁷*Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion* (Washington, 1894-1922), Series I, vol. XVI, p. 546. Hereinafter cited as *Navy O. R.*

United States naval forces composing the Gulf Squadron, give notice that by virtue of the authority and power in me vested, and in pursuance of the proclamations of his Excellency the President of the United States, promulgated under the date of April 19 and 17, 1861, respectively, that an effective blockade of the port of Apalachicola, Florida, has been established and will be rigidly enforced and maintained against all vessels (public armed vessels of foreign powers alone excepted) which shall attempt to enter or depart from said port.⁸

To Mervine's statement Shaw added this further note:

I, T. Darrah Shaw, commanding the *USS Montgomery*, now off the port of Apalachicola, do hereby promulgate the enclosed declaration of blockade of the said port, made by William Mervine, esq., flag-officer, commanding U. S. Blockading forces in the Gulf of Mexico, under the following terms, viz:

No American coasting vessels are to be allowed to enter or depart from said port from the time of your arrival on the station. All foreign and neutral vessels now in the port of Apalachicola will be allowed ten days from the 11th of June, instant, for their departure.

All mercantile letters coming to me unsealed will be forwarded to their destination at the earliest practicable moment.⁹

Shaw was able to carry out the first part of his mission later in the afternoon of June 11. A pilot boat under a flag of truce brought a pilot and three men from Apalachicola to the *Montgomery*. The Commander answered their inquiry concerning his mission with a request that they deliver his and Mervine's announcements to the town. The master of the pilot boat agreed to carry copies to the mayor, the post master, the collector of customs, and the commercial reading rooms.¹⁰

⁸*Ibid.*, 531-33.

⁹*Ibid.*, 544.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 546.

The second part of Shaw's mission, that of establishing and maintaining a blockade of Apalachicola, was not so easily dispatched. In his first report to Mervine he pointed out the difficulties of the *Montgomery's* position. He cited the impossibility of preventing steamers from slipping unseen through the shoal water to the east and west of the *Montgomery's* station at the main entrance to the port. He further pointed out that most of the traffic at Apalachicola was made up of light draft steamers, and he requested that a vessel of that type be sent to aid his ship.¹¹

The blockade at Apalachicola was not immediately strengthened, and the Confederates continued their efforts to reinforce their hold upon Apalachicola. With the help of citizens of Apalachicola they were erecting batteries on St. Vincent's Island. The lieutenant commanding the project sent a request to Governor John Milton of Florida for additional guns on August 10. The fortification had at that time four thirty-two-pounders, but the lieutenant requested four additional thirty-two-pounders and two twenty-four-pounders for the defense of the road to St. Joseph's. He pointed out the "exceedingly small supply of ammunition" and the "immediate need for 1,000 friction primers."¹²

After receiving the report, Governor Milton went to inspect the fortifications on St. Vincent's. He wrote to the Secretary of War on August 16 asking that an artillery officer be sent to aid the force at Apalachicola. The Governor concluded his request:

Of all places in this State Apalachicola is most important to the commercial interests of Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, and at present it is in a condition almost defenseless. Now is the time to prepare for its defense. A few weeks hence may be too late.¹³

The Governor's message had not reached the Secretary of War before the blockade off Apalachicola was strengthened.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 547.

¹²*Army O. R.*, I, I, 472.

¹³*Ibid.*, 471-72.

It is possible that the impetus which sent the *USS R. R. Cuyler* to Apalachicola was touched off in the city itself. On July 30 a citizen of Lansingburgh, New York, wrote a letter to the Secretary of State which was forwarded to Gideon Welles in the Department of the Navy who sent it to Flag-Officer Mervine on August 5. The information contained in this circuitously routed message came from a woman in Apalachicola who had written to her uncle in Lansingburgh. She told him that the blockade had been a farce in that one small vessel guarded four passages from Apalachicola to the Gulf, making it rather easy for vessels to escape to sea. The woman's directions to her uncle that he reply to her letter through a firm in New York City indicated to the Union that there was still communication by sea with Apalachicola. Strengthening the blockade at that point, it was thought, might also "diminish Lord Lyon's instances of ineffectual blockade."¹⁴ Whether or not the department acted on the strength of this intelligence is not stated, but it was exactly two weeks after Welles sent his message to Mervine that the *Cuyler* joined the *Montgomery* off Apalachicola.

The addition of the *Cuyler*, a twelve-hundred-ton screw steamer with 111 men and ten guns, tripled the number of men and guns stationed at Apalachicola. Within ten days Captain F. B. Ellison had action to report at his new station. The Union force was still hampered, however, by the lack of vessels and equipment suitable for operation in the shallow water of the area. These circumstances served to dim the accomplishment of the blockading force in capturing its first prize vessel.

On the night of August 26, five boats from the *Cuyler* and the *Montgomery* were sent on a reconnaissance mission toward a large ship at anchor in Apalachicola Bay. The Union force discovered the ship *Finland* and the schooner *New Plan* and were able to capture the two vessels without opposition. Since the *New Plan's* papers were in order, it was released after the crew had taken the oath of allegiance to the United States.

¹⁴*Navy O. R.*, I, XVI, 613.

The *Finland*, however, was thought a lawful prize and the Union seamen began efforts to remove it from the bay. They found the sails and spars housed and spent all night bending sails and sending spars aloft. At dawn they began, against unfavorable winds and tides, to attempt towing their prize to the Union blockading station at East Pass. Nightfall found the *Finland* grounded on St. Vincent's Bar, four miles from the Union anchorage, and forty men were left behind to free the ship.¹⁵

Efforts to tow the *Finland* from the bar lasted all night. At dawn a steamer with a large schooner in tow appeared heading into Apalachicola and steered directly toward the Union prize. Unable to free the *Finland* from the bar and unable to call upon the *Cuyler* or *Montgomery* for defense, the seamen had to fire the *Finland* and take to their boats.¹⁶ So precarious was the position of the Union seamen that they were routed by nine men from the Apalachicola Guards who came upon the scene in a schooner towed by a steamer. That detachment boarded the burning *Finland* and recovered the life boats and a few useful articles that could be salvaged.¹⁷

Though the shots from the Apalachicola riflemen had caused no injury, Ellison recorded an injury to their pride that the Union inability to enter the Bay allowed the "rebels to make this demonstration with impunity."¹⁸ Ellison also deplored the loss of the *Finland* as a prize, for he had planned to send her to New York for adjudication. Had the Union vessels been able to enter the Bay, they could have protected the prize with their batteries against the threat of the steamer and schooner. Had they had kedge anchors and hausers they might have been able to operate more effectively. He added that with a steamer or gunboat of twelve foot draft or less the Union force could have captured the two Confederate vessels easily. Nevertheless, the incident caused increased concern among the Confederates on St. Vincent's.

Ten days after the *Finland* incident, Confederate Secretary of the Navy Mallory forwarded to Secretary of War Walker

¹⁵Eufaula *Spirit of the South*, September 10, 1861.

¹⁶Navy O. R., I, XVI, 646-47.

¹⁷Eufaula *Spirit of the South*, September 10, 1861.

¹⁸Navy O. R., I, XVI, 646-47.

a dispatch from the garrison on St. Vincent's. The commander of the garrison reported his fear that the Union planned to send light draft steamers into the Bay to attack and burn Apalachicola. To meet the threat he requested powder, primers, and artillerymen. In an interchange of messages the same day, Walker and Mallory agreed that Navy Lieutenant Augustus McLaughlin would be sent to Apalachicola with shells, shot, and guns if the War Department would supply two thousand pounds of powder, transportation, and two additional guns. Tredegar Iron Works promised two thirty-two-pounders within a short time, and ten days later, September 16, a midshipman was dispatched from Richmond to New Orleans and Apalachicola to make delivery.¹⁹

These efforts failed to satisfy the citizens of Apalachicola, however, and they wrote to the Secretary of War on October 1, listing their grievances. They pointed out that they had bought guns, sent requests to Richmond for attention to their needs, helped construct fortifications on St. Vincent's, and had organized themselves into volunteer companies. When the department had sent men and guns to their aid, the colonel in command had removed the battery from the city to St. Vincent's Island. This left the city itself with only one artillery company and two companies of undrilled infantry. Even though the St. Vincent battery had four short and two long thirty-two-pounders, the approaches to Apalachicola by land and through East Pass were left unguarded. This left the residents of Apalachicola, after nine months of southern occupation, with a "deep sense of insecurity, and anxiety for the safety and protection of their families and property."²⁰

While the Confederates at Apalachicola made immediate efforts for the defense of the port itself, plans were laid farther northward in the river system for offensive measures to meet the Union blockade. After delivering cannons, ammunition, and instructions to the Apalachicola batteries, Lieutenant McLaughlin moved up the river to confer with Chief Engineer James H. Warner, who had been sent to Columbus, Georgia, to lease private machine works and organize them for the use of the Confederate Navy.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 838-39.

²⁰*Army O. R.*, I, VI, 286-87.

Warner and McLaughlin went to Saffold, Early County, Georgia, about 150 miles south of Columbus on the Chattahoochee, to negotiate a contract with David S. Johnston for the construction of a wooden gunboat. They signed an agreement on October 19, 1861, in which Johnston agreed to construct the vessel in 120 days for the sum of \$47,500. The gunboat was to be 130 feet long, thirty feet across the beam, and 10 feet deep. Two engines providing a fire surface of 800 feet were to power two propellers.²¹

Thus, the first really significant efforts in the Confederate naval operations of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee river system were begun. However well-laid these plans were, progress in their actual execution was to be negligible during the remainder of 1861. Warner was transferred to Pensacola to design the machinery for the *Mississippi*, an assignment which lasted until the spring of 1862.²² Work on the gunboat went many months past the 120 days specified in the contract.

Meanwhile, the Union blockading force continued to labor under the disadvantages of operations in the shallow coastal waters. The commander of the *Cuyler* was much disturbed by his inability to engage shallow draft vessels which passed near his position. In reporting one such instance on September 13 he asked that his superior consider "the size and draft of water of his ship, without a launch or boats sufficiently large to carry out an anchor, without even a kedge on board, or any of the ordinary means and appliances for getting the ship off, in the event of grounding. . . ." ²³ Within a month the flag-officer of the Gulf Blockading Squadron took action to remedy the situation by sending the *Marion* to relieve the *Cuyler*. A month later the *Hatteras* was sent to relieve the *Montgomery*.

²¹P. Klein, Reporter, *Report of Evidence Taken Before Joint Special Committee of Both Houses of Confederate Congress to Investigate Affairs of Navy Department* (Richmond, n.d.), 440-41. Although the vessel is not named in the contract it is most probably the gunboat *Chattahoochee*. Lt. A. F. Crossman wrote to Gideon Welles on December 17, 1862, "The Navy Yard, where the rebel gunboat was built and where three more gunboats are building is only 150 miles to the southward from Columbus." *Navy O. R.*, I, XVII, 347-48.

²²Diffie William Standard, *Columbus, Georgia, in the Confederacy*, (New York, 1954), 43.

²³*Navy O. R.*, I, XVI, 669.

This new combination of vessels for the Apalachicola blockade was more suited to the area of operations. The *Hatteras*, commanded by Commander George F. Emmons, was an eleven hundred-ton side-wheel steamer with a complement of 101 men and five guns. The *Marion*, commanded by Lieutenant George W. Doty, was a 566-ton sloop carrying eighty men and fourteen guns. Besides this increase of maneuverability off Apalachicola, there was a slight increase in strength, four men and four guns more than the combined strength of the *Montgomery* and the *Cuyler*.

While the *Marion* and the *Hatteras* reported no captures during their first weeks of duty, the blockade of Apalachicola nevertheless had become more effective. Of five schooners that cleared the port in late November, only one, the *W. P. Benson*, returned safely — and it was captured on its second run out. The *W. A. Rain* was taken with a cargo of cotton on the outward voyage. The *Onward*, *Franklin*, and *Phoenix* were able to clear the port with cotton and turpentine, but they were all captured on their return voyages.²¹ A report of the harbor collector concerning this traffic was sufficient to set off a rapid exchange of telegrams among Governor Milton, Secretary Mallory, and Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin.

On November 25, 1861, Milton, signing himself "Governor and Commander in Chief," ordered Colonel R. F. Floyd at Apalachicola to allow no vessel with cotton to leave the port. He ordered any vessel attempting to do so sunk and any person attempting to ship cotton imprisoned. Floyd reported two days later that he had ordered three hundred bales of cotton back up the river and that he had forbidden shipment of turpentine as well. On the twenty-ninth Milton wired Mallory for an opinion regarding the shipment of turpentine. His brief answer was, "I know of no objections to the departure of the vessels." Mallory had evidently asked the opinion of Benjamin on the matter, for he telegraphed Milton the same day (November 30):

I learned that vessels at Apalachicola are detained from going to sea with cargo by some unknown military authority. It is not lawful nor is it the policy of the Govern-

²¹*Ibid.*, 855-56.

ment to prevent the departure of vessels with cargo, unless there is danger of their capture by a blockading vessel of the enemy.²⁵

On December 5 he modified the concluding subordinate clause of his message, saying that there was no law or reason to prevent vessels from running the blockade with cotton "unless there is reason to believe the cotton is really intended for the enemy under the guise of neutral."²⁶

For the remainder of December, 1861, Apalachicola remained quiet. Doty reported that he thought the garrison on St. Vincent's was withdrawn about December 20 and Emmons' reconnaissance a week later indicated that only a picket guard was left at the dismantled fort.²⁷ Emmons heard heavy guns firing in the town of Apalachicola, but when he surveyed the city from the seventy-seven-foot light house on St. George's, all appeared quiet and he "saw nothing afloat inviting attack."²⁸

Writing many years after the war, S. P. Richardson who had served the Confederacy at Apalachicola officially as an Army major and unofficially as a chaplain wrote that there were about twelve hundred men at Apalachicola at the end of 1861. According to his account, they did not feel extreme pressure from the Union blockade. In fact the approach to military life which he described seems rather casual.

He had been urged by the men of his congregation to enter the Army as a chaplain whereupon he jestingly told them that he would go only if they elected him major so that he could "command them and preach too." To his astonishment "they met and elected me major, and I had to go; for here came my commission, and with it orders to Apalachicola."

Life in the garrison was not altogether unpleasant for the Confederates. Richardson describes the following incident:

²⁵*Ibid.*, 856-57.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 857.

²⁷*Ibid.*, I, XVII, 121.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 7.

The general and all the field officers but myself drank. We had fine bands and they frequently serenaded us. . . . One day the Lieutenant Colonel came to me and said that I loved music and that the band had to be treated. I told him that I would not treat my father if he were to rise from the dead; but to show him that it was not money but principle with me, I said that if he would serenade me as a Christian I would treat them as Christian.

A band came with a singer to Richardson's quarters one evening and played "Before Jehovah's awful throne, ye nations bow with sacred joy" and he afterward treated them with oysters.²⁹ Richardson gave only passing mention to the garrison's military duties, concluding "we finally had to abandon the place."

Despite Confederate efforts to protect Apalachicola, the end of 1861 found them withdrawn from their fort on St. Vincent's back into the city where they had begun defense preparation the previous spring. Although the blockade of the city had been greatly hampered by the use of vessels unsuitable for the area, traffic to and from the port had been drastically reduced. The Confederate hold on Apalachicola in 1862 was to be short-lived; and, as the Union blockade tightened, their offensive and defensive plans were to be centered to the north along the river. Perhaps the contest between the two forces in 1861 can be best condensed into these terms: The story of that year is not told in terms of what injury each force did to the other but rather in terms of each one's inability to strike a decisive blow because of factors which hampered its effective operation.

²⁹S. P. Richardson, *Light and Shadows of an Itinerant Life* (Nashville, 1901), 173.

III. 1862: UNION CONTROL OF APALACHICOLA AND CONFEDERATE DEFENSE OF THE APALACHICOLA RIVER

Since the contest for the city of Apalachicola was ended by default early in the year 1862, this second year of the war brought a change in the nature of operations in the area. Withdrawal of the Confederates from Apalachicola proper, coupled with an increased concentration of Union vessels at that point, brought an improvement in the effect of the blockade and an extension of blockading operations. The emphasis of Confederate efforts was shifted up the Apalachicola River. In time, and with increased official attention to that area, they were able to expand their efforts, even though the offensive plan of launching the *Chattahoochee* gunboat and the defensive plan of obstructing the Apalachicola were somewhat at variance.

Early in 1862 Union communications with the mainland near the blockading stations improved, and the officers in command were able to gather rather complete intelligence on conditions in the area. After the Confederates withdrew up the river in March, blockading operations were extended to expeditions up the Apalachicola in search of vessels anchored there. By the end of the year the blockading force had been more than doubled. Reports of the Union officers reflected an increased interest in conditions inland and a heightened appreciation of the strategic importance of Apalachicola as a base of operations for expeditions inland.

As they had been in 1861, Confederate officials were plagued by concerns for defense. They were hampered by a lack of coordination and cooperation among governmental, military, naval, and civilian agencies. Although construction had begun at Safford, Georgia, on gunboats, the Navy was disturbed by the delays of the private contractor. The military officials' plans to lay obstructions in the Apalachicola River were impeded by the absence of an engineering officer to make a survey of possible sites. Although a very capable engineer was sent to perform the task, he gave up after being unable to obtain manpower from the civilian population or supplies from the Engineering Department. When commissioners in

Columbus, Georgia, tried to take matters into their own hands and arrange for an obstruction to be sunk, Governor Milton of Florida raised objections.

Late in the year, at the request of the governors Joseph E. Brown of Georgia, John Milton of Florida, and John G. Shorter of Alabama, the Military District of Middle Florida was created. Under the command of General Howell Cobb, this measure brought a somewhat greater degree of coordination and effectiveness into the Confederate operations. By the end of the year the obstructions had been sunk and the nearly-completed gunboat *Chattahoochee* had served as a protecting battery to the group at work on the obstructions. While the obstructions provided immediate defense, they curtailed the *Chattahoochee*'s offensive threat to the blockading squadron along the coast.

The Confederate retreat from St. Vincent's Island evidently opened the way for increased activity by the blockading force in early 1862. The commander of the *Sagamore*, which replaced the *Hatteras*, reported action which, though not spectacular, indicated a growing aggressiveness on the part of the Union. On January 18 a part of the *Sagamore*'s crew of seventy-eight landed on St. Vincent's and, finding the batteries dismantled, destroyed the barracks and other buildings which the Confederates had constructed there.¹ On the seventh of February another boat expedition landed on the coast near Apalachicola and destroyed two small sloops and two large sloops which had been hauled ashore for repairs.²

Lieutenant George W. Doty of the *Marion* had reports of a different nature to make during February. He supplied Flag-officer Mervine with intelligence concerning the traffic in Apalachicola Bay and in the Apalachicola River. From refugees he learned something of military and commercial conditions within the city of Apalachicola.

According to Doty's report, Confederate harbor operations consisted of patrols made by several small, unarmed sloops. These carried crews of about ten men who reported blockade

¹*Navy O. R.*, I, XVI, 54.

²*Ibid.*, 124.

conditions to larger vessels anchored up the Apalachicola River. There were rumored to be several schooners anchored about five miles above the city in Jackson River.³ The schooner *Kate L. Bruce* lay at anchor in Apalachicola five months after she had run in a cargo of fruit from Havana. Three of the eight river steamers in the waters lay at Apalachicola in order to tow schooners to the outlets to the Gulf. The steamer *Wave* was reported to have left for Saffold to be converted into a gunboat.

Doty learned that means of evading the blockade and supplying Apalachicola had been developed. Vessels landed cargo at Bear Creek off St. Andrew's Bay and transported it overland to Ochesee, Florida, twelve miles south of Chattahoochee. River steamers then transported supplies ninety-five miles down river to Apalachicola. Coffee was transported in this way in late January and cotton was sent from Apalachicola to load the vessel for the return voyage.

Military conditions in Apalachicola were described as being very poor. The military post consisted of about 450 soldiers, mostly citizens of Apalachicola who were armed with flintlock muskets and shotguns. Because of the scarcity of arms, one company was reportedly unarmed. Other defenses consisted of twelve light cannons mounted upon earthworks which had been erected 150 yards from shore. They extended for five hundred yards from southwest to northeast before the town.

The city of Apalachicola had begun to feel the restrictions of the blockade. Most of the stores had been closed and many of the citizens had moved inland. Despite the fact that coffee had been landed at St. Andrew's, the Apalachicola price was seventy-five cents per pound. Salt, which was produced at extensive salt works on Cape San Blas, sold for five dollars per half bushel.⁴

Conditions in Apalachicola were further described by Commander H. S. Stellwagen of the *Mercedita*, a steamer with nine

³Doty's report names the anchorage as Owl Creek. This place, however, is twenty-two miles up river from Apalachicola. Jackson River is just more than five miles, according to navigation charts prepared by U. S. Army Corps of Engineers.

⁴*Ibid.*, 120-21.

guns and 135 men which replaced the *Marion* on March 12. He made additions to the intelligence which Doty had collected, giving an indication that Apalachicola was still dominated by secessionist sentiment. Also he gathered information about fortifications and naval construction up the river.

Stellwagen received reports that Apalachicola had been evacuated on March 14, two days after his arrival there. A boat expedition sent to confirm the information found "not a soldier, a cannon, or apparently any weapon of war" left there. The civilian population had been ordered away by Governor Milton and Stellwagen included the description which refugees had given him of the operation:

The exodus of the poor frightened women and children is represented by the negroes as heart rending. Taken away at the shortest notice, in a storm, thrown ashore on the low bluffs many miles up the river, with their household goods, furniture, and everything they could snatch up in their flight, and left all night in a deluge of rain, the river rising and threatening to carry them away, with scarcely any shelter for the weak and sick, there most of them laid in the mud, almost perishing with cold, until the latter part of the next day, when they were taken away by rafts and flats over the deluged country.⁵

Left in the town were a group of five or six hundred, among them members of about a dozen white families, a few slaves, and some Spanish fishermen.

A boat was sent from the *Mercedita* to request that the city be surrendered without opposition in order that it might be spared naval bombardment. The Union seamen found in the town no one in authority to make the surrender or ask for terms. Nevertheless, the secessionists left at Apalachicola still had means at their disposal to prevent the surrender of the city. They threatened to starve any who expressed Union sentiments. They further threatened to burn the entire town should any of the citizens hold conference with members of the blockading force. Since the *Mercedita* could not anchor near the city, the commander had no means of preventing the seces-

⁵*Ibid.*, 193-94.

sionists from carrying out their threats at night. He therefore delayed pressing his advantage for a few days.⁶

On March 30 Stellwagen began planning a raid upon Apalachicola. He sent a gig to the *Sagamore* which was stationed at East Pass thirty miles away and asked that she join the *Mercedita*. The next day both ships began preparing their small boats for the expedition. Six of the boats, one of them armed with a howitzer, were to set out at night past the town and up the river, followed at daylight by two gigs.

The six boats left the Union steamers at nine o'clock on the night of April 2, but because of the strong current and darkness they were forced to anchor until daybreak. Soon after first light they captured the *Octavia*, a blockade runner anchored at Apalachicola. Three of the boats remained there while the remaining three pulled up the river. Seven miles upstream they captured the schooner *New Island* at anchor in a small creek. After towing their prize into mid-stream, the expedition continued up the river where they were able to take the schooner *Floyd*, two pilot boats, and the schooner *Rose* which was laden with cotton. They then set about towing their prizes to Apalachicola, meeting no opposition during the entire operation.

Although the Union force had been able to move at will in Apalachicola Bay and in the river near the city, they faced the old problem of freeing their prizes from the harbor. Only the *Rose* and the *Octavia* were cleared. The *New Island* and the two pilot boats were grounded in seven feet of water so Stellwagen ordered them burned. The remainder of the captured boats were left for the people of Apalachicola to use for fishing.⁷

Late in the afternoon of April 3, Stellwagen gathered his entire force to proceed to the landing at Apalachicola. There he was met by most of the residents with whom he conducted,

⁶*Ibid.*, 205. Letters received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers of Squadrons, 1841-1886, East Gulf Blockading Squadron, 1862-1865, National Archives Microcopy Number 89, Roll 197, p. 82. Hereinafter cited as National Archives Microcopy 89.

⁷*Ibid.*, 204.

according to his own account, a very effective interview. He began by saying:

My countrymen, for even you who are engaged in this unholy, unnatural war against our Government are my fellow-countrymen, we come not to injure the defenseless, or women and children; I like the people of the South, though I hate secession and rebellion, which have brought such calamities and misery upon all parts of our late happy land.

The citizens answered, "we have had no part in it." "The innocent must suffer with the guilty."⁸

After the introductory remarks, Stellwagen told the people that he had brought his force to show them that the blockading crew had ample means for the use of force against them. Knowing of their distress, however, he had decided to treat the city mercifully, offering safety to all who would take the oath of allegiance to the United States. Leaving them all the fishing and oyster boats unharmed, he promised that they could fish and oyster in the Bay safely as long as there was no firing upon Union vessels, no aid for blockade runners, or any harboring of soldiers in the town. Any of these violations would bring severe punishment.

Continuing in his talk with the group, Stellwagen pointed to the Confederate sand batteries and said:

See what protectors your soldiers are; look at the fort built in the midst of your houses, so that a few shells even from boat guns at them would be sure to burn your town. (Laughter and cries, 'Oh, they're no great soldiers; there's no engineers amongst them!')

He then informed them of Union successes at Fort Henry, Tennessee; Fort Donelson, Tennessee; Columbus, Kentucky; and Nashville, Tennessee. After this reference to Union strength he concluded by telling the people of Apalachicola that he did not require their help if it would endanger them. He again reminded them that actions against his vessels would result in severe retaliation.⁹

⁸*Ibid.*, 203.

⁹*Ibid.*

Stellwagen knew at that time that the Confederate efforts for the war in his area of command had been increased. Refugees had informed him of the small garrison stationed on Ricko's Bluff fifty-seven miles up the river and of a larger force at Johnston's (Saffold), thirty-three miles up the Chattahoochee River from Chattahoochee, Florida. Although he also knew that a gunboat was under construction there, his mention of these facts was brief and he seemed to accord them little importance.

Actually the Confederate war efforts along the Chattahoochee were well underway by the second spring of the war. The Navy Yard at Saffold was at work upon the gunboat *Chattahoochee* and Columbus, Georgia, was becoming increasingly important to the Confederacy. The *Mobile Daily Advertiser and Register* reported that by April, 1862, the Columbus Naval Iron Works cast six and finished four cannons each week.¹⁰ The installation was able to supply Saffold with machinery and necessary hardware, shipping it by raft down the Chattahoochee to the Landing Yard a short distance upriver from Johnston's Navy Yard.¹¹

The Saffold Navy Yard reflected three policies of the Confederate Navy which Secretary Mallory had expressed to the Committee on Naval Affairs during the early months of the war. It was near stands of live oak and pine which were useful as ships' timber. Work was carried on there by a civilian contractor, D. S. Johnston, thus fostering private industry. Finally, the gunboat *Chattahoochee* satisfied Mallory's standards for an effective vessel. He had reported to the Committee:

Small propeller ships, with great speed, lightly armed with [rifled] guns, must soon become, as the light artillery and rifles of the deep, a most destructive element in naval warfare.¹²

These policies were not as smoothly carried out as they had been stated, for there was a lack of trained men to work on

¹⁰*Mobile Daily Advertiser and Register*, April 9, 1862.

¹¹Undated clipping formerly in possession of D. H. McDowell, Blakely, Georgia.

¹²*Navy O. R.*, II, II, 53.

the vessel and many delays arose which displeased the Department of the Navy.

One Confederate report of early 1862 said that work on the gunboats was at a standstill because of the lack of ship's carpenters. On March 4 this advertisement appeared in the *Columbus Daily Sun*:

HANDS WANTED
AT THE
C. S. NAVY YARD
LOCATED ON THE
CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER
AT SAFFOLD, EARLY COUNTY, GEORGIA
TO BUILD GUNBOATS

Twenty ships' carpenters, joiners, caulkers, and hands accustomed to ship and steamboat work are wanted at the Confederate States Navy Yard to work on gunboats. . . . as several gunboats are under contract steady employment and good wages. All hands employed at the Confederate States Navy Yard are exempt from military duty and anyone in the Army can be furloughed to work there.

D. S. Johnston¹³

Johnston employed, in addition to the labor he recruited, a working force of eighty-four slaves.¹⁴ The demand for trained workers was to increase, for on March 25, 1862, William O. Saffold and his son, Adam G. Saffold, signed a contract with Lieutenant McLaughlin for the construction of two gunboats.

The Saffold-McLaughlin contract specified that the vessels should be 106 feet long, eighteen feet wide, and eight feet deep. Each was to have a single, back-acting propeller and seven hundred feet of fire surface. Delivery of the two gunboats was to be made on July 1, 1862, for the sum of \$50,000.¹⁵

¹³*Columbus Daily Sun*, March 4, 1862.

¹⁴According to Early Co. Deed Book D and Will Book L, Johnson's Navy Yard was located on lots 322 and 321, bordering the Chattahoochee a mile south of the point where U. S. highway 84 crosses the river.

¹⁵P. Klein, *op. cit.*, 450-51.

McLaughlin evidently was not pleased with the progress of the work at Saffold. In June, he directed the master of the *Kate L. Bruce* to stop at Johnston's on his next trip down the Chattahoochee in order to consult the master carpenter about progress on the gunboat. McLaughlin said that the Navy Department had been "very much annoyed at the manner in which things have been conducted" there. Department officials suspected that the contractor was more interested in developing facilities which would benefit his private business than in making sacrifices to advance the southern cause. The Navy Department, therefore, wanted a full report on the operation and a probable date for the gunboat's launching.¹⁶

A month later, Lt. Catesby ap R. Jones, former executive officer of the *Virginia*, was ordered to Columbus, Georgia, to assume command of the "gunboat *Chattahoochee* about being completed near that place."¹⁷ Jones evidently proceeded to Saffold; for three weeks after the Navy Department ordered him to Columbus, a friend addressed a letter to him at Saffold, Early County, Georgia. He replied from Saffold on October 1, 1862, explaining that his delay in writing had been caused by his work in arming the gunboat *Chattahoochee*.¹⁸

Jones' new command was a three-masted, squared-rigged schooner which measured about 130 feet from bowsprit to stern. The vessel was thirty feet across the beam; and, most important, it drew only five feet fore and eight feet aft. With two propellers driven by two steam engines of a thirty-six-inch bore and twenty-four-inch stroke, it was capable of a speed of twelve knots.¹⁹

In comparison with other Confederate gunboats, the *Chattahoochee* might be termed a first class gunboat. A first class gunboat was described as being about 150 feet long with a thirty-four-foot beam and an eight to ten-foot draft. The cost of a vessel meeting those specifications was estimated at \$45,000 to \$50,000.²⁰

¹⁶*Navy O. R.*, II, II, 208.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, I, XVII, 864; Columbus was the official naval station nearest Saffold.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, I, VII, 62.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, I, XVII, 421.

²⁰*Columbus Daily Sun*, April 27, 1862, quoting the *Charleston Courier*.

The battery which Jones arranged for placement on board the *Chattahoochee* consisted of six guns, one forward and one aft on pivots and four broadside on trucks.²¹ The best of these guns was a nine-inch Dahlgren which was mounted on a pivot. The Dahlgren was a smooth bore, cast solid and bored out. Captain Henry Wise of the U.S. Naval Ordnance Bureau said that the Dahlgren had a distribution of metal to give it "the very best form in which a gun can be made to attain the greatest strength." This type of gun had been used by the United States Navy prior to the war and in the opinion of Admiral DuPont there was "relatively none better."²²

The thirty-two-pound rifled piece was also a valuable weapon. Matthew Fontaine Maury said of the rifled cannon, "[It] will send as far and hit as hard when fired from the smallest boat as it will when fired from the largest ship."²³ Even though the rifled cannon had a greater range and accuracy, the tendency of the spinning projectile to ricochet on water made it less effective than the Dahlgren in naval action.²⁴

The remainder of the *Chattahoochee's* battery was made up of four thirty-two-pounders, which were mounted broadside. They were six-inch smooth bore cannon, forty-two hundred-weight. This type of gun had an elevation of five degrees and a point blank range of 313 yards.²⁵

The *Chattahoochee* required a complement of 110 to 120 crew members. Seventy-eight men were required to man the guns, seventeen each for the Dahlgren and rifle and eleven each for the thirty-two pounders. The magazine, passage, runner, and scuttles required ten men; the shell room required six. Six men manned the wheel, con, signals, lead, and pumps. A lieutenant commanding and a lieutenant, a master, four midshipmen, a boatswain, a gunner, an assistant paymaster, and an assistant surgeon comprised the staff of officers. There

²¹ John Thomas Scharf, *History of the Confederate States Navy* (New York, 1887), 616.

²² *Report on Conduct of the War, Second Session Thirty-Eighth Congress* (Washington, 1865), I, 23.

²³ *Navy O. R.*, II, II, 100.

²⁴ *Report on Conduct of the War*, I, 23.

²⁵ Albert Mauncy, *Artillery through the Ages* (Washington, 1949), 52.

was also a chief engineer with three assistants and about seven firemen.²⁶

In assembling a crew, Jones recruited Lieutenant George W. Gift from the CSS *Arkansals*, an Annapolis graduate and an officer with whom he had served in the U. S. Navy. When Gift arrived at Saffold to take his position on the *Chattahoochee*, he wrote that he was pleased with his fellow officers, "some of them . . . sons of the old aristocracy, who are carrying on the traditions creditably."

Of the crew of the *Chattahoochee* Gift wrote:

Among the seamen of this ship, there is not one in ten, who has a relative in the Confederacy: their shipmates of today are their only friends. If one dies, we put him away according to military form; some sinner like myself reading the burial service; a head board marks his resting place for a few years, and then all is oblivion.²⁷

Gift went on to muse about whether mothers and sisters in the Scandanavian countries and along the Rhine prayed for "these wayward and erratic creatures" that they be kept safe from harm.²⁸

Life aboard the *Chattahoochee* was not all a matter of working to ready the ship for service. There was social life in the surrounding country. Mr. and Mrs. D. S. Johnston frequently had the officers to their home along with young ladies from the neighborhood. Great favorites among the officers were the Shackelford sisters from "The Pines," a nearby plantation. There were the twins Hannah and Georgia and, just older than they, Ellen whom George Gift later married.

Jones and Gift returned the Johnston's hospitality by having the ladies of the neighborhood visit the *Chattahoochee*. They took their guests on a tour of the ship and later served strawberries, cream, and pound cake supplied by Mrs. Shackle-

²⁶Navy O. R., I, XVII, 700.

²⁷Harriet Gift Castlen, *Hope Bids Me Onward* (Savannah, Georgia, 1945), 97. This is a biography compiled from letters written by George Gift to his wife.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 98.

ford. The officers also decorated their quarters with flowers from "The Pines."²⁹

Many indications are given that the *Chattahoochee* was intended for service against the Union blockade of Apalachicola. Like the blockade runners, the vessel was painted black and fitted out with sail and steam. Jones must have expressed the hope that the gunboat would see active service in the Gulf, for a comrade concluded a letter addressed to him at Saffold "with hopes that you may not only be successful in getting out to sea, but successful in worrying the Yankees when you get out."³⁰ Construction on the *Chattahoochee*, however, had been slow, and the loss of Apalachicola had forced the Confederacy to begin plans for obstructing the river.

At the time the Union gained control of the port of Apalachicola, the river northward was defended only by a battery of ten guns at Ricko's Bluff, fifty-seven miles north of the city and forty-nine miles south of Chattahoochee, Florida. This was obviously inadequate protection for an area where, according to a report by General Joseph Finegan, eighty thousand bales of cotton were stored in April of 1862.

. . . the general solicitude felt by the citizens of Columbus in the protection of the Chattahoochee River, and to the notoriously inefficient character of defense thereon render it . . . proper that we should endeavor to draw such attention to this subject from official quarters as will insure for a higher degree of security against federal invasion from that direction than we now enjoy.³¹

To this end, the council commissioned Alfred Iverson to confer with the Secretary of War in order to obtain adequate defenses.

Early in May, Secretary of War George W. Randolph ordered General John C. Pemberton to assign a competent engineer to make a survey of the Apalachicola to determine the most advantageous place for sinking an obstruction. In giving

²⁹*Ibid.*, 88.

³⁰*Ibid.*, VII, 62.

³¹Minutes of the Columbus City Council, April 28, 1862.

the order, Randolph made this statement of the Department's policy:

The introduction of small iron-clad steamers into coast operations of the enemy renders it necessary to change our plans of river defense and to rely upon obstructions more than we have heretofore.³²

As has been the case with Mallory's policy regarding the construction of gunboats, Randolph's statement of river defense policy was followed by difficulty in executing the policy.

The first difficulty was that Pemberton had no engineer to make a survey of the river. He went himself, however, to make observations of the Apalachicola and made a report to Inspector General Samuel Cooper. On the basis of his observations, he considered Fort Gadsden, a point twenty miles north of Apalachicola, a possible site.³³

Later in May, Pemberton obtained the services of a very capable engineer, William R. Boggs, who began his expedition at Columbus and continued downriver to Fort Gadsden. With the Company assigned him he was able to make a brief voyage to Apalachicola.³⁴

Boggs was displeased with conditions at the Chattahoochee Arsenal, finding no guard stationed at the Arsenal landing to guard supplies. Conditions farther down the Apalachicola were no better, for he recorded in his memoirs:

At Ricko's Bluff I found an effort being made to plant a battery; the guns were on top of a bluff at least three hundred feet above the river, with a range of only half a mile. The most of the cotton was some twenty miles further down the river. Near it was a small battery of field artillery, behind an epaulment, supported by a battalion of infantry. Owing to a deep creek coming in to a

³²Army O. R., I, XIV, 493.

³³*Ibid.*, 498-99.

³⁴James L. Nichols, *Confederate Engineers* (Number 5 in *Confederate Centennial Studies*, ed. W. Stanley Hoole, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 1957), 10. Upon his graduation from West Point in 1853, Boggs had ranked fourth in his class and was among the first group whom Jefferson Davis appointed to the Department of Engineers.

very short range in their rear, the position was untenable. Below this point the Federals were in full possession.³⁵

In reporting to Pemberton, Boggs agreed that Fort Gadsden offered a good position for the obstruction. He observed that it was elevated above the river with good roads to the rear and a long, straight road in front of the position. The banks on either side of the river were very swampy and would offer an obstacle for any land force attempting to attack the fort. The river at that point was of average width and depth; therefore, Boggs suggested that cribs like those that had been used at Savannah, Georgia, be sunk there.

Fort Gadsden was actually the most southerly point on the Apalachicola where an obstruction would have been practical, for below that point the river widened considerably. It presented the disadvantage of being an unhealthy location for quartering troops, but despite this observation, Boggs asked Pemberton to supply Fort Gadsden with two eight-inch columbiads with carriages, platforms, and other implements.

The second possibility which Boggs suggested as a site for sinking an obstruction was called the Narrows. This is a five-mile stretch of the Apalachicola River lying fifty-five miles below Chattahoochee and thirty-six miles above Apalachicola. From a generally southerly course the river bends and flows due east for nearly a mile before it curves back to flow due west for another mile. From there it takes a sharp southeast-north northwest turn and flows south in a straight course for a mile before entering two more miles of short, abrupt bends. The disadvantage of this area was that it offered no position to command an obstruction with a land battery.³⁶

Having completed his survey, Boggs began his efforts to gather men and supplies to carry out his plans. He requested one hundred hands, rations, and tents from the Confederate Quartermaster at Columbus. Getting no encouragement from

³⁵W. R. Boggs, *Military Reminiscences of General William R. Boggs*, C. S. A. (Durham, 1913), 30.

³⁶*Army O. R.*, I, XIV, 506-07.

the Quartermaster, he then appealed to the mayors of Columbus and Eufaula. From them he learned that workmen could not be obtained until the crops had been secured. Even an advertisement offering a dollar per diem wage, lodging, rations, and medical care did not bring response to Boggs' efforts.

Boggs received no more aid from General Pemberton than he had received from the Army and the government in the area. The General informed him that no guns could be spared for fortifications and that there would be no tents for a working force until winter. Pemberton promised Boggs \$15,000 as soon as it could be made available, but he added that the department at the time was without funds. After making a report of his difficulties to the Department of Engineers, Boggs resigned on June 4.³⁷ The placing of obstructions was thus delayed until very late in 1862.

Citizens of Early County, Georgia, who were much concerned about the delays in constructing the *Chattahoochee* and obstructing the river, wrote to the Secretary of War in October asking that something be done about river defense. They pointed out the strategic importance of Columbus' position near the West Point Railroad and the investment represented by the one hundred thousand bales of cotton stored in the river valley.³⁸

On November 5, 1862, the Columbus, Georgia, city council adopted the following resolution:

Whereas it is of the greatest importance that our city should be made secure from the approach of the abolitionist [*sic*] armies, and whereas there are many good and well grounded reasons to fear their approach by way of the Chattahoochee River.

Resolved that this council do hereby appropriate the sum of \$3,000 of aid in placing of obstructions in the said river, under the direction of the officers having work in charge. . . .³⁹

³⁷*Ibid.*, 542-48.

³⁸*Ibid.*, XIV, 666.

³⁹Minutes of Columbus City Council, November 3, 1862. *Army O. R.*, I, LII, 373-74.

The mayor, Dr. J. F. Bozeman, wrote a letter to Randolph expressing the council's concern for the safety of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee area. The mayor and his council evidently were not receptive to Randolph's efforts to assure them that the Chattahoochee would be defended, for on November 22 they announced their intention to sink an obstruction in the Apalachicola River at Alum Bluff twenty-two miles below Chattahoochee, Florida. Governor Milton of Florida raised immediate objections to this non-military interference at first and later withdrew his objection.⁴⁰

Some degree of coherence was introduced to the efforts to defend the Apalachicola River when, in November, the governors of Georgia, Alabama, and Florida appealed to Jefferson Davis. Soon afterward the Middle Florida Military District was created. Extending from the Suwannee River to the Choctawhatchee River, the principal area within the district was the Apalachicola River. The renewed efforts to defend the Apalachicola began under the command of a new officer, General Howell Cobb, and under the direction of a new engineer, Captain Theodore Moreno. The two men met in Columbus where they formulated plans for the defense of the district. The first concern was to obstruct the Apalachicola and the second was to defend the land approach to Tallahassee from St. Mark's, Florida.⁴¹

Moreno received suggestions for obstructing the river from Major A. L. Rivers, Assistant Chief Engineer of the Confederate Engineers. Rivers recommended as Boggs had, that a complex of cribs be used. This design involved two parallel rows of square cribs placed twelve feet apart and built up to the low water mark of the river. The two rows were thirty feet apart and the cribs were placed in a staggered arrangement. To these Rivers suggested that there be attached rafts which would provide obstruction at any stage of the river.⁴²

The plan which Moreno devised proved much simpler than that which Rivers had proposed, and, more important, it could

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 686-87.

⁴¹Horace Montgomery, *Howell Cobb's Confederate Career* (Number 10 in *Confederate Centennial Studies*, ed. W. Stanley Hoole, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 1959), 78-80.

⁴²*Army O. R.*, I, XIV, 682.

be carried out quickly. It consisted of three heavy chains placed across the river at the Narrows to catch logs, trees, and trash which floated downstream. Placement of the chains was completed before the end of December and by early March enough debris had collected to form an obstruction.⁴³

In directing river defenses, Moreno incorporated earlier efforts which the Columbus commissioners had made. He chose Rock Bluff, a point thirteen miles south of Chattahoochee, as the site of the second obstruction. Columbus Commissioners had earlier selected Alum Bluff, which was twenty-two miles south of Chattahoochee.⁴⁴

Fortifying the obstructions which had been sunk at the Narrows and Rock Bluff posed the next problem in river defense. As Boggs had pointed out in his first survey of the river, the advantages of the Narrows as a good place to sink an obstruction and as a point inaccessible to an enemy was counterbalanced by the fact that constructing batteries there would be difficult. Nevertheless, Cobb planned to place his best and heaviest guns there. He ordered three thirty-two pounders placed in one battery and planned to place another battery of that strength there also. At Rock Bluff eighteen and twenty-four pounders from Alum Bluff were mounted on wooden frames which had been built in Columbus. Concerning these defense measures, Cobb wrote to Commander of the District of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, General G. T. Beauregard:

These obstructions constitute the main defense of the river. If the enemy breaks there, there is little hope of successful resistance above.⁴⁵

Until the completion of the batteries, measures were taken to defend the force at work upon them. From the less than one thousand troops in the District of Middle Florida, Cobb ordered more than a hundred sharpshooters to lookout posts below the obstructions. The Army tried to use Negroes to

⁴³Montgomery, *op. cit.*, 82.

⁴⁴Army O. R., I, XIV, 731.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 729.

strengthen the lookout system, but the slaves used this duty as a means of escape.⁴⁶

Finally, the gunboat *Chattahoochee* was called into service to aid in protecting the defense works. The machinery on the vessel had not been completed so it was suggested that it be towed down the river. In this way the battery on the gunboat could be put to use while work continued on installation of the machinery.⁴⁷

The *Chattahoochee* was towed first from Saffold, Georgia, to Chattahoochee, Florida, where it remained for a while before going down the Apalachicola to the site of the obstructions. Once the ship arrived, the residents of the town were very curious to see it, and according to Gift the seamen were equally curious to see the ladies of the town who came down to the river.

After the ship had been at Chattahoochee for a week, some of the enlisted men invited a group of ladies aboard to observe gunnery practice. The crew fired all the cannon to the great delight of their visitors. One shot ricocheted and went "skipping and bounding over the water up the river, throwing beautiful jets at every point of contact with the water."⁴⁸ General Howell Cobb's Chief of Artillery had particularly wanted to see the exercise but, finding an acquaintance among the ladies, he paid little attention to the firing.

While their ship lay at Chattahoochee, Jones and Gift thought that they might fill the time by inviting some ladies of Columbus down to see the gunboat. Columbus women had tended members of the crew in the hospital and the officers wanted to show their gratitude. The ladies were to come down on a steamboat, stopping at Saffold to take on the Misses Shackelford. They were to arrive at one in the afternoon, passing by the *Chattahoochee* which would be flying the Confederate flag at each mast head and the Spanish, French, and English flags at the end of the gaff. As the ladies landed,

⁴⁶Montgomery, *op. cit.*, 83. The contrabands who escaped supplied Union blockading officers at Apalachicola with information relating to Confederate operations.

⁴⁷Army O. R., I, XIV, 728, 731.

⁴⁸Castlen, *op. cit.*, 102.

the officers planned to have men cheering in the rigging. Once their visitors were on board, a complete artillery exercise would begin. There is no record to indicate whether this expedition was ever carried out; surely if it had been, the Columbus papers would have noted it.⁴⁹

Despite the diversions at Chattahoochee, Catesby Jones must have chafed at the delays in getting the gunboat ready for action and at the relatively passive duty of guarding the obstructions, for General Cobb wrote to him:

I am glad to know that I shall have your cooperation in defense of the river, whilst I regret on your account that you cannot have a larger and more congenial field of operation.⁵⁰

Thus, the *Chattahoochee's* first assignment was that of implementing the measures which would block its passage to the Gulf and its hope of raising the blockade at Apalachicola.

'That blockading force was neither ignorant of, nor indifferent to, the Confederate activity upstream. They had kept close contact with sources of information, so close, in fact, that the delivery of newspapers to Apalachicola was halted and Cobb suspended the contract for mail delivery at the distribution point on Ricko's Bluff. This restriction of information did not prevent a Union report to Gideon Welles early in December which gave full information concerning the activity centered in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee area.

This report of Lieutenant A. F. Crossman of the *Somerset* described Apalachicola as "an important strategic point, inasmuch as its possession insures a base for any operations upon the interior of Georgia and Alabama." He pointed out that the city was without protection or provisions and that the only Confederate force was a horse troop of fifty which patrolled the river as far as the outskirts of Apalachicola. Under those circumstances he thought it possible for a Union regiment to move into the city and erect earthworks which would defend the city from an attack from up the Apalachicola River.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 104.

⁵⁰*Navy O. R.*, I, XVII, 865.

The situation which Crossman described was what he considered temporary. He feared that troops would be sent down from Columbus to re-occupy the city, for Milton of Florida in his annual message had called the withdrawal up the river a "fatal error." Crossman continued:

A company of 40 resolute men can come down at night, take possession of the town, mount guns upon works already thrown up, and any morning may show us the rebel colors floating over batteries in position to drive the blockade from the bar and permit the egress of the rebel gunboat *Chattahoochee*.⁵¹

On the strength of this threat Crossman suggested that a group of four or five light-draft gunboats be sent to engage and sink the *Chattahoochee*. He further suggested that light-draft river-steamers be captured to serve as transports for troops. The force could then proceed up the Chattahoochee to make a surprise attack upon Columbus.

In support of his plan, Crossman continued his report five days later on December 22 with information concerning communications and provisions. He reported that there was no telegraph connecting Apalachicola and Columbus and that communication was by river or by a sandy and circuitous road. Provisions could be supplied from the estimated thousand head of cattle roaming wild upon St. Vincent's Island. Crossman said that they would provide meat for a force of ten thousand men for thirty days. He included in his report a consideration recurrent in all reports from the blockaders off Apalachicola — the fact that his vessel was unable to enter the shallow waters adjacent to Apalachicola.

This inability to enter the Apalachicola River must have become even more frustrating to the Union officers in the blockading force, for Crossman had learned a great deal of the importance of what lay upstream. In his report he mentioned the Navy Yard on the Chattahoochee River where gunboats were under construction. He listed the industries in Columbus, Georgia: three cotton factories, one rolling mill, foundries to cast cannon, a machine shop, and two gun shops.

⁵¹*Navy O. R.*, I, XVII, 347-48.

He had learned that railroads diverged from Columbus to Montgomery, Alabama, and the important Georgia cities of Savannah, Augusta, and Milledgeville. He spoke also of tens of thousands of bales of cotton stored in Columbus and of quartermaster stores, calling the city "one of the grand depots and sources of strength of the Confederacy."⁵²

Had Crossman known of the paucity of fortifications and troops on the Apalachicola and that the obstruction had confined the *Chattahoochee* to the river, he would have realized that the blockading force at Apalachicola was more than sufficient to meet any attack which the Confederates could muster. On the first of October the blockade had been held by two side-wheel steamers and a bark, amounting to a total force of 301 men and nineteen guns. By November 15 the force had been increased to three side-wheelers — the *Somerset*, *Fort Henry*, and *Fort Royal* — and two barks, the *Amanda* and *J. S. Chambers*. This concentrated 479 men and thirty-three guns at Apalachicola. Although the *Fort Henry* was transferred at the end of November, the remaining vessels were stationed there to maintain a strength of 359 men and twenty-six guns, a force which was increased in February.⁵³

On December 16, 1862 the *Somerset* replenished its stores from a supply ship. An inventory of what the ship took on gives some insight into life and conditions aboard:

1 barrel pork, 1 barrel beef, 2 barrels flour, 840 pounds preserved meat, 175 pounds dried apples, 467 pounds sugar, 53 pounds tea, 400 pounds coffee, 96 pounds butter, 110 pounds D. M. vegetables, 72 gallons beans, 44 gallons molasses, 42 gallons vinegar, 351 pounds tobacco, 300 pounds soap, 10 pounds black thread, 5 pounds white, 96 handkerchiefs, 2000 needles, 28 thimbles, 36 jack knives, 36 scissors, 12 razors, 96 cases shaving soap, 24 fine combs, 48 coarse, 24 pots (tin), 48 tin pans, 50 boxes blacking, 96 bottles pepper.⁵⁴

⁵²*Ibid.*

⁵³This list was compiled from bi-monthly reports of the disposition of vessels in the East Gulf Blockading Squadron and from descriptive lists of United States blockading vessels, both of which appear in the *Navy O. R.*, I, XVII.

⁵⁴Log of the U. S. S. *Somerset*, December 16, 1862.

The *Somerset* received stores again on February 10, 1863.

The *Somerset's* log for late 1862 and early 1863 shows how the blockaders had settled into life off Apalachicola. Ships' surgeons supplied medical attention to residents of Apalachicola, either visiting the town or having patients brought out to the ships. Both white families (often with their furniture) and contrabands came aboard the blockading vessels for transfer to other ships bound for Key West and other ports. The ships did not neglect their military function, for they had gunnery practice both aboard ship and on Sand Island. The log of the *Somerset* also records the incident of a sailor smuggling on board ship "a quantity of champaigne cider in a barrel, the bottles being concealed by him by filling the top of the barrel with oysters."⁵⁵ For the most part, however, the record of events in the log are unrelieved by such incidents.

The year, 1862, brought success in some degree both to Union and Confederate efforts in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee area. The Union was able to gain a partial hold upon the city of Apalachicola and improve communications through contact with Union sympathizers, contrabands, and deserters. By the end of the year the blockade vessels, though not light-draft, were present in force along the coast. The Confederates, despite the withdrawal from Apalachicola, had sunk obstructions in the Apalachicola and the gunboat *Chattahoochee* had been useful even though it was not entirely completed.

The accomplishments of each force in 1862 were spurred by each one's fear of the other's strength. Not knowing that the blockaders off Apalachicola were too heavy to ascend the river and that no light-draft gunboats were available because of the Mississippi operations, the Confederates worked desperately to obstruct and fortify the Apalachicola. Not knowing the Confederate inadequacies in organization, manpower, and supplies and not knowing that the obstruction had blockaded the *Chattahoochee*, the Union greatly increased its blockading strength and feared the re-occupation of Apalachicola. Thus 1862 was a year during which the Union and Confederacy overestimated each other.

⁵⁵Log of the U. S. S. *Somerset*, 1862-1863, *passim*.

IV. 1863: EXTENSION OF UNION RAIDS AND CONFEDERATE FAILURE TO COUNTERATTACK

The first two years of the war in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee area had been a conflict without direct engagements. The Union captured a number of vessels and some prisoners, but no resistance was made to those captures. The Union blockaders heard heavy guns firing in Apalachicola as they stood outside the Bay; but the exchange of control of the town was accomplished with the firing of one shot, a shell from a Union howitzer fired into the Bay to display the blockaders' strength to the citizens of Apalachicola. The beginning of 1863 brought a possibility of direct action as each side laid plans to attack the other.

On New Year's Day 1863, Lieutenant A. F. Crossman of the USS *Somerset* again addressed himself to the Flag officer of the East Gulf Blockading Squadron and the Secretary of the Navy concerning an expedition up the Apalachicola River. He enclosed a tracing of railroad communications in Georgia, Alabama, Florida, west North Carolina, east Tennessee, and South Carolina to illustrate the commercial importance of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee River System. He asked them to study the tracing in order to see "the immense advantage of an expedition sent immediately, consisting of six or seven iron-plated river gunboats and 10,000 troops."¹

Crossman explained that his insistence was prompted partly by reports of Confederate strength to the north and partly by the situation which he had observed in Apalachicola. According to his information, the *Chattahoochee* and the *Kate L. Bruce*, which had been fitted out with steam engines at Columbus, were ready to come down the river and two other boats were near completion. He was equally disturbed by the situation in Apalachicola, which feared the arrival of Confederate conscript officers to impress all men between the ages of sixteen and sixty. He reported that the people of the town were almost starving, and he did not have adequate provisions to issue rations. Had he been able to issue rations, he would have feared their confiscation for shipment up the Apalachicola.

¹Navy O. R., I, XVII, 357-58.

Of the people of the town he wrote, "It seems hard to witness and not alleviate their sufferings."

Not only was Crossman persistent and thorough in his reports, he also was very much in earnest. He wrote to his commanding officer:

... though I may be considered presumptuous in offering my opinion to those of long experience, yet I am prompted by the feeling that it is the duty of all officers to do their utmost in all legitimate ways to further the crushing of this rebellion.²

Rear Admiral Theodorus Bailey was evidently convinced of his sincerity for Crossman's reports were forwarded to Gideon Welles in early February. On the ninth, Welles sent a brief note to Edwin M. Stanton asking if military forces could be assigned to a proposed expedition up the Apalachicola. The next day Stanton returned a brief reply offering troops in support of the Navy if further investigation of the Apalachicola proved attack feasible.³

Acting on the Secretary's request for a further investigation of the Apalachicola River situation, Bailey conducted a survey and made his report to Welles on March 7. He took the fact that the river's mouth was bounded by a bar which drew only six feet at high water to mean that the boats in preparation upstream could not be formidable. He added to his assumption that the vessels were intended for river defense the information that obstructions had been sunk in the river. This diminished the importance of the Confederate threat in his opinion.

Bailey then pointed out the inadequacy of his own force for making an expedition up the Apalachicola. The *Port Royal* had attempted to cross the bar into the river; and even though it had the lightest draft in service at Apalachicola, it had lain aground a week on the bar. Bailey thought that an expedition would be impossible without the light draft gunboats in the Mississippi command. Contrary to Crossman's opinion of the expedition, Bailey wrote:

²*Ibid.*

³*Ibid.*, 364.

To attempt it with small boats would be quixotic, as the river is sinuous, with frequent abrupt bends, and the current rapid, in so much that the enemy would get information of our attempted ascent long before we could reach them.⁴

His only action, therefore, was to increase the strength of the blockade. This placed four steamers off Apalachicola, one third of the steamers in his command, and one bark which provided the blockade with 447 men and thirty-five guns.

The officers of the blockade continued to collect and report information concerning Apalachicola and river defense. Lieutenant Commander George U. Morris of the USS *Port Royal* made a report to Bailey on April 24 concerning a move into Apalachicola and intelligence gained from prisoners. Having learned that there was cotton in Apalachicola awaiting shipment, he had let a small armed force into the town where he captured twelve bales of cotton along with a large supply of cannister, chain, and bar shot for thirty-two-pounders. From three prisoners, all members of the *Chattahoochee* crew, he gained full information about the dimensions and armament of the gunboat along with news of the ironclad *Muscogee*.⁵

A week after his raid in Apalachicola, Morris was visited by a refugee, William Martin, a former mechanic at the Columbus Naval Iron Works. Martin reported that there were no troops at Columbus; and he gave additional information about the *Chattahoochee* and *Muscogee*, saying that even the *Chattahoochee's* crew predicted that it would never get down the river. Martin had also seen the obstructions in the Apalachicola and had seen a picket guard at Fort Gadsden.⁶

By the first of May, therefore, the pressure of Confederate threats was greatly reduced for the blockaders at Apalachicola. The Confederates to the north, while not so powerful as the Union had thought, were nonetheless interested in launching operations of some type upon Apalachicola. Lieutenant George W. Gift was, perhaps, most interested in the prospect, un-

⁴*Ibid.*, 381-82.

⁵*Ibid.*, 421.

⁶*Ibid.*, 432.

derstandably so, since he had been among those who had constructed and served on the *Arkansas*.⁷

In his eagerness for action, Gift proposed a rather daring plan to capture Apalachicola. With a crew of sixty from the *Chattahoochee*, in his command since the transfer of Catesby Jones, he planned to go down the Apalachicola on the Steamer *Swan* as far as Jackson River six miles north of Apalachicola. He and his force would proceed from there to the outskirts of Apalachicola, sending three citizens of Apalachicola from the crew into town as if on leave. Lieutenant Morris of the *Port Royal* would be notified of their presence and come ashore in search of prisoners.

It was Morris' custom to come into the city with a force of about sixty men. After placing his howitzer in position at the landing with a guard of ten or fifteen men, Morris then set about searching the town. It was Gift's plan to attack and capture the guard left at the howitzer and take the remainder of the force as they returned to the landing. Dressed in the Union uniforms, the Confederates could then approach and capture the *Port Royal* unchallenged and engage the remainder of the blockaders in turn.⁸ Gift was unable to carry out this plan, for two weeks later the *Chattahoochee* became involved in the most important operation of its career.

During the last week of May, Lieutenant Morris learned that the schooner *Fashion* was anchored up the Apalachicola. Cotton was being placed on board the vessel in preparation for running the blockade at Indian Pass. In order to prevent her escape, Morris ordered a boat expedition to ascend the river and capture the schooner by surprise. On the night of May 23 forty-one men under the command of Acting Master Edgar Van Slyck left the *Port Royal* in three boats.

The Union seamen rowed up the Apalachicola at night during a heavy rainfall, passing Fort Gadsden at two in the morning. At ten the following day they had rowed an esti-

⁷Scharf, *op. cit.*, 617. James K. Polk's first act as President had been the appointment of Gift to Annapolis. After serving in the Pacific fleet following his graduation, Gift established a newspaper in Napa, California. At the beginning of the war he had come south with Albert S. Johnston. Following the war Gift returned to Napa.

⁸*Ibid.*, 866.

mated forty-five miles (probably less since the first obstruction was thirty-five miles from Apalachicola) without seeing any sign of the *Fashion*. Returning down the river, they saw a barge near Scott Creek, twenty-three miles above Apalachicola, which indicated that a larger vessel was nearby. The boats entered the creek where one discharge of the howitzer brought the surrender of the *Fashion* without opposition. Although a Confederate camp was reported to have been within six miles of the scene of the capture, the Union seamen were able to tow their prize into the river and from there to Apalachicola and the blockading station. Even though Morris adjudged the schooner unseaworthy, the raid netted several prisoners and fifty bales of sea island cotton.⁹

News of the capture of the *Fashion* caused great concern in Chattahoochee, Florida, where the *Chattahoochee* was stationed. Although Gift was temporarily absent from the vessel, having already received orders to join the *Baltic* at Mobile, Lieutenant J. J. Gurthrie decided to attempt crossing the obstructions to give aid to the *Fashion*. The *Chattahoochee* therefore left Chattahoochee on May 26 and continued as far downstream as Blountstown Bar, twenty-eight miles below Chattahoochee.

Finding that the bar carried only seven and one half feet, not enough to allow the gunboat's passage, Gurthrie ordered an overnight wait in hopes that the river would rise. The river did not rise, however, and at ten the following morning the order was given to raise steam in preparation for returning to Chattahoochee.

When the order was given to raise steam there was an argument in the engine room as to how much water the boilers contained. The chief engineer, Mr. Henry Fagan, heard the discussion from his bunk and hurried to the engine room. Curiosity had also drawn the pilot, William Bilbro, who started the donkey engine just as Engineer Fagan descended the ladder into the engine room. Water poured into the boilers and they immediately exploded.

Pandemonium followed on the *Chattahoochee*. Fourteen men were killed in the blast or died immediately afterward. Those who had been scalded ran about the deck frantic with

⁹*Ibid.*, 447-48.

pain, "leaving the impression of their bleeding feet and sometimes the entire flesh, the nails and all, behind them."¹⁰ Since the boilers of the ship had been within three feet of the magazine, one of the gunners warned of an explosion, sending the crew into further panic and sending many of them over the sides into the river. Three drowned as a result before Midshipman Craig could restrain those trying to abandon the ship. Dr. Marcellus Ford went about the deck trying to give aid to the injured and Lieutenant Gurthrie came from his cabin and began to administer baptism to the dying.¹¹

Before long the *Chattahoochee* began to sink and Gurthrie gave orders to abandon ship. Four men were dispatched to flood the magazine and one was ordered to save the personal effects of the officers and men. By the time the injured had been put ashore it had begun to rain and they "lay in the mud on the bank writhing and groaning."¹² Later they were taken to a nearby cotton gin where they remained until the steamer *William H. Young* carried them away the next afternoon.

The *Young* first reached the *Chattahoochee* about midnight of the twenty-seventh, about twelve hours after the accident. The steamer transported Gurthrie and six others seventeen miles upstream to Ochesee. On the following morning it returned to take aboard the dead and injured who were transported to Chattahoochee that afternoon. After another trip down the river, this time to salvage two of the guns, the *Young* set out for Columbus, a trip requiring three days.¹³

In Columbus the injured were received at the Soldier's Home.¹⁴ The street in front of the hospital was crowded with

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 870.

¹¹*Columbus Daily Sun*, June 7, 1863.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³*Navy O. R.*, I, XVII, 474.

¹⁴"Teeny" Benning (Gen. Benning's daughter) Manuscript, 1928. The Soldier's Home was the first hospital in Columbus, a two story wooden building donated by George Woodruff, a grist mill owner. It stood on the southwest corner of Broad and Ninth Streets. Though the hospital was staffed by a matron and Negro servants, local women served as nurses and supplied the patients with delicacies from their own tables. Some Columbus families had to content themselves with corn bread while the precious store of flour went into bread for the soldiers. One Columbus merchant complained that each time he looked for a clean shirt he found that his wife had used it to shroud a casualty. Soldiers who died at the home were buried at the southwest corner of Linwood Cemetery, where the grave of Chattahoochee fireman Cornelius Duffey may still be seen.

vehicles which had brought Columbus women to nurse the victims of the accident. Lieutenant McLaughlin wrote to Catesby Jones that they found a grim task. Despite the unpleasant aspects of their work, the ladies remained faithful in their efforts.

McLaughlin also related to Jones the details of the death of Midshipman Charles K. Mallory, one of the eleven members of the *Virginia's* crew who had volunteered for service with Jones aboard the *Chattahoochee*. At the battle of Hampton Roads he had been the first of the *Virginia's* crew to board the *Congress* after she had struck her colors. According to McLaughlin's touching account, Mallory was also brave in service on the *Chattahoochee*:

The doctor said that Mallory could not live. You would have thought differently had you seen him. I could not make up my mind that he would die. When they first commenced to remove his clothes he was talking cheerfully, but the nervous system could not stand the shock. He commenced sinking and was a corpse before they had gotten through.¹⁵

Cornelius Duffey, a fireman, died on the day following Mallory's death.

With the loss of the *Chattahoochee*, concern for defense of the river came immediately into the forefront. The Dahlgren and one of the thirty-two-pounders which the *Young* had salvaged were placed as a battery on the river near where the *Chattahoochee* lay. In a report of the accident the *Daily Sun* added the reassuring comment that with this battery the river was "safer than ever."¹⁶

On June 9 the *Sun* printed an article from the Quincy, Florida, *Dispatch* which reported an attempt by the Union to pass the obstructions at the Narrows. However, General Cobb had dispatched a force to strengthen the battery guarding the obstruction.

In the meantime the *Chattahoochee* remained partially sunk in the river. It had been hauled to the right bank where it

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 871.

¹⁶*Columbus Daily Sun*, June 7, 1863.

lay with the bow free and the stern resting in twelve feet of water. D. S. Johnston of the Saffold Navy Yard was placed in charge of raising the wreck. The most valuable parts of the vessel's outfit were taken to Saffold, Eufaula, and "the arsenal" (probably Chattahoochee), and the wreck was left under the protection of a group of Negroes. Johnston returned later to find that the vessel had been stripped of everything that could be sold or traded.¹⁷

The members of the *Chattahoochee's* crew who had escaped injury were stationed in Columbus for a short time under the command of Lieutenant McLaughlin. They were then transferred to Savannah where they were assigned to the gunboat *Savannah*. The lieutenant was liberal in praising the men for their fine appearance, close organization, and good discipline.¹⁸

Others of the crew were not so praiseworthy. J. C. Cook, ship's cook, went south from Blountstown Bar to Apalachicola where he boarded the *Port Royal*. Cook gave Lieutenant Morris a complete report of the accident and voluntarily took the oath of allegiance to the United States. Quartermaster Elias Lee also boarded the *Port Royal*, took the oath of allegiance, and became pilot of the ship. From the reports they had received from Cook and Lee, the Union blockading officers assumed that the *Chattahoochee* was a total loss.¹⁹

The Union blockading force lost no time in pressing the advantage it had gained by the loss of the gunboat *Chattahoochee*. Even the loss of the *Amanda* and the damage to the *Somerset* in a storm on May 29 did not detain them. On the twelfth of June they launched an expedition against the salt works on Alligator Bay just east of Dog Island.

With the *Somerset* standing in range of the operations with its battery, a force of sixty-five armed men and others armed with sledge hammers went ashore. They destroyed four establishments in the vicinity which contained a total of sixty-five vats, nine buildings related to the salt works and thirty

¹⁷*Navy O. R.*, I, XVII, 871.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 870.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 474. Dickison, *op. cit.*, 55, states that the *Chattahoochee* was quickly raised and repaired. Further references from the *Navy O. R.* would discount his statement.

nuts which had housed the workers. They scattered two hundred bushels of salt along the shore before returning to their ships.²⁰

Thus, the Union destroyed the most important installation on the coast near Apalachicola at that time. In addition to the works at Alligator Bay, there was another on St. Andrew's Bay which was three quarters of a mile square.²¹ A group of men from Early County, Georgia, near Saffold, had at the beginning of the war, established a salt works at St. Mark's. They transported the salt by ox cart to the Saffold Navy yard where the naval officers distributed it.²² The Alligator Bay works, however, was described as being "the most extensive on the coast at that time."²³

After the loss of the *Amanda* in a storm and the removal of the *Chattahoochee's* threat, the blockade off Apalachicola was cut to three vessels, the steamers *Port Royal* and *Somerset* and the bark *J. S. Chambers*, which carried a total of 275 men and twenty-three guns. This force continued to send expeditions inland. In July, raids netted twelve bales and fourteen bags of cotton.²⁴ Early in October another salt works was discovered two and one half miles inland opposite St. George's Sound. A small Union force destroyed it without either opposition or casualties.²⁵ On the thirtieth another raid into Apalachicola netted ten bales of cotton.²⁶ For the remainder of the year three vessels held their positions without action to report.

Whether they were aware of the reduction in the blockading force or not, Confederates up the Apalachicola feared that their defenses were inadequate. The military and the government, as they had been a year earlier, were in opposition as to how the defense could be strengthened. Governor Milton of Florida favored keeping up contact with Apalachicola and re-occupying it if possible. Major General J. F.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 470-71.

²¹Ella Lonn, *Salt as a Factor in the Confederacy* (New York, 1933), 71.

²²Undated clipping in the possession of D. H. McDowell, Blakely, Georgia.

²³Lonn, *op. cit.*, 177.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 503.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 562.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 582.

Gilmer of the Confederate Engineers favored concentration upon strengthening the obstructions in the Apalachicola.

Governor Milton re-opened the discussion of the reoccupation of Apalachicola in a letter to Beauregard on October 15. In it he outlined the gloomiest threats of Union occupation of the city and the serious results of their accomplishing such a mission. He also dwelt upon the plight of the five hundred citizens who, though loyal to the Confederacy, were left in the city starving for bread.²⁷

Milton received no encouragement from the General, for he had opposed Cobb's suggestion that the city be reoccupied a year earlier. Confederate military strength simply was not sufficient. While Beauregard could have released a sufficient force to occupy the city, he could not have stationed a strong force in the city to hold it.²⁸

The opinion of General Gilmer, which Beauregard received, opposed the re-occupation of Apalachicola. He said that placing a garrison at Apalachicola "would be to tempt the enemy to concentrate his strength and make an attack, which must, in all probability, result in disaster to us." He further pointed out the advantages of the Confederate position at the Narrows, a point which was virtually impossible to attack or surround at high water, the only time when the enemy could transport troops upstream. While, as Gilmer stated, a garrison at Apalachicola would be open to attack from St. Joseph's and St. Mark's, the obstructions could be manned effectively by a much smaller force, thus freeing additional men for active combat.²⁹

General Gilmer, with the support of Col. D. B. Harris on the Apalachicola and Brig. General Thomas Jordan at Albany, Georgia, advocated the obstruction of Mocassin Creek and Chipola Cutoff near the Narrows. These two streams provided treacherous and circuitous, but nevertheless accessible, passage around the obstructions at the Narrows for communication with Apalachicola. These officers thought that the existence of these passages greatly weakened the effect of

²⁷*Army O. R.*, I, XXVIII, part II, 450-51.

²⁸Montgomery, *op. cit.*, 85.

²⁹*Army O. R.*, I, XXVIII, part II, 450-51.

the obstructions on the main stream and strongly advised that they be closed. Moreno had thought of placing guns at Fort Gadsden to slow the progress of any attacking force, but the largest gun available would have been of insufficient range and force for effectiveness.³⁰

Governor Milton remained unconvinced by the argument of the Engineers. He wrote to Beauregard saying that he continued to discourage obstruction of Mocassin Creek and to urge occupation of Apalachicola. He countered Gilmer's evidence with the opinion that the General had been overly influenced by railroading interests, which sought to diminish river traffic, thus diverting river commerce to rails and increasing the importance of Pensacola and Mobile.³¹ Evidently the Governor remained firm, for McLaughlin wrote to Catesby Jones on December 26, "Old Milton says he will blow them all to the devil and open the river."³²

The loss of the gunboat *Chattahoochee*, the decision to obstruct the Apalachicola completely, and the conflict over whether or not to re-occupy Apalachicola struck a serious blow to Confederate hopes in 1863 but by no means exhausted them. The major hope of river defense, the iron-clad *Muscogee*, was and had been an important promise of an effective striking force.

From the organization of the Confederacy, much importance and much money had been accorded the iron-clad vessel. In Mallory's opinion it would serve to equate the ship and the fort in firepower and resistance to bombardment. Confederate ironclads in opposition to United States wooden ships would overcome inequality of numbers with invulnerability. He therefore urged the construction of iron-clads "without regard to first cost."³³

Steps had been taken before the end of the first year of the war to establish facilities in Columbus which could construct iron-clads. Major James H. Warner had been sent to Columbus in the fall of 1861 to lease private machine works

³⁰*Ibid.*, 423-24.

³¹*Army O. R.*, I, LIII, part II, 299.

³²*Navy O. R.*, I, XVII, 872.

³³*Ibid.*, II, II, 117.

and organize them for the use of the Confederate Navy. His work was delayed until the spring of 1862 while he served in Pensacola designing the machinery for the *Mississippi*.³⁴

Warner, who had been Chief Engineer at Gosport, Virginia, prior to the war, had been the only Chief Engineer in the Confederate Navy at the time of its organization.³⁵ He was therefore very valuable in organizing and directing what Gorgas termed "the nucleus of our ordnance establishment."³⁶ The nucleus with which he began in Columbus was comprised of Brown's Foundry, Golden's Machine Shops, Gray's Gun Manufactory, Fell's Cannon Foundry, Love's Variety Shop, Churchill's Rolling Mill, and Sanford's Boiler Manufactory.³⁷

The three major tasks of the Columbus Naval Iron Works were casting cannon, manufacturing boilers and engines for steamers, and constructing gunboats. Frequent mention is made in the *Navy Official Records* of the cannon and machinery which Warner's command produced. However, the *Muscogee* received rather slight and infrequent mention.

The earliest mention of the *Muscogee* in the *Navy Official Records* is contained in a report from Lieutenant Morris of the USS *Port Royal*. Three crew members of the *Chattahoochee* whom he had captured in Apalachicola in April of 1863 informed him that the vessel was under construction. They described it sketchily as a diamond-shaped iron-clad drawing four or five feet and intended for service in Apalachicola Bay.³⁷ Morris gained fuller information several days later from William Martin, a former mechanic at the Columbus Naval Iron Works who had emigrated from the Confederacy to escape conscription. According to Martin the vessel was 120 feet long and ten to twelve feet deep. The frame of one-foot-square green pine timber had been completed and work begun in planking and coiling the outside as Martin left Columbus on April 22. The boilers, taken from an old river steamer, *Times*, had already been put into place. Martin predicted that

³⁴Standard, *op. cit.*, 43.

³⁵Etta Blanchard Worsley, *Columbus on the Chattahoochee* (Columbus, 1951), 283.

³⁶Frank Vandiver, *Ploughshares Into Swords: Josiah Gorgas and Confederate Ordnance* (Austin, Texas, 1952), 61.

³⁷*Navy O. R.*, I, XVII, 421.

due to the scarcity of iron the *Muscogee* would not be ready for launching before November.³⁸

It is entirely possible that plans and work on the *Muscogee* had begun as much as a year earlier since Major Warner began his work in Columbus in the spring of 1862. It seems unlikely also that Catesby Jones and George Gift, who had participated in the construction and careers of the most illustrious of Confederate iron-clads, the *Virginia* and the *Arkansas*, were sent to Columbus solely to command the wooden gunboat *Chattahoochee*. Delays had been caused by Major Warner's inability to secure iron and Mr. Charles Blair's inadequate force of skilled carpenters to construct the hull of the *Muscogee*.³⁹

Lieutenant McLaughlin wrote to Catesby Jones that caulking and laying the spar decks was begun on June 18 and at that point the engines were ready to be put into place.⁴⁰ By December 26 all of the internal fixtures were complete with the exception of guns and a magazine. "I am only waiting for the river," wrote McLaughlin, "which, from present appearances, will not keep me waiting long."⁴¹

Governor Milton of Florida had given McLaughlin his assurance that Apalachicola would be re-occupied as soon as the *Muscogee* was launched. Though Moreno planned to build a wagon road over the river, using the obstruction as a foundation, Milton had interested Jefferson Davis in the advantages of sending the *Muscogee* to Apalachicola.

While Confederate dissension over major problems of defense went on among high administrative officials, the blockading officers off Apalachicola were not without their own conflicts. Their plans for a large scale offensive on the river system had been rejected because there were no light-draft vessels available. The accident on board the *Chattahoochee* had removed the threat of an immediate offensive against the blockade. Although there were raids upon salt works, the duty of blockading Apalachicola had become somewhat routine.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 432.

³⁹John H. Martin, *Columbus, Georgia, from its Selection as a "Trading Town" in 1827, to its Partial Destruction by Wilson's Raid in 1865* (Columbus, 1874), 169.

⁴⁰*Navy O. R.*, I, XVII, 871.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 872.

Thus, dispatches to the Commander of the Squadron included complaints that the mail boat failed to visit Apalachicola at regular intervals.⁴² One officer complained that the supply ship crew had been most abrupt and discourteous to members of his own crew who wanted to purchase delicacies from the supply ship.⁴³ The commanders seined the bay for fish to vary the diet and allowed their crews exercise liberty on the beach at St. George's, but by 1863 Apalachicola had become more and more a hardship station.

Nevertheless, the third year of the war in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee area had been the most active year. It had begun with great offensive plans on each side and sufficient strength amassed to promise action. However, neither plan was brought to fruition because the Union lacked light-draft steamers and the Confederates lost one gunboat and were unable to complete the other. The Union blockade, even without light vessels, had been effective off shore and along the coast. Confederate efforts, on the other hand, had brought tragedy, dissension, and failure.

The end of 1861 had seen the Confederate foothold weakening at Apalachicola and the end of 1862 had seen their efforts centered on the obstruction and the *Chattahoochee*. The conclusion of the third year of the war found them faced with efforts in Columbus to repair the *Chattahoochee* and launch the *Muscogee*. Columbus as the head of navigation in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee River System was the last stronghold in Confederate naval installations. Confederate naval efforts could be driven no farther north than Columbus.

⁴²National Archives Microcopy Number 89, Roll 200, 5.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 13-15.

V. 1864: CONFEDERATE OFFENSIVE THREATS AND UNION COUNTER THREATS

The iron-clad *Muscogee* represented the greatest test of Confederate skill and ingenuity in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee area. Failure to launch the vessel on New Year's Day was a bitter disappointment to those who hoped to re-occupy Apalachicola, and it meant the failure of the supreme effort of war industry in the area. In a more immediate sense it was to mean spending an additional year, an expenditure of man hours and supplies, in efforts to re-model and launch the iron-clad.

The gunboat *Chattahoochee* also remained out of service because of the accident on board. Its crew, lacking an armed vessel, was sent to Apalachicola in small boats with a plan to break the blockade. This daring expedition also met with failure; for, betrayed by Apalachicola Unionists, caught in a storm, and pursued by Union landing parties, the Confederates were barely able to escape up the Apalachicola to the obstructions.

Despite two significant failures, the Confederates remained a threat to the blockade at Apalachicola. The officers stationed there maintained a careful study of Confederate strength. In addition, they prepared careful surveys of the navigability of the river system northward and delivered full reports on the strength of Columbus. By the end of the year the threat of the reconstructed *Muscogee* was sufficient to bring Union orders for increasing the blockade.

Lieutenant McLaughlin had been correct on December 26 when he predicted that the Chattahoochee River would soon rise sufficiently to float the *Muscogee* from the blocks. He must have read with great anticipation the *Daily Sun's* report that the river had risen ten feet on New Year's Eve, causing the citizens of Columbus to fear for the dams and suspend operation of the cotton mills.¹ The *Enquirer* also reported that the river was high and included its best wishes for the *Muscogee*, adding, "may she have better luck than her consort,

¹Columbus *Daily Sun*, January 1, 1864.

the *Chattahoochee*, which is now lying at our wharf a perfect wreck of her former self.”²

Contrary to predictions and expectations, the high water did not lift the *Muscogee* into the river. The steamer *Marianna*, whose return trip to Chattahoochee was delayed by the high water, was engaged to tow the vessel into the river. Operating in sixteen feet of water, the *Marianna* was unable to move the iron-clad.³

The Confederates at the Naval Iron Works were left nothing to do except begin altering the *Muscogee* in an effort to make it operable. The hull was to be extended in the hope that that would provide needed buoyancy. The casemate was also reduced to remove excess weight.⁴

The renewed efforts on the *Muscogee* were not viewed with a great degree of public support and patriotism, as an *Enquirer* editorial reflected in March:

If one will but take a stroll upon the banks of the Chattahoochee, just below our wharf, they will find that there has been enough money wasted upon the old “slantin’ dicu’ar” looking craft, propped upon legs, to feed a brigade of soldiers for a considerable period, if not longer. What could ever have been expected of such a looking craft we cannot imagine — unless a second flood is expected — and we are quite sure that nothing but a general inundation can ever lift the thing from its present position. To say the least, it is decidedly a great failure; and in our opinion, the best thing that can be done with the whole concern is to take it to pieces and commence over again.⁵

The editorial continued by estimating that the entire project had cost the government several hundred thousand dollars. The *Daily Enquirer* conjectured that the *Muscogoo* had been more expensive than the *Alabama*.

The Confederate Navy evidently expected the alterations

²Columbus *Daily Enquirer*, January 1, 1864.

³Columbus *Daily Sun*, January 2, 1864.

⁴*Navy O. R.*, I, XVII, 774.

⁵Columbus *Daily Enquirer*, March 16, 1864.

of the *Muscogee* to be dispatched quickly. Guns were ordered from the Selma ordnance works for the vessel in February. Lieutenant George W. Gift was returned to Columbus with orders to command the iron-clad. On March 15, however, he was transferred to command of the *Chattahoochee*.

Gift's new command was also unfit for service. Major Warner had examined the vessel in December and expressed surprise that it had been allowed to sink. Although the deck above the boilers had been raised six inches by the explosion in May, 1863, Warner observed that a pine plug driven into the feed pipe would have kept the gunboat afloat. Ironically, the lack of this simple bit of information kept the *Chattahoochee* partially sunk in the river for more than six months before it could be towed to Columbus for repairs.

In May, almost exactly a year since the accident at Blountstown Bar, Gift and his officers decided to conduct an expedition against the Union blockaders *Adela* and *Somerset*. They planned to board and capture the *Adela*, the smaller of the two vessels at East Pass, and with it to capture the *Somerset*.

Being a crew without a ship, the officers and men of the *Chattahoochee* were transported down the Chattahoochee River by the steamer *Marianna*. On May 3 the *Marianna* deposited the eleven officers and forty-seven crew members at Saffold. There they manned seven boats, two launches under the command of Gift and Midshipman Blanc which pulled fourteen oars each; two yawls, two cutters, and a metallic boat, each pulling four oars and commanded by Midshipmen Vaughn, Sparks, Hague, Frazee and Surgeon Ford.

The boats were fitted out with muffled oars, paddles, grapnels, and incendiary materials. Gift issued pistols to the officers and the men were armed with rifles, bayonets, and cutlasses. They carried on the expedition fifteen days' provisions for one hundred men.

The party reached Chattahoochee, Florida, at seven o'clock on the morning of the fourth. Sixteen volunteers from the First Georgia Regiment, Fifth Georgia Cavalry, and the First and Second Florida Battalions joined them there. At 10:40

⁶*Navy O. R.*, I, XVII, 873.

the expedition left Chattahoochee and made its way down the Apalachicola to Ricko's Bluff fifty miles below Chattahoochee and fifty-seven miles above Apalachicola. There they received thirteen additional volunteers. After dark on the same day the seven boats reach Fort Cobb, a battery at the obstructions. Captain Blount who was in command there assured Gift of reinforcements from his command.⁷

Upon reaching Apalachicola, the Confederates crossed St. George's Sound at night and landed at East Point near where the *Adela* and *Somerset* lay. There they took cover to await a dark night and a rough sea to cover their move against the *Adela*.

Gift and his men remained on St. George's for a week. The rough sea which they had hoped for did not come and Midshipman J. T. Scharf later wrote, "The sea was smooth and the dipping of the oars in the phosphorescent water emitted a luminous light which shone brightly some distance beyond."⁸ Due to the delay caused by the weather, the party ran low on supplies and were forced to obtain more from Apalachicola. The scouts who delivered the supplies informed Gift that Unionists in Apalachicola had informed the blockaders of his plan.

This combination of circumstances led Gift to decide to abandon his plan for attack, withdraw from East Point, and attempt an escape up the Apalachicola. Late on May 12 as a storm was rising on the sound, the boats left East Point. Gift's boat and another manned by ten soldiers took a course across the sound for Apalachicola while the other boats hugged the shore toward Cat Point.

The next several hours proved that Gift's course across the sound had been an unfortunate choice for the wind rose rapidly in the north. The boat containing the soldiers was swamped and the survivors swam to grasp the outside of Gift's boat. After several hours, Gift became ill. He then trans-

⁷*Ibid.*, 700. Midshipman Blanc's diary which contained this record of the expedition was captured by the Union and forwarded to the U. S. Navy Department. Microcopy 89, Roll 202 refers to the diary, but it was not included in the film.

⁸Scharf, *op. cit.*, 618. Scharf, who became known as a journalist and author of a history of the Confederate Navy, was able to furnish a colorful and detailed account of this storm in his *History of the Confederate States Navy*.

ferred command of the boat to Scharf who later recorded the experience:

At this time the boat was half filled with water and seventeen men on the inside, ten men from the swamped boat hanging on the outside and the sea washing over her. The boat was but two miles from the shore and all expected every moment would be the last. Finding that it would be impossible to reach the town in the face of the storm, Midshipman Scharf informed Lieutenant Gift that the only hope was to turn around and go to sea before the wind. The commander instructed Midshipman Scharf to do what he thought best, and immediately Midshipman Scharf informed the men of his determination. There was great fear of swamping in the trough of the sea in churning, but having confidence in his judgement, the crew were ready to obey his commands.⁹

In preparation for turning about, the guns, ammunition, lanterns, baggage, water casks, and other articles were jettisoned. Six of the nearly exhausted men were taken from the outside of the boat.

Finally, as a large wave struck under the quarter, nearly lifting the boat out of the water, it was turned and headed toward St. George's. Soon afterward the remaining four who had been clinging to the outside of the boat were taken into the already over-loaded craft. The "storm driven Confederates" approached St. George's fearfully in the sound of the breakers pounding the beach. Abandoning the boat as they neared the island, they were able to swim to safety. For two days they were cast away on St. George's without provisions, foraging the island for palmetto cabbage, alligators, and oysters.¹⁰

In the meantime, the other Confederate boats had reached Apalachicola where they were confronted with further dangers. With the hope of capturing the raiding party which he knew to be in the vicinity, Lieutenant Samuel Budd of the *Somerset* had sent a detachment of New York Volunteers from the

⁹*Ibid.*, 619.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 620.

schooner *J. S. Chambers* ashore below Apalachicola on the night of the storm. With two launches from his own ship he set out for Apalachicola. The plan was to strike the town at dawn, the land force from the rear and Budd's force from the bay.

Arriving at Apalachicola at daybreak on the thirteenth, Budd's force found seventy or eighty of the *Chattahoochee* party on the upper wharves preparing to man their boats. Seeing the Union launches, they abandoned their boats and retreated through the town followed by two shells from the *Somerset's* howitzer.

The retreating Confederates took the river road northward, passing within a short distance of the Union landing party. The lieutenant in command of the Volunteers, thinking that they were a part of his own command, allowed them to pass unchallenged. This mistake allowed the Confederates time to scatter into the swamp before Budd's force could land their boats and set out in pursuit. After going two miles up the river through dense undergrowth in search of the Confederates, Budd and his men returned to take possession of the deserted boats and supplies.

Later in the same day, Budd learned that Gift was in St. George's Sound with two boats and about thirty men. He dispatched a boat to give chase, but Gift's boat was able to elude it at nightfall. The smaller boat, however, with a crew of three was overtaken and captured.¹¹

Before leaving Apalachicola, the Confederates had arranged to send three citizens of the town in search of Gift and the rest of the crew. The relief party found them on the fourteenth and carried them from St. George's to Apalachicola. When they learned that the other members of the crew had been driven from the town, they lost no time in pushing off from Apalachicola. After traveling some distance up the river, Gift ordered the boat sunk in a bayou. From there he and his party traveled overland to join the remainder of the expedition force above the obstructions on the Apalachicola.¹²

¹¹*Navy O. R.*, I, XVII, 698.

¹²Scharf, *op. cit.*, 621.

The Confederate expedition only served to bring orders for strengthening the blockade they had tried to break. The *Fort Henry*, a side wheeler with 120 men and seven guns, was ordered immediately to replace the *J. S. Chambers*, a six-gun sailing vessel with a crew of sixty-two. With the *Adela* and *Somerset* this provided three hundred men and twenty guns off Apalachicola in May, 1864.

Lieutenant Gift returned to Columbus where he immediately began inquiries about repair work on the *Chattahoochee*. A letter from the Navy Department on June 2 informed him that Chief Constructor Daniel Porter had been instructed to inspect the *Chattahoochee* as soon as his duties in Wilmington permitted. A week later he again received a message from the Navy saying that Lieutenant McLaughlin would superintend repairs on the gunboat, a job which would require about four months according to the Department estimation.¹³

Within two months, however, Captain Theodore Green, successor to Bailey in the East Gulf Blockading Squadron, reported to Welles that the Confederates planned an attack on the blockade. Accounts from a deserter and refugees reported that the *Muscogee* was completed and was to be sent to Apalachicola with the support of cotton-clad barges and scows. Acting on these reports, Green ordered the *Sagamore* and the *Fort Henry* to join the *Somerset* at Apalachicola, replacing the *Adela* and *Clyde*.¹⁴

Union interest in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee area showed a marked increase in the fall of 1864. During the month of October three detailed reports on the bay and river system were filed by the Corps of Engineers at the request of the Navy Department. The first report dealt with bars, shoals, and passages in Apalachicola Bay and information about river soundings as far north as Columbus. It also contained names of pilots familiar with the waters.¹⁵

A second report, ten days later on October 17, contained more specific information on the Apalachicola, Chattahoochee,

¹³*Navy O. R.*, I, XVII, 874.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 742.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, I, XXI, 674.

and Flint Rivers. After giving soundings on the Chattahoochee for the U. S. Arsenal at Chattahoochee, Florida, Barber's Shoals, Fort Gaines, and Georgetown, the report concluded that vessels drawing seven feet six inches to eight feet could be carried to Columbus from September until June. It reported that on the Flint nine feet could be carried to Bainbridge and seven feet eight inches to Albany. Significant in the report is mention of the condition of the obstructions thirty miles north of Apalachicola. According to prisoners of the First Florida Cavalry, a wooden obstruction had been washed away and a schooner was anchored there to be sunk across the channel.¹⁶ This schooner was almost certainly the *Kate L. Bruce*, listed in Confederate reports as having been sunk in the Apalachicola as an obstruction.¹⁷ The final report of the series cleared up a minor question regarding soundings on the bar at Apalachicola. Through talking with refugees, the Union officers off Apalachicola were able to gain very valuable information about the state of affairs from Apalachicola to Columbus. Lieutenant Commander Simpson of the USS *Insomnia*, who had served at Apalachicola since October 1, collected and delivered to the East Gulf Blockading Squadron Headquarters a very comprehensive report dated November 11.

According to the information that Simpson had gathered, there was a picket guard at Fort Gadsden composed of five men and a corporal. Although this point twenty miles from Apalachicola had been a part of Confederate plans for river defense, there were no guns there at the time of Simpson's report. Twenty-six miles farther up the river at Iola was a landing visited regularly by the *William H. Young*. This river steamer served as headquarters for the captain commanding a detachment of 140 men at Chattahoochee. This force, which had a battery of four guns, was encamped without tents about one half mile from the town. Nearby the former U. S. Arsenal had been converted into quarters for the families of the men stationed at Chattahoochee.

Refugees traveling southward along the Chattahoochee in the early fall had seen no troops between Columbus and Chattahoochee. They reported that in Columbus every able

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷*Ibid.*, II, II, 257.

bodied man was being enlisted for the defense of the city, whose population had been swelled to 11,000 or 12,000 by the influx of refugees from the north. Mostly women and children, the refugees were sheltered in huts and abandoned rolling stock along the railroad from Fort Valley, Georgia, to Columbus and Eufaula and supplied by the State with enough corn meal to prevent starvation. For the defense of the city's residents and its industry, works were being erected in the city and all industrial employees were organized into armed companies.

Columbus industries, as they were listed by the refugees, were certainly vital and extensive enough to warrant considerable defense measures. Hayman's factories which manufactured swords, pistols, and bayonets employed 175 white men. At the Army Ordnance Department 150 white men and 150 white women worked in two factories, producing saddles, bridles, harness, and equipment for artillery in one division and casting shot and shell in the other. In the division for shot and shell there was also a laboratory. At the Quartermaster station 225 white men operated a tannery and shoemaking shop and twenty-five men were employed as tailors for the Army. In addition to these installations there were three cotton mills employing a total of about 365 white men and a paper mill which employed twenty-five white men. The staff of each of these establishments was increased by a force of Negroes.

The most important installation in Columbus was the Columbus Naval Iron Works which operated on a twenty-four-hour day and employed four hundred white men. It was thought that no guns were being cast at Columbus (orders in 1864 for the *Muscogee* and in 1865 for the *Chattahoochee* were directed to Catesby Jones in Selma), but the Iron Works was known to be active in supplying boilers and engines for vessels under construction at Charleston and Savannah.¹⁸

Reports on vessels in progress at those stations on November 1, 1864, reflect the extent of the Iron Works' operations. Major Warner's command had supplied engines for an iron-clad under construction at Wilmington, for two steamers

¹⁸*Ibid.*, I, XVII, 772-775. Microcopy 89, Roll 203, 73-82.

and an iron-clad at Savannah, for two iron clads on the Tombigbee River in Alabama.¹⁹

Because other needs of the Confederate Navy received priority at the Columbus Naval Iron Works, the gunboat *Chattahoochee* still awaited repairs in Columbus, nearly a year and a half since the accident on board. The best that Warner's report of November 1 could promise was that the vessel "will soon be put in commission again." The engines had been overhauled and repaired along with damage to the deck. Two boilers had been sent from the wreck of the *Raleigh* at Wilmington. In addition to the work on the *Chattahoochee*, there was a torpedo boat nearing completion.

The major consideration of the construction program in Columbus was the *Muscogee*. As it had a year earlier, it lay on the stocks to be launched as soon as the river rose. The machinery supplied by Warner was in readiness, and the six seven-inch rifles from Selma were in place. Due to the low supply of iron (a deficiency of 280 tons according to the Chief Constructor's report for November) the vessel had been armored only at the knuckle where the casemate was joined to the deck.²⁰

Progress at the Columbus Naval Iron Works did not escape the interest of the Union blockade off Apalachicola. Lieutenant I. B. Baxter of the *Fort Henry* reported that he had learned from prisoners that the *Muscogee*, reportedly more formidable than the *Tennessee*, was ready for launching. They had said also that the torpedo boat was nearly complete and that the *Chattahoochee* was fully repaired and ready for action. He concluded that the Confederates were "making every preparation to make a raid on the blockade at this place."²¹

Five days after Baxter made his report, Acting Rear-Admiral C. K. Stribling, who had replaced Green in the Squadron, informed Welles that his force at Apalachicola was insufficient either for conducting inland raids or for maintain-

¹⁹*Ibid.*, II, II, Reports on Vessels in Progress: Wilmington, 751; Savannah, 752; Chief Constructor Porter's report from Richmond, 600.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 752. Standard, *op. cit.*, 45, interprets Porter's figures on the deficiency of iron as the *Muscogee's* tonnage.

²¹Navy O. R., I, VII, 785.

ing the blockade. It was necessary for the blockading force to make repeated attacks upon salt works along the coast, an operation which usually resulted in a short-term disruption of salt making rather than a permanent destruction of Confederate salt works. Sending the men in small boats on expeditions which lasted oftentimes several days resulted in hard labor and over-exposure. Therefore, Stribling requisitioned vessels of lighter draft which could be maneuvered nearer the mainland.²²

Stribling was especially concerned about the blockade's capability in the event of a Confederate attack. The boilers on the *Somerset*, which had seen such extended service off Apalachicola, had worn out, and the ship could serve only as a floating battery. The remainder of the force there was made up of the *Fort Henry*, the schooner *Beauregard*, and the steam tug *Sunflower*. The total force was 209 men and 18 guns, but Stribling feared that it could not withstand an attack from the vessels which Baxter had described.

Actually the Union fears were unfounded during the weeks immediately following. The *Chattahoochee* was never returned to action; the torpedo boat was completed just as the war closed; although it was launched, the *Muscogee* was never fully plated. Neither force could foresee that the war was drawing to a close. Therefore, the launching of the *Muscogee* on December 22 was a great boon to Confederate morale. The *Daily Enquirer* reported on the morning of the twenty-third:

This splendid ram was successfully launched yesterday at about 11 o'clock and now sits as calmly upon the Chattahoochee as a duck upon a pond. Mr. Chas. Blair, her builder, superintended her launching. Too much praise cannot be bestowed upon the manner in which the whole affair was conducted. An eye witness says that she glided into the water so smoothly and easily that there was not motion sufficient to have shaken the water in a tumbler Those capable of judging, who have examined this craft, inform us that she is one of the most compact, and securely built craft yet afloat upon our waters. Success to her, say we, and may she be manned by able and capable

²²National Archives Microcopy 89, Roll 203, 113.

officers who will never get scared and blow her up or stick her in the mud the first time a booger man says booh at her.²³

The *Muscogee's* launching was thus finally accomplished and the *Enquirer's* praises finally forthcoming.

The year 1864 had been in several ways much like the preceding year. It had begun with concern for launching the *Muscogee*, a failure which 1863 had built toward. It was marked by action at Apalachicola in May followed by an increase in the strength of the blockade. The fall had brought increased Union attention to intelligence relating to inland affairs on the one hand and Confederate concern for repairing the *Chattahoochee* and launching the *Muscogee* on the other. The year ended with the launching of the *Muscogee* as the crowning achievement, a factor which caused the Union to fear for and increase its blockade.

Aside from the changes that the passage of a year most certainly made in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee area, there was one subtle factor. Despite the Union report of a threat to the blockade at Apalachicola in early December, their earlier intelligence had been different in tone. Their dispatches of October and November were more objective, seemingly less motivated by contemplation of an attack upon the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee River System or by fear of an attack upon the blockade from the vessels in preparation there. Their reports were almost stated in terms of an inventory of territory and installations which the Union ultimately would control.

²³*Columbus Daily Enquirer*, December 23, 1864.

VI. 1865: CONCLUSION OF OPERATIONS

The closing months of the war brought two brief and bloodless Union expeditions along the Apalachicola River. The previous fall had seen a hard-fought engagement at Marianna, Florida, west of the Apalachicola and the following March brought a raid from St. Mark's into Tallahassee east of the Apalachicola. By comparison the Apalachicola itself was very quiet, and as late as March 14 the commander of the East Gulf Blockading Squadron appealed to Welles for more vessels to strengthen the blockade against the threat of Confederate gunboats from the Chattahoochee and Apalachicola.

The last months of the war found the Confederates at Columbus still at work on vessels there. The *Muscogee* was receiving final attention to the battery and armor and a torpedo boat was nearly complete. The *Chattahoochee* remained in a partial state of disrepair. In late March and early April the threat upon these vessels at Columbus had become a land force from the west, not a naval force from the south as it had been for the previous four years. In the face of General James H. Wilson's raid the *Chattahoochee* was burned, the torpedo boat set adrift, and the *Muscogee* left to fall into Union hands.

On January 16 the U. S. bark *Midnight* dispatched a boat expedition from its blockading station at St. Andrew's west of Apalachicola. The object of the expedition was to capture the steamer *W. H. Young* which transported supplies from Columbus to the Confederate garrison at Ricko's Bluff. The Union planned to travel overland to the Chipola River, enter the Apalachicola above the obstructions, and ambush the steamer as it tied up at Ricko's Bluff.

On the afternoon of the sixteenth a party of thirty men under the command of Acting Master Charles Cadieu left the *Midnight* in the second cutter and a launch armed with a howitzer. Proceeding along a creek as far as possible from St. Andrew's, the group concealed the launch in a lagoon near Vetapo Creek. Proceeding inland, the party held a pre-arranged meeting with three Confederate deserters at noon the next day. One of the deserters led Cadieu and several others to his home where they received a yoke of oxen and a wagon for transporting the cutter overland to the Chipola.

Cadieu's party remained in the vicinity of Ricko's Bluff for a week, exploring the nearby tributaries to the Apalachicola and keeping a close watch upon the movements of the Confederate garrison there. They received reports that the steamer was expected daily, but an incident on the evening of the twenty-fourth caused them to abandon the plan of waiting to capture the *W. H. Young*.

At seven o'clock on the night of the twenty-fourth a small Negro girl stumbled upon the picket guard which Cadieu had posted near his camp. Ignoring their orders to halt, she escaped — carrying, Cadieu was certain, news of the Union's presence to the garrison on Ricko's Bluff. A consultation among the group led to the decision to move immediately upon the bluff while they could still do so with an element of surprise.

The Union party was able to surprise the five Confederates at a camp near the bluff without firing a shot. There they took possession of ten horses, eight carbines, two shotguns, one musket, and one rifle. Moving on the guard post at the bluff, they captured the picket guard of four. In addition, they discovered and burned a government storehouse where a large quantity of corn was stored.

In the Union soldiers' absence from their camp, a group of about thirty Negroes gathered there. They asked that they be taken to the Gulf and Cadieu agreed to let them travel with his party. They set out on the morning of the twenty-fifth, returning overland as they had come, and reached the *Midnight* on the twenty-ninth.

Instead of returning to the *Midnight* with the main body of Cadieu's force, eleven men under the command of Acting Ensign Gruff took a small boat through the Chipola Cutoff and Gum Swamp and into the Apalachicola below the obstructions. Their objective was Fort Gadsden, which they reached on the night of the twenty-sixth. Though it had been the custom of the picket guard there to man a scow in midstream, the Union party saw nothing afloat as they passed. They attempted to land and move up the river bank toward the fort, but they were cut off by a creek. They then rowed upstream past the garrison and approached it from the rear. After capturing a

sergeant and a private there, they searched along the river for three remaining men who were residents of the area and stationed at Fort Gadsden.

The net gain of the two expeditions was one lieutenant, three sergeants, twelve privates, and nineteen stands of arms. Forty-three contrabands had also returned with the Union. The expedition had had to abandon the captured horses because they could not be transported across the river. The most significant accomplishment of the expedition was the destruction of the warehouse containing an estimated 150 bushels of corn.¹

Even though the force from the *Midnight* had seen little that could pose any threat to the blockade, it was increased during February and March. On the first of February the *Matthew Vasser*, a mortar schooner with a battery of three guns, joined the *Beauregard*, *Fort Henry*, *Somerset*, and *Sunflower* which had held the blockade for several months. On the fifteenth the *Mahaska* with ten guns and a crew of 145 joined this group at Apalachicola.

Two weeks later the *Fort Henry* and the *Mahaska* were sent east to St. Mark's to join a large group of vessels, no doubt to support the Union Army's movement to Tallahassee in March. This force of seven steamers and three schooners placed a strength of forty-nine guns and 722 men within a relatively short distance from any difficulty at Apalachicola.

Despite the heavy concentration of vessels off Apalachicola, Acting Rear-Admiral Stribling was concerned with the safety of their position. He communicated to Welles on March 14 the need for stationing light draft vessels with heavy batteries at that point. Of the five vessels stationed there in mid-March (*Fort Henry*, *Howquah*, *Mahaska*, *Spirea*, and *Beauregard*) only the *Fort Henry* was suited to operations there.

According to Stribling's account the need at Apalachicola was desperate. He had been informed that the *Muscogee* was launched and prepared for action and with the support of other vessels from Columbus contemplated a raid on the Apalachicola blockade.² His fears that the Union blockade at Apalachicola would not hold were unfounded, as the events of the next

¹*Navy O. R.*, I, XVII, 797-800.

²*Ibid.*, 825.

month proved. By that time General J. H. Wilson's force had swept through Alabama, capturing Selma and Montgomery and the war was in its last days.

As General Wilson's force moved across Alabama, the first major threat to Columbus took shape. Prior to April, 1865, Columbus had feared enemy raids from time to time, but its major preoccupation had been war production and receiving refugees and wounded from centers of action. Work had been in progress for nearly two years on a line of trenches and gun emplacements which stretched for two miles along the ridge west of the Chattahoochee. The city's industrial force and Columbus men too old or too young for active service were organized into companies of militia. Conditions in the city, however, were comparatively good in the spring of 1865 and news of the fall of Selma, Alabama, on April 3 brought no immediate realization that the capture of Columbus would follow twelve days later.³

The influx of refugees from Montgomery on April 13 made Columbus aware of the immediacy of the Union threat. General Howell Cobb and Colonel Leon von Zinkern directed a force of about two thousand men in almost frantic efforts to complete Columbus defenses. On April 15 noncombatants were ordered to evacuate the city and all bridges except the railroad span and the Fourteenth Street bridge were made impassable.⁴

Arriving late in the afternoon of the fifteenth, Wilson's Cavalry Corps surprised a group of Negro men who were hastily strengthening the Girard fortifications. The Union withheld attack until eight in the evening when they launched the first of three assaults on the Confederate line. The capture of the Fourteenth Street bridge two hours later ended effective resistance, and Columbus was in Union hands on the morning of April 16, 1865.⁵

Having captured Columbus, Wilson's raiders spent two days destroying the installations which had supplied the Confederacy: the Navy Yard, foundries, armory, railroad stocks

³Standard, *op. cit.*, 59.

⁴C. Robert Watkins, *Wilson's Raid Through Alabama and Georgia* (unpublished master's thesis, Auburn University, 1959), 194, 198, 199.

⁵Standard, *loc. cit.*

and depots, the cotton factories, and the gun and harness factories. The Union captured also what remained of the Confederate Navy, the uncompleted *Muscogee*.⁶

General E. F. Winslow's report contained a painstaking description of the *Muscogee*. Even in the eyes of the army officers Wilson and Winslow, the *Muscogee*, though not fully completed, was a formidable vessel. Had the blockading officers at Apalachicola known that the iron-clad could not have been ready for action before May 1 they would have probably held their stations in a greater degree of security.

Winslow's report, which he called personal and not scientific, described the *Muscogee* as being 250 feet long and forty-five feet wide with a draft of six and one half to seven and one half feet. The hull was of live oak, two feet thick with a solid oak ram extending fifteen feet from the bow. Below the water line were two engines supplied with steam from four boilers. With a three-foot bore and a three-foot stroke, these engines powered a seven and one half foot propeller.

Three hatches led from the engines and boilers to the gunroom, a space forty feet long and twenty feet wide. The gun room was built in a pyramid shape and extended nine feet above the deck. There were ten port holes in the gun room and the six seven-inch rifles were arranged so that there were two guns fore and aft and one gun on each side. The guns fore and aft were arranged in a way that would allow them to fire broadside as well.

Two feet above the gunroom and directly adjacent to it was the pilot house. This was a heavily plated position and from that point the armor of the vessel sloped toward the knuckle in six-by-two-inch slabs. The armor curved over the knuckle and extended below the water line. The overlapping plates at the knuckle provide a thickness of four inches of armor.

The *Muscogee* was complete except for armor on the gunroom. Winslow wrote that it had been three years in preparation and was two weeks away from completion. Its career

⁶Army O. R., I, XLIX, 383.

ended before it had begun as Union troops set fire to the vessel and set it adrift in the Chattahoochee.

In recording its destruction the Union also obtained a complete record of the strength of the installation which had produced the *Muscogee*. Winslow itemized the destruction of buildings and machinery in a small rolling mill, a larger rolling mill about to go into production, a large blacksmith shop, a foundry, a copper shop, a boiler shop, a pattern shop, and several offices and drawing rooms.⁷

The Union Army and Navy remained in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee area for some months after the close of the war. The *Paul Jones*, *Spirea*, and *Muscosta* were placed in service for a time off Apalachicola and a military post was established in the city in early June. Agents of the Army and Navy in Columbus were sent to take charge of collecting captured goods for sale or shipment.

The first Union troops which reached Apalachicola took the torpedo boat which had been sent downstream from Columbus. Stribling reported to Welles that it was complete and ready for action and that he had ordered it towed to Key West. The steamer *Yucca* was assigned the task, but the prize was lost when the *Yucca* encountered a strong westerly wind enroute to Key West.⁸

The occupation force which was sent to Apalachicola on May 31 was made up of units of the 161st New York Infantry and the 82nd U. S. Colored Infantry. Thirty mounted men were also included in this force which carried with it supplies for Wilson's command to be transported to Macon.

General Alexander Asboth, who was placed in command at Apalachicola, reported that citizens who had emigrated from the city were returning to re-occupy their homes and businesses. The Union force aided in the return to normalcy by collecting

⁷*Ibid.*, 385-86. Wilson's report of capture says "*Muscogee*, alias *Jackson*"; Winslow's report says, "*Muscogee*." Thatcher's final report (7 fn) says *Jackson*. No Confederate reports studied cites *Jackson*, but there was a river steamboat named *Jackson*.

⁸*Navy O. R.*, I, XVII, 853. Prior to this study it had been thought that the torpedo boat had sunk in the Chattahoochee River.

and replacing buoys and light house machinery from storage in Eufaula. The port saw renewed activity as it became a clearing house for cotton, captured machinery, and other booty which was shipped from the river system to the Gulf.⁹

One of the Union soldiers stationed at Apalachicola later wrote:

Apalachicola contained before the war a population of two thousand, but we found on our arrival only a few hundred. All the places of business except one cotton press was closed, the streets were covered with grass, the houses and sidewalks were falling to decay, all the churches were closed, and an oppressive quietness everywhere prevailed.

The appearance of things at our departure was different from what it was at our arrival; then, hardly a person was to be seen, and a spirit of utter desolation brooded over the place. Now the levee was covered with bales of cotton, the wharf was astir with citizens, and handkerchiefs were waving from many of the windows and sidewalks.

Part of Asboth's detachment left Apalachicola on July 26, 1865, whereupon the Union diarist commented, "Farewell, sandy, dry, hot Apalachicola, may we never see thee more!"¹⁰

On November 20, 1865, Acting Rear-Admiral H. K. Thatcher of the Gulf Squadron, made a complete and final report to Gideon Welles concerning the state of affairs in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee River System. It included a report on the condition of the late Confederate Navy on the rivers.

The burned wreck of the *Chattahoochee* lay at Race Pass twelve miles south of Columbus. The gunboat had been wet down with ten barrels of kerosene and ignited by slow fuses before Wilson's raiders had arrived, and the crew had retreated by the light of the fire.¹¹ The *Muscogee's* wreckage had come

⁹*Ibid.*, 856-57.

¹⁰*Military History of the One Hundred and Sixty-First New York Volunteer Infantry*, (n.d.), 48.

¹¹*Montgomery Advertiser*, clipping with no date in the possession of the Alabama Department of Archives and History. Information contained in the clipping was from a relative of Andrew Olds, a *Chattahoochee* crew member who had helped with the destruction.

to rest on a shoal thirty-two miles south of Columbus. The iron-clad's guns, armor, and machinery lay partially melted in the bottom of the hull. Thatcher suggested that both vessels be sold to someone who would finish wrecking them in order to recover the iron.¹²

Thus, the operations of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee River System ended. The last three months of the war passed much as the previous three years of the war had passed, with the Confederates working to complete vessels which could raise the blockade and the Union blockade trying to organize a light-draft force which could engage and destroy these vessels in the shallow waters at Apalachicola. The war ended before either side could carry out the task it had set for itself.

¹²*Navy O. R.*, I, XXII, 258-59. Two guns from the *Chattahoochee* were recovered from the Chattahoochee River in 1912 by Gunby Jordan and are mounted at the Confederate Naval Museum in Columbus. Through the efforts of the Georgia Historical Commission and a group of Columbus citizens, the wrecks of the *Muscogee* and *Chattahoochee* were recovered during the early 1960's and may be seen at the Museum.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

While the major engagements of the Civil War were fought in other areas of the Confederacy, the record of the war in the Apalachicola and Chattahoochee Rivers developed in terms of preparing for rumored attacks and making abortive plans to launch significant offensives. The Union and Confederate naval forces in that area did not fight an engagement; the only shots fired were aimed at Confederates who fled Union forces or at Unions who fled Confederates; neither side inflicted a single casualty, except upon itself as a result of accident or negligence. The conclusion of the war, in fact, found the Union off Apalachicola able for the first time to muster an effective light-draft force for operations in the waters there, and the Confederate iron-clad *Muscogee* was less than a month away from completion. In contrast to other theatres of action, the history of the navies here becomes a record of frustrated efforts and potential never fully realized.

The Union at Apalachicola accomplished its chief mission at Apalachicola by establishing an effective blockade during its first year of operations there. Maintaining the blockade became a somewhat routine matter, marked by changes in strength from time to time. Officers there continually feared that the Confederate vessels in the rivers to the north would descend upon the blockade, and the strength of the blockade fluctuated according to the Union assessment of Confederate strength along the Apalachicola and Chattahoochee Rivers.

As the concentration of Confederate strength receded up the Apalachicola River, the Union was able to pursue the minor and complementary mission of conducting raids along the coast and into the river. Landing parties in 1861 confined their operations to St. Vincent's and St. George's Island opposite the port of Apalachicola. In May, 1862, parties from the *Mercedita* and *Somerset* ascended the Apalachicola River to capture vessels anchored five miles from the town. The *Fashion* expedition in May, 1863, penetrated twenty-two miles into Confederate territory to capture the schooner and a cargo of cotton. During the remainder of the year the Union was active in its raids upon stores of cotton and salt works along the coast. Although 1864 brought only minor action, January, 1865, marked

the most far-reaching expedition up the Apalachicola — a raid on the Confederate garrison at Ricko's Bluff, fifty-seven miles north of Apalachicola.

The officers who directed the Union operations at Apalachicola felt through the war that their force was ill-suited for operations there. The first reports of the blockaders made urgent requests for lighter draft vessels and equipment for operations in shallow coastal waters. Hardly more than a month before General Wilson's force took Columbus, the blockading squadron reported their fear of attack from the rivers and pointed out the inadequacies of their vessels. The war ended as the Union Navy finally supplied suitable vessels.

Apalachicola, however, was not as important to the Union as Mobile, Pensacola, and New Orleans. The officers off Apalachicola were simply left to make the blockade as effective as possible with the vessels assigned to them. Oftentimes in the early months of the war, when activities at the Apalachicola wharves continued out of their reach, they lost advantages which lighter vessels could have gained. Their vessels grounded; the prizes they were able to capture they were unable to free from the harbor. They were never able to launch an offensive against the strategic objectives they knew to exist along the Apalachicola and Chattahoochee Rivers. In consideration of the Union disadvantages at Apalachicola, it may be said that they acquitted themselves well in operations there.

Confederate efforts along the Apalachicola and Chattahoochee Rivers were far more diversified than Union operations there. Their defense measures involved obstructing the river, maintaining land batteries, and constructing vessels. Their defenses were responsible for the security of valuable ship building and arms manufacturing installations, lines of communication, and vital agricultural areas. Providing these defenses required the combined efforts of civilian contractors and employees.

After almost a year of trying to fortify and defend the Apalachicola area, the Confederates were forced, through lack of organizations and materials, to withdraw into Apalachicola from the fortifications on St. Vincent's and St. George's Islands. This retreat began a steady recession of Confederates from the port of Apalachicola northward.

In 1862 the drive to finish the gunboat *Chattahoochee* was carried on simultaneously with efforts to obstruct the Apalachicola River at the Narrows and Rock Bluff. Both projects were completed by the end of 1862, but the obstructions and the defense which they offered cut off the offensive promise of the *Chattahoochee*, a vessel capable of operations against the blockade at Apalachicola.

When the *Chattahoochee* was blown up by an inexperienced crew at Blountstown in May, 1863, as it attempted to go down river to relieve the *Fashion*, the progress of naval operations was greatly slowed. As the *Chattahoochee* lay partially submerged in the river and later awaiting repairs at Columbus, Georgia, efforts were concentrated upon completing the iron-clad *Muscogee*.

The failure to launch the *Muscogee* on January 1, 1864, brought the concentration of Confederate efforts to Columbus, the northernmost point of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee area. Throughout the year work continued to repair the *Chattahoochee*, remodel the *Muscogee*, and prepare small torpedo boat for action.

The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee area was a point far more vital to the Confederacy than the blockade of Apalachicola was to the Union. This has already been reflected in a discussion of the variety of efforts made there and can be further shown through a consideration of the personnel assigned there. Chief Engineer Warner of the Columbus Naval Iron Works was a man of ample training and experience. He organized the industrial potential of Columbus and directed an installation which proved invaluable to the Confederacy. Catesby ap R. Jones, whose service in the area was rather brief, had already proved his ability as executive officer of the *Virginia* and was to render important service as commander of the ordnance works at Selma, Alabama. George W. Gift, who had helped to construct and command the *Arkansas*, served two tours of duty in Columbus during the war.

This capable executive force was hampered, however, by the lack of personnel and supplies to carry out its plans. Skilled carpenters and mechanics were difficult to find at Saffold and

at Columbus. This created delays in the construction of vessels, and the *Muscogee* had to be redesigned. In the absence of Gift, an inexperienced crew exploded the boilers of the *Chattahoochee* and allowed the vessel to sink, not taking the simple measures which could have prevented its loss.

Defense efforts along the Apalachicola and Chattahoochee were delayed by conflicts between the Army and the government. Governor Milton was in constant disagreement with the Corps of Engineers about the obstructions in the Apalachicola. Civilians implored the Army to provide defense only to refuse donations of labor and material to complete the work. At one time in 1862, the Army, the state government of Florida, the Navy, and a group of civilians were working independently to defend the river.

Despite the instances in which Confederate operations and policy proved inadequate in the Apalachicola and Chattahoochee Rivers, they achieved some significance. The greatest accomplishment was the work of the Columbus Naval Iron Works, as the records of its contribution to Wilmington, Norfolk, and Savannah show. The construction of an iron-clad warship, the *Muscogee*, was also a significant feat, in spite of the fact that the vessel did not see action. Moreover, the fact that an essential agricultural area could mobilize itself and develop its industrial and commercial potential into a significant installation for war production is a tribute to the ingenuity and perseverance of the people of the Apalachicola and Chattahoochee area.

Wilson's raid on Columbus and the end of the war concluded more than four years of a warfare of threats and preparations to meet those threats. Ironically, neither force — the Union with its heavy draft vessels nor the Confederacy with its uncompleted vessels — could enforce the threats which it posed. Operations in the Apalachicola and Chattahoochee Rivers were virtually a cold war within a heated and destructive conflict.

BOOK REVIEWS

James H. O'Donnell, III. *Southern Indians in the American Revolution*. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1973. Bibliography and index. 171 pp. \$8.50.)

On the southern colonial frontier the war between American and Briton involved a third party, the American Indian. The combatants of the Revolutionary War either hoped or feared that Cherokee and Creek, Choctaw and Chickasaw, would take up the hatchet and, by the strength of their numbers (estimated at ten thousand warriors) and with their forest cunning and aboriginal courage, sway the balance of victory for either the garrisoned redcoat or the homebound militiaman. O'Donnell sketches the efforts of both to influence the tribes by gifts of powder and trade goods, food and rum, and, on the American side, by devastating military strikes into the Cherokee heartland.

Although diplomacy occupied much of the time and effort of the American George Galphin and the British Indian superintendents John Stuart, Alexander Cameron, and Thomas Brown, the course of events was determined by other factors. Indian poverty and dependence upon the whiteman's culture, especially for the tools of war, had already reduced the tribes to clientage before the Revolution began. They were incapable of military action on their own and fatally vulnerable to attack, as Williamson, Rutherford and Christian demonstrated in 1776, Pickens and Sevier in 1780-82. The Patriots (to use O'Donnell's term) enjoyed a further advantage in their clarity of purpose — in this case, land-grabbing. The Americans fought for profit against an enemy who either could not or would not fight for his home. The losses of the Indians can be measured, like those of massacred frontiersmen, by the dozens (including women and children); the gains of the southern states constituted millions of acres well worth the price. Finally, any hope of British support and leadership (and in the villages there were men who might have provided it) was crushed by the dead-weight of petrified administration personified by the Florida Governors Tonyn and Chester and the military incompetence of General John Campbell. The southern tribes were caught in the middle, and it is not surprising that the shrewdest of their leaders, McGillivray of the Creeks, turned to Spain as a

last resort, seeking to shore up the old collapsing policy of playing one white nation against another.

O'Connell's book makes all this clear enough and provides a convenient, well-balanced survey of the subject. Although he ignores Hispano-Indian relations after 1781, his research in the Anglo-American sources have been extensive and sufficient to have enabled him to write at greater length, with much desirable and enlightening detail, on all aspects of the story. It is most regrettable that he did not, for the brevity of his text forbids any delineation of a host of colorful characters, both Indian and white. It also makes impossible a full description of the difficulties that faced the British Indian agents and the achievements of those American backwoods leaders whose daring exploits virtually carved out new states to the west of Virginia and the Carolinas. If such matters be looked upon as having minor local import, such was the nature of southern Indian affairs during the Revolution. It also characterized the fall of a British and the emergence of an American continental empire.

Robert R. Rea
Auburn University

William Warren Rogers and Robert David Ward, *August Reckoning: Jack Turner and Racism in Post-Civil War Alabama*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973. Pp. xii, 195. \$7.50.)

An alternative subtitle for this careful and enlightening book might have been, "The Biography of a Political Lynching." Jack Turner was a Choctaw County freedman who acquired his own farm and achieved local prominence in the Republican party during the decade after 1872. Under his leadership Choctaw County blacks continued to vote the Republican ticket in larger numbers than was customary or entirely safe for them in Bourbon Alabama. They failed to turn their population edge into an electoral majority, however, until the gubernatorial election of August 12, 1882, when a fusion ticket of Republicans, Greenbackers, and Independent Laborites carried the county by less than a hundred votes.

Three days later a twelve-year-old white boy discovered a packet of letters and other papers lying in the road in front of his house. On examination they purported to reveal a conspiracy by Turner and several other leading blacks to massacre the white citizens of Choctaw County, irrespective of age or sex, a month hence. Quickly the authorities rounded up all but one of the suspects and confined them in the jail at Butler, the county seat. Two of the prisoners were taken out successively and tortured before the desired confession was obtained. The rest steadfastly maintained their innocence. On the morning of August 19 about a thousand men assembled from all over the county; after two hours of debate it was voted to hang Jack Turner as the ringleader of the conspiracy. He was taken out forthwith, and died still protesting his innocence. The remaining prisoners were eventually released on bail, and after many postponements the case against them was dropped.

Professors Rogers and Ward devote scarcely more than half of their book to Jack Turner's life and death. The remainder is an illuminating account of the public reaction to the lynching around the state, the region, and the nation, based primarily on the newspaper press. As had been true during the long succession of Reconstruction outrages, opinion divided sharply, and primarily along racial and political lines. Only a few Democratic spokesmen agreed with blacks and Republicans (and with Rogers and Ward) that Turner was the victim of a political murder, based on a fictitious conspiracy concocted to get him and his colleagues out of the way. Democrats in fact employed the episode to justify their own strong-arm tactics elsewhere — the old bloody shirt turned inside out. The supposed fact of the Jack Turner conspiracy in Choctaw County led other communities around the state, with an eye to the coming congressional elections in November, to accuse their Republican parties of similar intentions. It is impossible to measure the success of the tactics: Democrats swept the November elections, but in Choctaw and neighboring counties blacks voted in relatively large numbers and the Republicans polled a substantial minority vote. Of course no solid evidence of a contemplated Negro uprising was ever found.

The authors — professors at Florida State University and Georgia Southern College, respectively — have presented this

case study of post-Reconstruction race relations about as fully and effectively as one could hope for. They have used court records from the county to the federal levels, manuscript census returns, newspapers in great number, and a variety of other source materials, published and unpublished. If the biographical data on Jack Turner unavoidably remains sketchy, this hardly affects the main thrust of the story. For anyone who has made similar investigations of that era, the account will ring true. Despite an abundance of typographical errors, the book is well and clearly written. It serves as valuable additional evidence of where Southern race relations once were, and how far they have come.

Allen W. Trelease
University of North Carolina
Greensboro

Glenn Tucker. *High Tide at Gettysburg*. (Dayton, Ohio: Press of Morningside Bookshop, 1973. Pp. 395, bibliography, index. \$9.00.)

Eight hundred and ninety-two major and more than five thousand minor battles or engagements were fought during the War Between the States. The war was over half over when Lee and Meade collided at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863, in a battle which took place because a Confederate heard that there were shoes in the town for his barefooted soldiers.

Millions of words have been written and spoken both to dramatize and justify events that took place there during the three-day struggle. In a revised version of his highly readable, well researched, and explicitly detailed book, Glenn Tucker has explained how the myth of invincibility of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was broken. Although Lee's losses at Gettysburg were almost irreplaceable, of greater importance to the outcome of the war was the shattering of the myth surrounding Lee and his men. The Northern Army of the Potomac learned that it was not always pre-ordained to lose.

Although psychological warfare was an unknown technique in our Civil War, Lee and Jackson were very adept at

it. Jackson's valley campaign of May, 1862, not only defeated three Union armies but also the mind of President Lincoln, prompting him to make the strategic decision to reinforce the Union forces in the valley instead of McClellan in front of Richmond. This was what Lee wanted him to do. The defeat of McClellan in the Peninsula campaign and Lee's great victories at Fredericksburg, December, 1863, and Chancellorsville, May, 1863, had convinced the Union Army of the Potomac prior to Gettysburg that it was fighting an almost unbeatable combination of general and soldiers.

In 1958, Field Marshall Montgomery, Viscount Alemien, better known as "Monty," spent a few days at Gettysburg with then President Eisenhower. While there he commented to the effect that Lee and Meade had fought like mediocre generals. North and South of the Mason-Dixon line, the howls of anger rose.

Montgomery spoke at the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia, three days later. After his address, his aide asked one of the Instructors there, "How can we keep the Field Marshal from being scalped by the United Daughters of the Confederacy? He has to speak at the Air University in Montgomery next week."

"Tell him to say that if Jackson had been there, the Confederates would have destroyed Meade by noon on July 2d," the Instructor replied.

Monty made a statement, in his own fashion, to this effect. It was quoted in the press prior to his arrival in Montgomery. Result: No scalping. Instead he got the key to the city.

Tucker makes it abundantly clear in his book that the greatest reason Lee lost at Gettysburg was simple. Jackson was dead. All the points that add up to this conclusion are made.

For example, Lee fought and won his battles by what can be called the "thumb and finger" technique. One force, "thumb," holds the enemy. The other, "finger," encircles him and both forces destroy him. At Chancellorsville, Lee was his own thumb and Jackson the finger.

Longstreet was the "thumb" in almost every other fight and Jackson the finger. At Gettysburg, Longstreet wanted to fight the entire battle as a thumb only. Lee had two new "fingers" — Ewell and A. P. Hill. Neither had learned yet to be a finger in the Jackson manner. Result: Lost battle for Lee.

Lee, by his own words, had become psychologically mesmerized by past victories. He, too, was a victim of psychological warfare. After the failure of Pickett's charge on July third, he remarked, "It's all my fault, I thought my soldiers were invincible."

Although the myth of Lee's invincibility had been shattered at Gettysburg, like all myths it died hard. When Grant took over as General-in-Chief and went to Virginia to conduct operations in the spring of 1864, Meade's veterans were not impressed by either his reputation or his appearance. They simply expressed a view of skepticism in the words, "He ain't fit Bobbie Lee yet."

Tucker's book is excellent reading for Civil War buffs and professional historians as well as for the average reader who is interested in getting a good look at one important aspect of Americana.

Maj. Gen. George B. Pickett, Jr., USA-ret.
Montgomery

J. Leonard Raulston and James W. Livingood, *Sequatchie, A Story of the Southern Cumberlands*. (University of Tennessee Press, 1974, Pp. 278, \$9.75.)

J. Leonard Raulston, historian of Marion County, Tennessee, and James W. Livingood, Distinguished University Research Professor of History at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, have collaborated to produce one of the finest of local histories. The book is notable for its format as well as for its content. The maps, sketches, and photographs are outstanding. The layout of the book is superb.

It is perhaps an oversimplification to say that all history is local history of some area. However, the broad general application of a local history is certainly exhibited in this chronicle of the seventy-mile-long valley of the Sequatchie River which extends from northern Alabama into eastern Tennessee. Here in a picturesque region in the heart of the Cumberlands, the drama of American history takes place. On this relatively small stage a panorama of our heritage unfolds.

The drama begins with Archaic Indians who left charred embers in Russell Cave 9000 years ago. Later, De Soto rested in the valley. The explorers and traders came—Joliet and Marquette, the canny Scots, Acadians, Spanish, English, French.

Finally the pioneer settlers found the beautiful valley and their long struggle with the Indians brings upon the scene Daniel Boone and those intrepid Indian brothers, Dragging Canoe, Little Owl, and Badger. John Ross and Sequoyah play their parts.

Pioneer life is accurately depicted with coverage given to the gamut of history—churches, schools, agriculture, industry, transportation, medicine, and social life. This is no dull recital of founding dates and locations, but rather an intimate and exciting narrative of the reality of life.

Even an isolated valley feels the impact of national and international events, and the authors recount the effects of major national conflicts upon the lives of the folk of the Sequatchie. The Civil War actually penetrated the fastness of the area and here the military ebb and flow left its scars upon the people. The tragic war had an added horror to these folk who lived in a border area where loyalties were divided.

The struggle between the Union and the Confederacy to control the valley has been characterized as a "military drama without parallel in the nation's history." The fight for supplies was so fierce that one report said "mules were living on wagon tongues and fence rails." In a futile effort to keep warm, the soldiers "burned up enough rails to fence a county."

The divided loyalties of the people made the aftermath of the Civil War even more painful. Finally the pioneer spirit

prevailed and the drama moves on to TVA, broad highways, improved schools, mining, newspapers, and prosperity. The authors sum up the story in their final sentence. "The hills, valleys and coves have changed but little . . .; only the human drama and the ideas born in the minds of men have altered as life has moved on to meet the challenges of the future."

Margaret Pace Farmer
Troy, Alabama

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